



Logius  
*Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en  
Koninkrijksrelaties*

Programme of Requirements part 2:  
Admittance to and Supervision within the PKI  
for the government.

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The Policy Authority (PA) of the PKI for the government (PKIoverheid) supports the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in maintaining the PKI for the government.

The PKI for the government is an agreements system. This system enables generic and large-scale use of the electronic signature, and it also facilitates remote identification and confidential communication.

The tasks of the PA of PKIoverheid are:

- contributing towards the development and the maintenance of the framework of standards that underlies the PKI for the government, the Programme of Requirements (PoR);
- supervising and preparing for the process of admission by Certification Service Providers (CSPs) to the PKI for the government;
- overseeing and monitoring the activities of CSPs that issue certificates under the root of the PKI for the government.

The purpose of the Policy Authority is:

Enforcement of a practicable and trustworthy framework of standards for PKI services that provides an established level of security for the government's communication needs and is transparent to users.

*Revision control*

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

This is part 2 of the Programme of Requirements (PoR) for the PKI for the government. Set out in the PoR are the standards for the PKI for the government. This part concerns the Certification Service Provider (CSP) joining the PKI for the government and the PA's supervision of CSPs that have joined the PKI for the government.

For a detailed explanation regarding the background and structure of the PKI for the government please refer to part 1 of the Programme of Requirements. This also covers the cohesion between the various parts of the Programme of Requirements.

## 1.2 The aim of this document

Within the PKI for the government, certificates are issued by CSPs to end users. To be able to issue PKIoverheid certificates, a CSP has to be incorporated into the hierarchy of the PKI for the government. More specifically, this means that the public key of a CSP has to be signed by a Domain CA of the PKI for the government.

To safeguard the trustworthiness of the PKI for the government, CSPs within the PKI for the government have to be reliable organizations that fulfil high requirements in respect of their operational procedures, technical devices, security of information, expertise and reliability of staff and the provision of information to their audience. The specific requirements which a CSP has to fulfil in order to be able to issue certificates within the PKI for the government are listed in part 3 of the PoR.

CSPs that wish to join the PKI for the government have to demonstrate that they fulfil the requirements laid down in part 3. To specify how a CSP has to demonstrate compliance with the requirements that have been laid down and how the admittance process works, this document describes in detail the admittance process and the associated formalities.

To safeguard the trustworthiness of the PKI for the government in an enduring manner, the CSPs have to continue to fulfil the requirements stipulated in part 3 after their admittance to the PKI for the government. To ascertain this, the Policy Authority PKIoverheid (PA) supervises the CSPs that have joined. Therefore, this document also provides an insight into how the PA regulates and which formalities the CSP has to meet to regularly demonstrate compliance with the stipulated requirements.

When compiling this document, where possible use is made of generally accepted standards and certification schemes.

## 1.3 Status

This is version 4.3 of part 2 of the Programme of Requirements. The current version has been updated up to 1 July 2016 inclusive.

## 1.4 The structure of this document

Chapter 2 provides a description of the admittance process to the PKI for the government. Successively this chapter deals with the applicable

requirements, certification and the approved audit declaration, and the admittance process.

Chapter 3 details the supervision of CSPs within the PKI for the government. It outlines which documents have to be submitted periodically and the applicable schedule.

## **1.5 Standards and legislation**

The standards and legislation referenced in this document [no.], are included in part 1 under paragraph 1.5 of the PoR.



## 2 Joining the PKI for the government

### 2.1 Requirements relating to CSP services

Part 3 of the PoR lists the requirements which the CSP services have to fulfil when a CSP wishes to join the PKI for the government. Part 3 is also the so-called Certificate Policy (CP) that applies to the certificates issued by the CSP. In part 3, a distinction is made between the following categories of requirements:

- *CSP services*

This category of requirements is the main part of part 3. The requirements are made up of:

  1. the requirements that are laid down in the Electronic Signature Act [1] and Decree [2] and the corresponding regulations [3 and 4];
  2. ETSI EN 319 411-2 [5] (specifically for the qualified certificates);
  3. ETSI EN 319 411-1 [6] (specifically for non-qualified, server, website and EV SSL certificates);
  4. Additional PKIoverheid requirements (hereinafter: PKIo requirements).
- *Certificate profiles and certificate status information*

The requirements in this category relate to the content of the certificates to be issued and the format in which the certificate status information (for example a Certification Revocation List or the Online Certificate Status Protocol) are presented. The requirements are divided into legal requirements, requirements under ETSI and additional PKIoverheid requirements. This category of requirements is included in part 3 as an appendix to the CP and as such forms part of the CP.

In PoR part 3, the applicable requirements are examined in detail. In this part, among other things, a list is presented which shows how the legal requirements, requirements under the ETSI and the PKIo, Sv, EV and AA requirements relate to one another.

## **2.2 Demonstrate compliance with CSP service requirements**

### *2.2.1 General*

In order to establish whether the services of the CSP meet the stipulated requirements, the Policy Authority PKIoverheid requires that:

1.
  - a. the CSP is certified against ETSI EN 319 411-2 in accordance with the ETSI EN 319 403 scheme. This demonstrates that the CSP satisfies ETSI EN 319 411-2. In addition, the report has to state that the CSP fulfils the additional requirements under the Electronic Signatures decree.
  - b. If the CSP wishes to issue non-qualified, server and/or website certificates within PKIoverheid, it has to be certified against ETSI EN 319 411-1, in accordance with the ETSI EN 319 403 scheme. See the appropriate PoR part for the application of specific policy identifiers.
2. by means of an unqualified audit opinion, the CSP demonstrates that it fulfils the PKIo requirements. An unqualified audit opinion is required, as certification schemes do not exist for testing against the PKIo requirements;
3. only in the case of PKIoverheid EV SSL certificates, contrary to the provisions under 2.2.1-1b, the CSP may undergo a WebTrust for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation audit.
4. the CSP is registered with the ACM.

The costs associated with the certification process, the unqualified audit opinion and the ACM registration will be borne in full by the joining CSP. The following paragraphs describe in detail the specific requirements and circumstances that apply to obtaining the ETSI EN 319 403 certificate and the unqualified audit opinion. For more information regarding the registration with the OPTA, please refer to [www.acm.nl](http://www.acm.nl).

### *2.2.2 ETSI EN 319 403 certification*

#### *Why ETSI EN 319 403 certification?*

In order to join the PKI for the government, a CSP is certified under the ETSI EN 319 403 scheme [7]. This scheme is applicable in the Netherlands when becoming certified under ETSI EN 319 411-2. The Electronic Signatures Act states that a CSP does not have to be certified to be able to issue qualified certificates to the public in the Netherlands. However, within the PKI for the government the ETSI EN 319 403 certification has been made compulsory for affiliated CSPs because this will provide even more of a guarantee regarding the trustworthiness of the CSP services.

#### *What is the ETSI EN 319 403 scheme?*

The ETSI EN 319 403 scheme is based on the standard ETSI EN 319 411-2 and ETSI EN 319 411-1 and is intended for compliance certification of CSPs that issue qualified certificates and other public key certificates to the public. The scheme provides and describes the process requirements for:

- the implementation by the Certification Body (CB) of an initial certification audit of the CSP;
- issuing a compliance certificate to the CSP when the requirements of the standard have been fulfilled; the certificate is valid for three years;
- performing an annual verification audit ;
- after two years, performing a reassessment of the CSP; the reassessment carries equal weight to the initial certification audit.
- Due to the additional demands by browser parties the above requirements have been increased by PKIoverheid. An acceded CSP must undergo a full audit annually.

The ETSI EN 319 403 scheme also provides sub-certification. In sub-certification, an organization is certified against a predetermined sub-set of ETSI requirements. This applies when the CSP has, for example, contracted out the certificate generation service. However, the CSP remains ultimately responsible for all aspects of the services. Within the PKI for the government, a CSP is allowed to contract out a part of the services to a different organization. However, the CSP has to provide proof of conformity concerning the services as a whole, including the services that have been contracted out. For further information regarding sub-certification, reference is made to the ETSI EN 319 403 scheme.

#### *Who can certify?*

Compliance certification under ETSI EN 319 403 is based on the assessment of the CSP by a CB against the applicable standard, ETSI EN 319 411-2 and ETSI EN 319 411-1. A CB is an organization that has entered into an agreement with ECP-EPN. To this end, the CB has to be accredited by the Accreditation Council. The following paragraph examines in more detail the accreditation of a CB.

#### *Accreditation of a Certification Body*

The ETSI EN 319 403 scheme for certification of CSPs lays down the requirement that Certification Bodies have to have been accredited by the Accreditation Council (RvA) to test compliance with standard ISO 17065 [8]. This is the compulsory standard under ISO when certifying products and services. The term of validity of an accreditation is four years. To determine whether, during the period of 4 years, the CB fulfils the standard ISO 17065, the Accreditation Council performs annual audits of the CB. After four years, the CB has to be reaccredited.

It is expected that accredited Certification Bodies perform certification in a trustworthy and professional manner. To guarantee this, requirements are laid down in the ETSI EN 319 403 scheme which the CB and specifically the audit team and the team members have to fulfil. As a CSP within the PKI for the government has to be certified against ETSI EN 319 403, a CB therefore has to fulfil the quality requirements laid down in the ETSI EN 319 403 scheme. Within the PKI for the government, no additional quality requirements are laid down for Certification Bodies.

#### *Appointment of Certification Body by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation*

In addition to the accreditation of a CB by the Accreditation Council, a CB can also be appointed by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (EL&I). In the "beleidsregel aanwijzing certificatieorganisaties elektronische handtekening (policy rule regarding the appointment of

certification organizations for electronic signatures)" dated 6 May 2003 (WJZ/03/02264), the requirements have been laid down for appointment of a CB by the Minister of EL&I. When an accredited CB is appointed by the Minister of EL&I, the registration with ACM is simplified. The Electronic Signatures Act states that in this case it is sufficient for the CSP to submit the ETSI EN 319 403 certificate. In all other cases, the CSP has to submit a completed questionnaire and documents which show that the legal requirements have been fulfilled.

**2.2.3** *Unqualified audit opinion for PKIo requirements - PKI for the government*  
 As outlined in paragraph 2.2.1, the CSP has to have an unqualified audit opinion to demonstrate that the PKIo requirements are fulfilled. As there is no certification scheme for the PKIo requirements, a CB can logically not be accredited by the Accreditation Council to test and certify against the PKIo requirements. To be able to issue an unqualified audit opinion concerning the PKIo requirements, a CB must, however, fulfil the same quality requirements as those stipulated for ETSI EN 319 403 certification. The depth and the method of execution of the audit for this unqualified audit opinion have to be comparable to those of the certification investigation for the ETSI EN 319 403 certification. In part 3 of the PoR, the PKIo requirements can be recognized by the marking [PKIo]. A CSP that issues certificates under a specific domain must comply with the PKIoverheid requirements of the domain in question.

**2.2.4** *Expansion of the CSP services to issue services certificates and/or autonomous device certificates and/or EV SSL certificates*

*Deviating requirements*

For the issuance of services certificates and/or autonomous device certificates and/or EV SSL certificates, other requirements apply than for the issuance of personal PKIoverheid certificates. The specific requirements laid down for the CSP wishing to issue services certificates are defined in the 'Services' Certificate Policy, which is incorporated in part 3b of the PoR. The specific requirements laid down for the CSP wishing to issue autonomous certificates are defined in the 'Autonomous Devices' Certificate Policy, which is incorporated in part 3d of the PoR. The specific requirements laid down for the CSP wishing to issue EV SSL certificates are defined in the 'Extended Validation' Certificate Policy, which is incorporated in part 3e of the PoR.

**2.3 Admittance process**

The entire admittance process consists of three phases:

- *Phase 1: Preparation*  
 In this phase, the CSP prepares to join the PKI for the government. The CSP organizes its services in accordance with the requirements laid down by the PKI for the government. Furthermore, coordination will take place between the CSP and the PA during this phase.
- *Phase 2: Request for admittance and decision-making*  
 This phase ends with a decision made by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
- *Phase 3: Implementation of admittance*  
 During this phase, the technical and organizational measures are taken by means of which the admittance will be implemented.

In the following paragraphs, the relevant points of attention are discussed per phase.

### 2.3.1 *Phase 1: Preparation*

When the CSP intends to join the PKI for the government, it is recommended that the PA is contacted. It can then be decided to introduce frequent consultations during which coordination takes place between the CSP and the PA. In addition, specific contact persons will be appointed at the CSP and the PA, to ensure that the lines of communication are transparent and clear. The PA is available during the preparatory phase for any questions relating to the requirements laid down in the PoR and the course of the admittance.

During the preparatory phase, the CSP also has to become familiar with either the agreement or the contract that will be entered into with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The agreement or the contract will be signed by the CSP, before the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will make a decision regarding admittance. The standard agreement and/or the standard contract can be requested from the PA.

The aforementioned difference between the ETSI requirements on the one hand and the legal requirements and PKIo requirements on the other hand entails that a CSP can simultaneously follow the certification process for ETSI EN 319 411-2, for ETSI EN 319 411-1 if applicable, and the assessment process for the other applicable requirements within the PKI for the government. Within the same investigation the CB can determine the compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-2, ETSI EN 319 411-1 if applicable, and the legal requirements and the PKIo requirements of the PKI for the government. This can be beneficial to the CSP both in terms of time and money.

The lead time of the first phase very much depends on the situation with the CSP and therefore no estimate can be given.

### 2.3.2 *Phase 2 : Request for admittance and decision-making by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations*

The "Aanvraagformulier toetreding PKI voor de overhead (Application form to join the PKI for the government)" (PKI00112) has to be used to request admittance. This form can be found at <https://www.logius.nl/ondersteuning/pkioverheid/aansluiten-als-csp/> under "Modelcontracten en -formulieren (Model contracts and forms)" and it can also be obtained from the PA. The CSP that wishes to join the PKI for the government has to complete the form and return this to the PA along with supporting documentation. (The address of the PA is given on the application form).

#### *Documentation required with an admittance request*

The diagram below shows which documentation has to be provided.

It also outlines which additional documents have to be provided if the joining CSP also wishes to issue services certificates and/or autonomous devices and/or EV SSL certificates.

Document	Explanation
Proof of registration with the OPTA.	<p>This demonstrates that the CSP is entitled to issue qualified certificates to the public and that the CSP fulfils the Electronic Signature Act (WEH).</p> <p>If the CSP has a branch in the Netherlands, the CSP has to be registered with the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) or alternatively, if the CSP does not have a branch in the Netherlands, with a different national entity appointed by a member state of the EC, that fulfils a similar function to the ACM. (This text is consistent with [WEH II under B, no.3])</p>
ETSI EN 319 403 certificate (including full report of the certification) <sup>1</sup> .	<p>This serves as proof of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-2. The PA wishes to receive the report in order to gain insight into any potential non-conformities. The report and/or ETSI EN 319 403 certificate have to state against which version of the requirements document an assessment has been made.</p>
Unqualified audit opinion for the PKIo requirements of the PKI for the government (including full report) <sup>2</sup> .	<p>This opinion demonstrates that the CSP fulfils the PKIo requirements. The PA wishes to receive the report in order to gain insight into any potential non-compliances. The report has to state against which version of the requirement documents the assessment was made and which published amendments to the PoR applicable at that time have been included.</p>
Certificate profile for end users.	<p>This is the blueprint for the certificates to be issued by the CSP. As in the event of non-compliance any issued certificate has to be revoked, it is advisable that the PA vets this certificate profile beforehand.</p>
Fully completed application form, with the request to join the PKI for the government.	<p>Further details regarding the request are to be included on the form.</p>
Completed OID application form.	<p>Each CSP and CA within the PKI for the government will receive their own OID. Based on the completed application form, the PA requests an OID for the CSP and CA.</p>
Proof that the CSP is authorized to represent an organizational entity.	<p>The PA is responsible for identifying, with certainty, the (representatives of the) CSP.</p>
The signed agreement or contract with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in duplicate.	<p>The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is owner of the PKI for the government and therefore a formal agreement or contract has to be entered into with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations for admittance to the PKI for the government.</p>

<sup>1</sup> The ETSI EN 319 403 certificate has to be issued by an accredited Certification Body.

<sup>2</sup> For the aforementioned approved declarations, the CB does not have to be accredited but has to fulfil the stipulated quality requirements (see paragraph 2.2.2).

Additional for non-qualified certificates including services certificates and Autonomous devices certificates.

ETSI EN 319 403 certificate (including full report of the certification) <sup>3</sup> .	This serves as proof of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-1. The PA wishes to receive the report in order to gain insight into any potential non-conformities. The report and/or ETSI EN 319 403 certificate have to state against which version of the requirements document an assessment has been made.
Unqualified audit opinion for the PKIo requirements of the PKI for the government (including full report) <sup>4</sup> .	This opinion demonstrates that the CSP fulfils the PKIo requirements. The PA wishes to receive the report in order to gain insight into any potential non-compliances. The report has to state against which version of the requirement documents the assessment was made and which published amendments to the PoR applicable at that time have been included.
Certificate profile for non-qualified certificates.	See certificate profile for end users.

Additional for server, website and EV SSL certificates.

Document	Explanation
ETSI EN 319 403 certificate (including full report of the certification) <sup>5</sup> .	This serves as proof of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-1. The PA wishes to receive the report in order to gain insight into any potential non-compliances. The report and/or ETSI EN 319 403 certificate have to state against which version of the requirements document an assessment will be made.
Instead of a ETSI EN 319 403 certificate, a declaration from a qualified auditor that there is compliance with the WebTrust for CA Extended Validation criteria.	This serves as proof of compliance with the WebTrust for CA Extended Validation criteria. The PA wishes to receive the report in order to gain insight into any potential non-compliances. The report has to state against which version of the document outlining the requirements the assessment was made.
Unqualified audit opinion that the PKIo requirements of the PKI for the government have been fulfilled (including full report).	This opinion demonstrates that the CSP fulfils the PKIo requirements of CP part 3f EV. The PA wishes to receive the report in order to gain insight into any potential non-compliances. The report has to state against which version of the requirement documents the assessment was made and which published amendments to the PoR applicable

<sup>3</sup> The ETSI EN 319 403 certificate has to be issued by an accredited Certification Body.

<sup>4</sup> For the aforementioned approved declarations, the CB does not have to be accredited but has to fulfil the stipulated quality requirements (see paragraph 2.2.2).

<sup>5</sup> The ETSI EN 319 403 certificate has to be issued by an accredited Certification Body.

	at that time have been included.
Certificate profile for EV SSL certificates	See certificate profile for end users.

*Decision-making*

After receipt of all required documentation, the PA assesses to what extent the request and the documentation that has been provided contain sufficient and adequate information to take the admittance request under consideration. If the admittance request is incomplete or unclear, the PA will make time for consultation with the CSP. The documentation will be returned to the CSP with the request to modify or to expand on the set of documentation.

If the request is complete and correct, the PA will advise the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will then decide whether or not to honour this request for admittance. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will inform the CSP about the Minister's decision. In the event that a positive decision is taken, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will instruct KPN Corporate Market B.V (hereinafter KPN), the technical administrator of the PKI for the government root, to include the CSP in the hierarchy of the PKI for the government.

The completion time of Phase 2 amounts to a few days, unless there is a reason for the PA to consult the CSP. This situation is only foreseen if the request for admittance is incomplete or unclear.

2.3.3


*Phase 3: Implementation*

When joining the PKI for the government, the CSP has to have its public key<sup>6</sup> signed by the relevant domain key of the PKI for the government. The signed CSP certificate can only be used to issue certificates and to publish CRLs, in accordance with the Programme of Requirements of the PKI for the government, and to sign the certificates of any sub-CAs. To arrive at a CSP certificate that has been signed by the PKI for the government, a number of process steps have to be followed. These steps are shown as a diagram in the following figure, the steps are then explained.

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<sup>6</sup>"Key", "CSP certificate" and "naming document" can also be read as "keys", "CSP certificates" and "naming documents", depending on the design of the CA structure chosen by the CSP





*Preparation for the creation of CSP certificate*

During this phase, the CSP is appointed a contact person at the PA. This contact person provides the CSP with the information required for implementation. During the coordination phase, the following sub-steps are followed:

1. *Discuss the technical and organizational preconditions*  
This includes the project planning of the technical certification process, the appointment of anyone who needs to be present and the organization of the ceremony.
2. *Enter into the contract between the CSP and KPN*  
For the acceptance test that is to be performed, the CSP and KPN have to enter into a contract. To this end, the PA provides (amongst other things) the names of the contact persons at KPN and other details (such as a draft date for the key ceremony).
3. *Provision of an OID number*  
The OID number requested by the CSP is sent by the PA to the CSP.

At this time in the procedure, all data, with the exception of the validity data, are included in the naming document. The naming document has to be used for the actual production of the CSP certificate<sup>7</sup>.

*Performance of acceptance test for the creation of CSP certificate*

The acceptance test is performed as part of this step. This stage comprises the following sub-steps:

1. *Performance of the acceptance test*  
During the acceptance test, the signing script and key ceremony are

<sup>7</sup> Deviations from the naming document can be a hindrance, particularly when fields marked as 'critical' differ from the required certificate profile.

performed in full as a dry-run (test) for the production phase. The acceptance test is performed jointly by the CSP and KPN, without the involvement of the PA. At the end of the acceptance test, the CSP and KPN perform a technical verification of the test CSP certificate that has been produced.

2. *Verification by PA*

After performance of the acceptance test, KPN sends the test CSP certificate to the PA. The PA then verifies whether the content in the various fields is correct. A final date is then established for the production.

*Delivery of CSP's certificate request to PA*

This stage comprises the following sub-steps:

1. *Send request to PA*

The CSP generates a certificate request (a PKCS#10 file) and securely submits the request, including a print of it, to the PA.

2. *Verification by PA*

The PA checks the certificate request, to ensure a greater level of guarantee that no problems will arise during production. In addition, KPN has to send the fully completed naming document for verification to the PA. When the verification of the certificate request and of the naming document is positive, the CSP certificate can be produced and the CSP and KPN are informed of this. The PA then securely submits the certificate request to KPN.

*Production of CSP certificate by technical administrator*

This stage comprises the following sub-steps:

1. *Submission of the certificate request to KPN*

The PA securely submits the certificate request to KPN.

2. *Generation of the CSP certificate*

The CSP's public key is physically signed by the signing key (of the relevant domain) of the PKI for the government. The PA is present during this process to establish the accuracy of the process. The CSP is not present when the CSP certificate is generated. The output of this step is a CSP certificate signed by the relevant Domain CA.

*Delivery of CSP certificate to CSP*

This stage comprises the following sub-steps:

1. *Verification by PA*

The PA receives the CSP certificate from KPN and checks the CSP certificate. If the check is positive, the PA sends a letter to KPN which states the positive result.

2. *Handover to CSP*

The PA hands the CSP certificate over to the CSP. The CSP then checks the CSP certificate and signs a confirmation of receipt, in which the content of the CSP certificate is approved. The handover takes place directly after the generation at KPN in Apeldoorn. From that moment onwards, the CSP is responsible for the transport to the location of the CSP certificate and the further processing of the CSP

certificate signed by the Domain CA. The transport of the PKCS#7 file to the location of the CSP has to take place in a way that is comparable to submitting the PKCS#10 file, to ensure a comparable degree of trustworthiness.

*Publication of the CSP certificate on the website of PKIoverheid*

After submission of the CSP certificate, the PA will publish the CSP certificate on its website [www.logius.nl/pkioverheid](http://www.logius.nl/pkioverheid).

*Lead time*

The estimated lead time of this implementation of admittance phase is two months. If the CSP lays down specific requirements (detailed key ceremonies, presence / use of several parties) or should unforeseen technical complications arise, the completion time can increase.

*Costs*

The costs for completing this phase will be borne in full by the joining CSP and amount to € 7,000.00. This amount is stipulated in the agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations with KPN as technical administrator of the root.

## 3 Supervision

### 3.1 Introduction

To permanently safeguard the security of the PKI for the government, the CSPs will have to continue to fulfil the requirements stipulated in part 3 after joining the PKI for the government. To determine this, the Policy Authority PKIoverheid (PA) supervises the CSPs that have joined. This chapter outlines which documents have to be regularly submitted and the applicable schedule.

### 3.2 Documents to be submitted regularly

In chapter "Admittance to the PKI for the government" paragraph 2.2.2 states that a ETSI EN 319 403 certification is valid for two years and that repeat audits have to be performed annually. Due to the additional demands by browser parties the above requirements have been increased by PKIoverheid and a full audit must be performed annually. This system has been adopted by the PKI for the government in relation to the unqualified audit opinions that have to be submitted.

#### 3.2.1 *To be submitted annually*

The CSP has to submit the following documents annually<sup>8</sup>:

- Proof of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-2 or ETSI EN 319 403 certification;
- If applicable, proof of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-1 or ETSI EN 319 403 certification;
- Instead of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-1 or ETSI EN 319 403 certification: an unqualified audit opinion concerning WebTrust for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation. Only if a CSP issues PKIoverheid EV SSL certificates;
- Unqualified audit opinion for the PKIo requirements of the PKI for the government;
- Unqualified audit opinion that fulfils the requirements based on ETSI EN 319 411-1 of the CP Services and/or Autonomous Devices and/or EV SSL<sup>9</sup>.

The complete final audit report with detailed findings has to be submitted to the PA PKIoverheid as soon as it has been supplied by the auditor. The Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has to be submitted to the PA as soon as it has been approved by the auditor. Where possible, the PA will also receive the sub-certification of sub-contractors. If a follow-up audit is found to be necessary, the PA PKIoverheid wishes to receive the results of this audit.

As soon as the CSP has received the unqualified audit opinion(s) from the CB, the CSP has to immediately send these opinions by post or by e-mail to the Policy Authority PKIoverheid. The opinions and the proof of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-2, and ETSI EN 319 411-1 if applicable, must also state against which version of the requirements the documents have been assessed and which published amendments have been included in the PoR applicable at that time.

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<sup>8</sup> The period commences at the time that the agreement with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, but not the agreement for provisional admittance, has been signed by both parties.

<sup>9</sup> Of course this declaration only has to be supplied when the CSP has been admitted to issue services certificates or autonomous device certificates and/or EV SSL certificates.

The aforementioned documents have to be provided by a CB; the same quality criteria apply that were applicable at the time of admittance to the PKI for the government.

**3.2.2** *Publication ETSI-ETSI EN 319 403 certificate*

The CSP must publish the three year ETSI EN 319 403 certificate on its website.

**3.3** **Planning**

Due to the fact that the opinions (including WebTrust Certification Authorities – Extended Validation) and the proof of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-2, and ETSI EN 319 411-1 if applicable, have to be submitted annually, these documents logically have a term of validity of one year. The new documents therefore have to be submitted by the CSP to the PA no later than one year after the previous opinion of the CB and the proof of compliance with ETSI EN 319 411-2, and ETSI EN 319 411-1 if applicable. The CSP is responsible for the timely delivery of the opinions and the proof of compliance with ETSI TS 101 456 and, ETSI EN 319 411-1 if applicable.

**3.4** **Amendments to certification and OPTA registration**

Because it is possible that the ETSI EN 319 403 certificate is revoked or suspended or the ACM registration is terminated, the CSP is obliged to immediately inform the PA if one of the following situations occurs:

- The ETSI EN 319 403 certificate is revoked or suspended by the CB;
- The ETSI EN 319 403 sub-certificate of the organization to which the CSP has contracted out activities is revoked or suspended by the CB;
- There is a negative WebTrust for Certification Authorities – Extended Validation opinion;
- The registration of the CSP is revoked by the ACM.

**3.5** **Enforcement of agreements**

Government organizations that operate as a CSP within the PKI for the government have entered into an agreement with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The other CSPs within the PKI for the government have entered into a contract with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The agreement and the contract outline how the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the CSP have to act within the PKI for the government. It discussed the continued fulfilment of the stipulated requirements and the options the PA has of enforcing the arrangements. This concerns, amongst other things, the option to have an audit performed of the CSP and the dissolution of the agreement or the contract.

The agreements and contracts have a term of validity of six years. Before the term of validity expires, the PA will contact the CSP to discuss potential renewal of the agreement or the contract.



## 4 Revisions

### 4.1 Amendments between version 4.2 and 4.3

#### 4.1.1 Amendments

- TTP.NL schema replaced by European scheme ETSI EN 319 403 (per 1-7-2016)
- Changed the normative reference from ETSI TS 102 042 to ETSI EN 319 411-1 (per 1-7-2016)

### 4.2 Amendments between version 4.1 and 4.2

No changes.

### 4.3 Amendments between version 4.0 and 4.1

#### 4.3.1 Amendments

- Changed the normative reference from ETSI EN 319 411-3 to ETSI TS 102 042

### 4.4 Amendments between version 3.7 and 4.0

#### 4.4.1 Editorial

- References to ETSI EN 319-411-3.

### 4.5 Amendments between version 3.6 and 3.7

No changes.

### 4.6 Amendments between version 3.5 and 3.6

#### 4.6.1 Amendments

- Certification against ETSI EN 319 411-2 (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 3.6);

#### 4.6.2 Editorial

- References to PKIo-OO, PKIo-Bu, PKIo-Sv etc.

### 4.7 Amendments between version 3.4 and 3.5

#### 4.7.1 Amendments

- Paragraph 2.2.1 (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 3.5 );
- Paragraph 3.2.1 (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 3.5 );

### 4.8 Amendments between version 3.3 and 3.4

No changes.

### 4.9 Amendments between version 3.2 and 3.3

No changes.

#### **4.10 Amendments between version 3.1 and 3.2**

##### *4.10.1 New*

No changes.

##### *4.10.2 Amendments*

- Paragraph 1.4;
- Paragraph 2.2.1;
- Paragraph 2.3;
- Paragraph 2.4;
- Paragraph 3.2.1;
- Paragraph 3.2.2;
- Paragraph 3.3;
- Paragraph 3.4.

##### *4.10.3 Editorial*

A number of editorial changes have been made but these do not affect the content of the information.

#### **4.11 Amendments between version 3.0 and 3.1**

##### *4.11.1 New*

- Paragraph 3.2.3.

##### *4.11.2 Amendments*

- Paragraph 3.2.1.

##### *4.11.3 Editorial*

A number of editorial changes have been made but these do not affect the content of the information.

#### **4.12 Amendments between version 2.1 and 3.0**

##### *4.12.1 New*

No changes.

##### *4.12.2 Amendments*

The following paragraphs have been modified in connection with the introduction of Extended Validation within the PKI for the government:

- Paragraph 2.1;
- Paragraph 2.2.1;
- Paragraph 2.2.3;
- Paragraph 2.2.4;
- Paragraph 2.4.2;
- Paragraph 3.2.1.

##### *4.12.3 Editorial*

Only a few editorial changes have been made but these do not affect the content of the information.



#### **4.13 Amendments between version 2.0 and 2.1**

##### *4.13.1 Editorial*

Only a few editorial changes have been made but these do not affect the content of the information.

#### **4.14 Amendments between version 1.2 and 2.0**

##### *4.14.1 New*

No changes.

##### *4.14.2 Amendments*

The following paragraphs have been modified in connection with the introduction of the Autonomous Devices Domain within the PKI for the government:

- Paragraph 2.1;
- Paragraph 2.2.1;
- Paragraph 2.2.4;
- Paragraph 3.2.1.

##### *4.14.3 Editorial*

Only a few editorial changes have been made but these do not affect the content of the information.

#### **4.15 Amendments between version 1.1 and 1.2**

##### *4.15.1 Editorial*

Only a few editorial changes have been made but these do not affect the content of the information.

#### **4.16 Amendments between version 1.0 and 1.1**

No changes.

#### **4.17 Version 1.0**

First version.