



Logius  
*Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en  
Koninkrijksrelaties*

## Programme of Requirements part 3c: Certificate Policy - Citizen Domain

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The Policy Authority (PA) of the PKI for the government supports the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in managing the PKI for the government.

The PKI for the government is an agreements system. This system enables generic and large-scale use of the electronic signature, and it also facilitates remote identification and confidential communication.

The tasks of the PA of PKIoverheid are:

- contributing towards the development and the maintenance of the framework of standards that underlies the PKI for the government, the Programme of Requirements (PoR);
- assisting in the process of admittance by Certification Service Providers (CSPs) to the PKI for the government and preparing the administration;
- supervising and monitoring the activities of CSPs that issue certificates under the root of the PKI for the government.

The purpose of the Policy Authority is:

Enforcement of a practicable and reliable framework of standards for PKI services that provides an established level of security for the government's communication needs that is transparent to users.

*Revision control*

<b>Version</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Description</b>
1.0	09-11-2005	Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations November 2005
1.1	25-01-2008	Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2008
1.2	13-01-2009	Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2009
2.0	09-10-2009	Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations October 2009
2.1	11-01-2010	Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2010
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# 1 Introduction to the Certificate Policy

## 1.1 Overview

This is part 3c of the Programme of Requirements (PoR) for the PKI for the government and is known as the Certificate Policy (CP). Set out in the PoR are the standards for the PKI for the government. This section relates to the requirements laid down for the services of a Certification Service Provider (CSP) within the PKI for the government. Within the PKI for the government, a distinction is made between various domains. This document only relates to the personal certificates issued by a CSP in the Citizen domain.

This chapter includes a brief explanation of the CP. A more detailed explanation regarding the background and structure of the PKI for the government, as well as the cohesion between the various parts within the PoR is included in part 1 of the PoR.

For a list of the definitions and abbreviations used in this section, please refer to part 4 of the PoR.

### 1.1.1 Design of the Certificate Policy

As stated in part 1 of the PoR, the requirements that form part of the CP consist of requirements <sup>1</sup>:

- that ensue from the Dutch legal framework in relation to the electronic signature;
- that ensue from the current version of the ETSI EN 319-411-2, QCP public + SSCD (ETSI CP OID 0.4.0.1456.1.1) for non-repudiation certificates;
- that ensue from the current version of the ETSI EN 319 411-1 standard where policy NCP+ is applicable to authenticity and confidentiality certificates;
- that are specifically drawn up by and for the PKIoverheid.

Incorporated in chapters 2 to 9 inclusive are references to the specific PKIoverheid requirements in the Additional Requirements. The table below shows the structure of the reference to the actual PKIoverheid requirement (PKIo requirement).

<b>RFC 3647</b>	Reference to the paragraph from the RFC 3647 structure to which the PKIo requirement relates. RFC 3647 is a PKIX framework of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and is the de facto standard for the structure of Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements <sup>2</sup> .
<b>Number</b>	Unique number of the PKIo requirement. In each paragraph, consecutive numbering is used for the PKIo requirements. In combination with the RFC 3647 paragraph number, this forms a unique label for the PKIo requirement.

This CP also includes a number of provisions that are not formulated as PKIo requirements. These provisions do not make any demands on the

<sup>1</sup>For an explanation regarding the positioning of the requirements applicable within the PKI for the government, please refer to part 1 of the PoR.

<sup>2</sup>Chapters 2 to 9 inclusive only include those paragraphs from RFC 3647 to which a PKIo requirement applies.

CSPs within the PKI for the government, but do apply as a policy to the PKI for the government. This concerns provisions from paragraphs 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8, 9.12.1, 9.12.2, 9.14 and 9.17.

The profiles used within PKIoverheid relating to the end user certificates are listed in appendix A. The certificate status information is listed in the basic requirements.

**1.1.2** *Status*

This is version 4.3 of part 3c of the PoR. The current version has been updated up to 1 July 2016 inclusive.

The PA has devoted the utmost attention and care to the data and information incorporated in this CP. Nevertheless, it is possible that there are inaccuracies and imperfections. The PA accepts no liability for damage resulting from these inaccuracies or imperfections, nor is any liability assumed for damage caused by the use or distribution of this CP, if this CP is used for purposes other than for the use of certificates described in paragraph 1.4 of this CP.

**1.2** **References to this CP**

Within the PKI for the government different structures or roots are used based on the SHA-256 algorithm (G2 and G3). Furthermore these structures are divided into different domains.

The G2 root is divided into an Organization, a Citizen and an Autonomous Devices domain.

Under the G3 root there are domains for Organization Person, Organization Services, Citizen, and Autonomous Devices.

Each CP is uniquely identified by an OID, in accordance with the following schedule.

OID	CP
2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.1	for the authenticity certificate, that contains the public key for identification and authentication
2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.2	for the signature certificate, that contains the public key for the qualified electronic signature
2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.3	for the confidentiality certificate that contains the public key for confidentiality

The OID is structured as follows: {joint-iso-itu-t (2). country (16). the Netherlands (528). Dutch organization (1). Dutch government (1003). PKI for the government (1). CP (2). citizen domain (3). authenticity (1)/non repudiation (2)/confidentiality (3). version number}.

If requirements only apply to one or two types of certificates, this is expressly specified by stating the Object Identifier (OID) referencing the applicable CP or CPs.



### 1.3 User Community

In the Government and Companies domain, the Organization domain and the Organization Person domain the distinction between subscriber and certificate holder is relevant because, in practice, the following situation is anticipated: the CSP has an agreement with the subscriber which stipulates that the CSP will issue certificates to the certificate holders to be appointed by the subscriber (for example, the subscriber's employees). In the Citizen domain, the subscriber and certificate holder are the same person. Where the subscriber is listed in the CP Citizen, this has to be interpreted as certificate holder. The citizen takes on the obligations of both the subscriber and the certificate holder.

Within the Citizen domain, the user community consists of certificate holders (the citizens that use the certificates) and relying parties who act with trust in certificates of the relevant certificate holders.

The parties within the user community are subscribers, certificate holders and relying parties.

- A subscriber is a natural person who enters into an agreement with a CSP for certification of the public keys. A subscriber is also a certificate holder.
- A certificate holder is an entity, characterized in a certificate as the holder of the private key that is linked to the public key provided in the certificate.
- A relying party is every natural or legal personality who is a recipient of a certificate and who acts with a reliance on that certificate.

### 1.4 Certificate Usage

The use of certificates issued under this CP relates to communication of certificate holders who act in a private capacity.

[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.1] Authenticity certificates, that are issued under this CP, can be used for reliable electronic identification and authentication of persons. This concerns both the mutual identification of people and identification between people and computerized devices.

Authenticity certificates that are issued under this CP cannot be used to identify people in cases where the law requires that the identity of persons may only be established using the document referred to in the Compulsory Identification Act (Wet op de identificatieplicht).

[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.2] Signature certificates, that are issued under this CP, can be used to verify electronic signatures, that have "the same legal consequences as a handwritten signature", as specified in article 15a, first and second paragraphs, in Title 1 of Book 3 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) under section 1A and are qualified certificates as referred to in article 1.1, paragraph ss of the Telecommunications Act (Telecomwet).

[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.3] Confidentiality certificates, issued under this CP, can be used to protect the confidentiality of data that is exchanged and/or stored in electronic form. This concerns both the mutual exchange between people and exchange between people and computerized devices.

**1.5 Contact information Policy Authority**

The PA is responsible for this CP. Questions relating to this CP can be put to the PA; the address can be found at: <http://www.logius.nl/pkioverheid>.

## 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

### 2.1 Electronic Repository

Contains no additional requirements.

### 2.2 Publication of CSP information

<b>RFC 3647</b>	2.2 Publication of CSP information
<b>Number</b>	2.2-pkio7

### 3 Identification and Authentication

#### 3.1 Naming

<b>RFC 3647</b>	3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of certificate holders
<b>Number</b>	3.1.3-pkio11

#### 3.2 Initial Identity Validation

<b>RFC 3647</b>	3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity
<b>Number</b>	3.2.3-pkio21

#### 3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

Contains no additional requirements.

## 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

### 4.1 Certificate Application

Contains no additional requirements.

### 4.4 Certificate Acceptance

Contains no additional requirements.

### 4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

Contains no additional requirements.

### 4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

<b>RFC 3647</b>	4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation
<b>Number</b>	4.9.1-pkio52

<b>RFC 3647</b>	4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
<b>Number</b>	4.9.3-pkio57

<b>RFC 3647</b>	4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency
<b>Number</b>	4.9.7-pkio65

<b>RFC 3647</b>	4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
<b>Number</b>	4.9.9-pkio66

<b>RFC 3647</b>	4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
<b>Number</b>	4.9.9-pkio67

<b>RFC 3647</b>	4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
<b>Number</b>	4.9.9-pkio68

<b>RFC 3647</b>	4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
<b>Number</b>	4.9.9-pkio70

<b>RFC 3647</b>	4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
<b>Number</b>	4.9.9-pkio71

#### **4.10 Certificate Status Service**

Contains no additional requirements.

## 5 Facility, Management and Operational Controls

### 5.2 Procedural Controls

Contains no additional requirements.

### 5.3 Personnel Controls

<b>RFC 3647</b>	5.3.2 Background checks procedure
<b>Number</b>	5.3.2-pkio79

### 5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

<b>RFC 3647</b>	5.4.1 Types of events recorded
<b>Number</b>	5.4.1-pkio80

### 5.5 Records Archival

Contains no additional requirements.

### 5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

<b>RFC 3647</b>	5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster.
<b>Number</b>	5.7.4-pkio861

## 6 Technical Security Controls

### 6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.1.1 Key pair generation for the CSP sub CA
<b>Number</b>	6.1.1-pki087

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders
<b>Number</b>	6.1.1-pki088

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders
<b>Number</b>	6.1.1-pki089

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.1.2 Private key and SSCD delivery to certificate holder
<b>Number</b>	6.1.2-pki094

### 6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key
<b>Number</b>	6.2.3-pki099

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key
<b>Number</b>	6.2.3-pki100

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key
<b>Number</b>	6.2.3-pki101

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating
<b>Number</b>	6.2.11-pki104



<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating
<b>Number</b>	6.2.11-pkio105

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating
<b>Number</b>	6.2.11-pkio106

### 6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.3.1 Public key archival
<b>Number</b>	6.3.1-pkio108

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
<b>Number</b>	6.3.2-pkio109

### 6.4 Activation data

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation
<b>Number</b>	6.4.1-pkio112

<b>RFC 3647</b>	6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation
<b>Number</b>	6.4.1-pkio113

### 6.5 Computer Security Controls

Contains no additional requirements.

### 6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

Contains no additional requirements.

**6.7 Network Security Controls**

Contains no additional requirements.

## 7 Certificate, CRL and OSCP profiles

### 7.1 Certificate Profile

<b>RFC 3647</b>	7.1 Certificate Profile
<b>Number</b>	7.1-pkio149

### 7.2 CRL Profile

Contains no additional requirements.

### 7.3 OCSP Profile

<b>RFC 3647</b>	7.3 OCSP profile
<b>Number</b>	7.3-pkio123

## 8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

All subjects relating to the conformity assessment of the CSPs within the PKI for the government are covered in PoR part 2: Admittance to and Supervision within the PKI for the government.

## 9 Other Business and Legal Matters

### 9.2 Financial Responsibility

<b>RFC 3647</b>	9.2.1 Insurance coverage
<b>Number</b>	9.2.1-pkio124

### 9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

Contains no additional requirements.

### 9.6 Representations and Warranties

<b>RFC 3647</b>	9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by CSPs
<b>Number</b>	9.6.1-pkio127

<b>RFC 3647</b>	9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by CSPs
<b>Number</b>	9.6.1-pkio129

<b>RFC 3647</b>	9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by CSPs
<b>Number</b>	9.6.1-pkio131

<b>RFC 3647</b>	9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by CSPs
<b>Number</b>	9.6.1-pkio132

### 9.8 Limitations of Liability

<b>RFC 3647</b>	9.8 Limitations of liability
<b>Number</b>	9.8-pkio133

### 9.12 Amendments

Contains no additional requirements.

**9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures**

Contains no additional requirements.

**9.14 Governing Law**

Contains no additional requirements.

**9.17 Other provisions**

<b>RFC 3647</b>	9.17 Miscellaneous provisions
<b>Number</b>	9.17-pki0139

If by judicial decision one or more provisions of this CP are declared to be invalid or not applicable, this does not affect the validity and applicability of all other provisions.

## Appendix A Certificate profiles

### Profile of the certificate for the Citizen domain

#### Criteria

When defining the fields and attributes within a certificate, the following codes are used:

- V : Compulsory; indicates that the attribute is compulsory and MUST be used in the certificate.
- O : Optional; indicates that the attribute is optional and MAY be used in the certificate.
- A : Advised against; indicates that the attribute is advised against and SHOULD NOT be used in the certificate.

It is not allowed to use fields that are not specified in the certificate profiles.

For the extensions, fields/attributes are used that, in accordance with international standards, are critical, are marked in the 'Critical' column with 'yes' to show that the relevant attribute MUST be checked using a process by means of which a certificate is evaluated. Other fields/attributes are shown with 'no'.

#### Naming convention Subject.commonName

The following requirements apply to the CommonName of the Subject field. The main principle is that the CSP is responsible for correct entry of the CommonName. For a correct implementation this entails that the CSP has to be able to check each part that is entered. This means the following for parts:

##### A. Notation:

The notation and spelling of the parts of the CommonName have to be in accordance with the GBA registration (GBA: municipal personal records database). This can be done by consulting the Compulsory Identification Act document provided with the identification.

##### B. Order:

The CSP is, in principle, free to choose the order between the categories <First name(s) and/or initials>, <Surname prefixes> and <Surname>. Of course, within such a category, the order has to be maintained (on account of rule A). The use of commas as punctuation between the categories is advised against due to possible technical conflicts when processing the certificate.

##### C. First names in the CommonName:

The CSP is free to use either first name(s) in full or initials in the CommonName. The style of first name(s) or initials may not conflict with the Compulsory Identification Act document that is used or the GBA registration (see rule A). If when full first names are used the CommonName contains more characters than the field can cope with technically, use will be made of the replacement of the full first names by initials, starting with the last full first name, until the CommonName that is used does fit.

##### D. Entry of the name of partner/spouse:

1. A certificate holder is not obliged to include the partner name in PKIO certificates. In that case <Surname> only consists of the <maiden name/boy's name from the Compulsory Identification Act document that is provided>.
2. If the certificate holder does wish for his/her partner's name to be included in a PKIO certificate, then the <Surname> consists of <Name partner/spouse>-<maiden name/boy's name from the Compulsory Identification Act document that is provided>.
3. With respect to the correctness of <Name partner/spouse> the certificate holder has to show evidence. It should be noted that, as far as the entry of the status ('spouse of') is concerned, a Compulsory Identification Act document does not have to run in synchronization with the GBA registration (and this does not have to run in synchronization with the current situation). The Compulsory Identification Act document will therefore not always be adequate as evidence.

If, when the name of the partner/spouse is entered, the names jointly contain more characters than the CommonName field can hold after application of rule C, only the maiden name/boy's name listed in the Compulsory Identification Act document is reverted to.



## Citizen certificates

### Basic attributes

Field / Attribute	Criteria	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
Version	V	MUST be set at 2 (X.509v3).	RFC5280	Integer	Describes the version of the certificate, the value 2 stands for X.509 version 3.
SerialNumber	V	A serial number that MUST uniquely identify the certificate within the publishing CA domain.	RFC5280	Integer	All end user certificates have to contain at least 8 bytes of unpredictable random data in the certificate's serial number (SerialNumber).
Signature	V	MUST be created on the algorithm, as stipulated by the PA.	RFC5280, ETSI TS 102176	OID	MUST be the same as the field signatureAlgorithm. For certificates under the G2 and G3 root certificate, only sha-256WithRSAEncryption is allowed.
Issuer	V	MUST contain a Distinguished Name (DN). The field has the following attributes:	PKIo, RFC3739, ETSI TS 102280		Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used. The attributes that are used MUST be the same as the corresponding attributes in the Subject field of the CSP certificate (for validation).
Issuer.countryName	V	MUST contain the country code of the country where the issuing organization of the certificate is located.	ETSI TS101862, X520, ISO 3166	Printable String	C = NL for CSPs located in the Netherlands.
Issuer.OrganizationName	V	Full name in accordance with the accepted document or basic registry	ETSI TS 102280	UTF8String	
Issuer. organizationalUnitName	O	Optional specification of an organizational entity. This field MUST NOT include a function indication or similar. It may include, if applicable, the types of certificates that are supported.	ETSI TS 102280: 5.2.4	UTF8String	Several instances of this attribute MAY be used.
Issuer.serialNumber	O	MUST be used in accordance with RFC 3739	RFC 3739	Printable String	

Field / Attribute	Criteria	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
		if required for unambiguous naming			
Issuer.commonName	V	MUST include the name of the CA in accordance with accepted document or basic registry, optionally including the Domain indication and/or the types of certificates that are supported	PKIo, RFC 3739	UTF8String	The commonName attribute MUST NOT be necessary in order to identify the issuing government body (no part of the Distinguished Name, requirement from RFC 3739)
Issuer.organizationalIdentifier	V	The organizationalIdentifier field contains an identification of the issuing CA.	EN 319 412-1	String	The syntax of the identification string is specified in paragraph 5.1.4 van ETSI EN 319 412-1 and contains: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 character legal person identity type reference;</li> <li>• 2 character ISO 3166 [2] country code;</li> <li>• hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D (ASCII), U+002D (UTF-8)); and</li> <li>• identifier (according to country and identity type reference).</li> </ul>
Validity	V	MUST define the period of validity of the certificate according to RFC 5280.	RFC 5280	UTCTime	MUST include the start and end date for validity of the certificate in accordance with the applicable policy laid down in the CPS.
subject	V	The attributes that are used to describe the subject (end user) MUST mention the subject in a unique manner. The field has the following attributes:	PKIo, RFC3739, ETSI TS 102 280		MUST contain a Distinguished Name (DN). Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used.
Subject.countryName	V	complete C with two-letter country code in accordance with ISO 3166-1. If an official alpha-2 code is missing, the CSP MAY use the user-assigned code XX.	RFC 3739, X520, ISO 3166, PKIo	PrintableString	The country code that is used in Subject.countryName MUST correspond with the subscriber's address in accordance with the accepted document or registry.
Subject.commonName	V	The commonName attribute MUST be entered in accordance with the Naming Convention Subject.commonName paragraph shown above.	RFC 3739, ETSI TS 102 280, PKIo	UTF8String	The contents of this field MUST correspond with the name given in the GBA. The Compulsory Identification Act document or other evidence (excerpt from the population register) can be used to demonstrate this. The use of commas as punctuation in the commonName is advised

Field / Attribute	Criteria	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
					against due to possible technical conflicts when processing the certificate.
Subject.Surname	A	A correct reproduction of the element of the name laid down in the CN. Based on the Compulsory Identification Act document.	RFC 3739	UTF8String	The use of this field is advised against. If this field is used, it MUST show the subject's surname including surname prefixes correctly. The surname MUST NOT be in conflict with the information in the commonname
Subject.givenName	A	A correct reproduction of the element of the name laid down in the CN. Based on the Compulsory Identification Act document.	RFC 3739	UTF8String	The use of this field is advised against. If this field is used, it MUST show the subject's first name(s) correctly. The givenName MUST NOT conflict with the information in the commonname; the givenName may contain full first name(s), whilst the commonName contains initials.
Subject.stateOrProvinceName	A	The use is advised against. If present, this field MUST contain the province of the certificate holder's branch in accordance with an accepted document or Basic registry.	PKIo, RFC 3739	UTF8String	Name of the province MUST correspond with the certificate holder's address in accordance with the GBA. The certificate holder will have to submit recent proof of his address.
Subject.localityName	A	The use is advised against. If present, this field MUST contain the location of the certificate holder in accordance with an accepted document or Basic registry.	PKIo, RFC 3739	UTF8String	Name of the domicile MUST correspond with the certificate holder's address in accordance with the GBA. The certificate holder will have to submit recent proof of his address.
Subject.postalAddress	A	The use is advised against. If present, this field MUST contain the certificate holder's postal address in accordance with an accepted document or Basic registry.	PKIo, RFC 3739	UTF8String	The address MUST correspond with the certificate holder's address in accordance with the GBA. The certificate holder will have to submit recent proof of his address.
Subject.serialNumber	V	Number to be determined by the CSP. The combination of CommonName and SerialNumber MUST be unique within the context of the CSP.	RFC 3739, X 520, PKIo	Printable String	The serial number is intended to enable a distinction to be made between subjects with the same commonName. To avoid susceptibilities a serial Number attribute MUST be allocated to every subject.

Field / Attribute	Criteria	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
subjectPublicKeyInfo	V	Contains, among other things, the public key.	ETSI TS 102 280, RFC 3279		Contains the public key, identifies the algorithm with which the key can be used.

### Standard extensions

Field / Attribute	Criteria	Critical?	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
authorityKeyIdentifier	V	No	The algorithm to generate the AuthorityKey MUST be created on an algorithm determined by the PA.	ETSI TS 102 280, RFC 5280	BitString	The value MUST contain the SHA-1 hash from the authorityKey (public key of the CSP/CA).
SubjectKeyIdentifier	V	No	The algorithm to generate the subjectKey MUST be created on an algorithm determined by the PA.	RFC 5280	BitString	The value MUST contain the SHA-1 hash from the subjectKey (public key of the certificate holder).
KeyUsage	V	Yes	<p>The attribute extension specifies the intended purpose of the key incorporated in the certificate. In the PKI for the government, for each certificate type various bits are incorporated in the keyUsage extension.</p> <p>In authenticity certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be incorporated and marked as being essential. Another keyUsage MUST NOT be combined with this.</p> <p>In confidentiality certificates, keyEncipherment and dataEncipherment bits MUST be incorporated and marked as being essential. Another keyUsage MUST NOT be combined with this.</p> <p>In certificates for the electronic signature the non-repudiation bit MUST be incorporated and marked as being essential. Another keyUsage MUST NOT be combined with this.</p>	RFC 3739, RFC 5280, ETSI TS 102 280	BitString	

Field / Attribute	Criteria	Critical?	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
CertificatePolicies	V	No	MUST contain the OID of the certificate policy (CP), the URI of the certification practice statement (CPS), and a user notice. The applicable PKI for the government OID scheme is described in the CP. The CSP SHOULD use UTF8String in the userNotice, but MAY use IA5String.	RFC 3739	OID, String, UTF8String or IA5String	For the Citizen domain, the OIDs are: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.1, 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.2 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.3. Reference to the paragraph numbers of the PoR/CP in the user notice is advised against because the persistency of this cannot be guaranteed (unlike the OID number of the CP).
SubjectAltName	V	No	MUST be used and given a personal worldwide unique identification number.	RFC 4043, RFC 5280, PKIo, ETSI 102 280		MUST include a unique identifier in the othername attribute. Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used.
SubjectAltName.otherName	V		MUST be used containing a unique identification number that identifies the certificate holder.	PKIo	IA5String, Microsoft UPN, IBM Principal-Name or Permanent-Identifier	Includes the OID of the CPS and a number that permanently and uniquely identifies the subject service, separated by a point or hyphen ('-'). It is advised that an existing registration number from the back office systems is used. In combination with the CSP's OID number, this identifier is unique throughout the world. This number MUST be persistent.
SubjectAltName.rfc822Name	A		MAY be used for the certificate holder's e-mail address, for applications that need the e-mail address to be able to function properly.	RFC 5280	IA5String	For PKIoverheid certificates, the use of e-mail addresses is advised against, because e-mail addresses of certificate holders often change and are susceptible to spam.  If the e-mail address is included in the certificate, the CSP MUST: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• have the subscriber sign for approval, and;</li> <li>• check whether the email address belongs to the subscriber and that the subscriber has access to the email address (for example by performing a challenge response).</li> </ul>
BasicConstraints	O	Yes	The "CA" field MUST be omitted (default value is then "FALSE").	RFC 5280		A (Dutch language) browser can then be seen: "Subjecttype = Eidentiteit", "Beperking voor padlengte = Geen" ("Subject type = End Entity", "Path length constraint = None")

Field / Attribute	Criteria	Critical?	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
CRLDistributionPoints	V	No	MUST include the URI of a CRL distribution point.	RFC 5280, ETSI TS 102 280		The reference MUST be accessible through the http or LDAP protocol. The attribute Reason MUST NOT be used, reference MUST be made to 1 CRL for all types of reasons for revocation. In addition to CRL, other types of certificate status information service MAY be supported.
ExtKeyUsage	V	No		RFC 5280		See requirement 7.1-pkio149
FreshestCRL	O	No	MUST contain the URI of a Delta CRL distribution point, if Delta CRLs are used.	RFC 5280, PKIo		Delta-CRLs are an optional extension. In order to fulfil the requirements of PKIoverheid a CSP MUST also publish full CRLs at the required release frequency.

### Private extensions

Field / Attribute	Criteria	Critical?	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
authorityInfoAccess	O	No	This attribute MUST include the URI of an OCSP responder if Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) plays a role.			This field can optionally be used to reference other additional information about the CSP.
SubjectInfoAccess	O	No		RFC 5280	OID, Generalname	This field can be used to reference additional information about the subject, provided that the information that is offered does not infringe the privacy of the subject.
BiometricInfo	O	No	Contains the hash of a biometric template and optionally a URI that references a file with the biometric template itself.	RFC 3739		
QcStatement	V/ N	No	<p>Certificates for the electronic signature MUST indicate that they are issued as qualified certificates complying with annex I of EU regulation 920/2014. This compliance is indicated by including the <i>id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance</i> statement in this extension.</p> <p>Certificates for the electronic signature MUST indicate that they are issued as type of certificate complying with annex I of EU regulation 920/2014. This compliance is indicated by including the <i>id-etsi-qct-esign</i> statement in this extension.</p> <p>Certificates for the electronic signature MUST indicate that the private key that is part of the public key in the certificate is saved on a qualified signature creation device (QSCD) complying with annex II of EU regulation 920/2014. This compliance is</p>	RFC 3739, ETSI TS 102 280, ETSI TS 101 862	OID	<p>The aforementioned QcStatement identifiers relate to the following OIDs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>id-etsi-qcs-QcCompliance { id-etsi-qcs 1 } 0.4.0.1862.1.1</li> <li>id-etsi-qct-esign { id-etsi-qcs-QcType 1 } 0.4.0.1862.1.6.1</li> <li>id-etsi-qcs-QcSSCD { id-etsi-qcs 4 } 0.4.0.1862.1.4</li> <li>id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS { id-etsi-qcs 5 } 0.4.0.1862.1.5</li> </ul>



Field / Attribute	Criteria	Critical?	Description	Standard reference	Type	Explanation
			<p>indicated by including the <i>id-etsi-qcs-QcSSCD</i> statement in this extension.</p> <p>Certificates for the electronic signature MUST contain a reference to the location of the PKI Disclosure Statement (PDS). This URL must present in the <i>id-etsi-qcs-QcPDS</i> statement in this extension.</p>			

## 10 Revisions

### 10.1 Amendments from version 4.2 to 4.3

#### 10.1.1 *New*

- Addition of Issuer.organizationalIdentifier in the certificate profile (effective date 1-7-2016)

#### 10.1.2 *Modifications*

- Description with attribute CertificatePolicies (effective date 1-7-2016)
- Removal of optional use KeyAgreement with Key Usage (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.3)
- Mandatory QcStatement in qualified certificate (effective date 1-7-2016)
- ETSI TS 102 176-1 replaced by ETSI TS 119 312 (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.3)
- Use of values in the BasicConstraints field no longer permitted in end entity certificates (effective date 1-7-2016)
- ETSI TS 102 042 replaced by ETSI EN 319 411-1 (effective date 1-7-2016 or when the accreditation to the certifying body has been granted with a final date of 30 June 2017)

#### 10.1.3 *Editorial*

- Removed references to G1 Root (expired)

### 10.2 Amendments from version 4.1 to 4.2

#### 10.2.1 *New*

- Requirement 7.1-pkio149 (effective date 1 juli 2016)

#### 10.2.2 *Modifications*

None

#### 10.2.3 *Editorial*

None

### 10.3 Amendments from version 4.0 to 4.1

#### 10.3.1 *New*

- Certification against ETSI TS 102 042(effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.1 );

#### 10.3.2 *Modifications*

- None

#### 10.3.3 *Editorial*

- Small editorial modifications to the following requirements:
  - 3.1.3-pkio11;
  - 5.7.4-pkio86;
  - 9.6.1-pkio131.

### 10.4 Amendments from version 3.7 to 4.0

#### 10.4.1 *New*

- None

#### 10.4.2 *Modifications*

- PoR requirements have been renumbered according to a new naming convention;
- The creation of a document containing the baseline and additional requirements;
- Changes to requirements can be found in the baseline and additional requirements documents respectively.

#### 10.4.3 *Editorial*

Editorial changes to requirements can be found in the baseline and additional requirements documents respectively. These changes have no effect on the content of the information.