Version

Date

Description

4.1

07-2015

Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2015

4.2

01-2016

Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2016

4.4

02-2017

Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2017

4.6

01-2018

Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2018

RFC 3647

Reference to the paragraph from the RFC 3647 structure to which the PKIo requirement relates. RFC 3647 is a PKIX framework of the Internet Engineering Task Force ( IETF ) and is the de facto standard for the structure of Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements [1] .

PKIo

The PKIo requirement that applies to this domain of the PKI for the government.

RFC 3647

2.2 Publication of TSP information

PKIo

The CPS shall be made available in English. In addition the TSP may issue a CPS in Dutch. There may be notsubstantial substantive difference between the two versions.

RFC 3647

2.2 Publication of TSP information

PKIo

The TSP has to actively inform the citizen and to state in the conditions that the authenticity certificate is not referred to in the Compulsory Identification Act (Wid) as an identity document and therefore cannot be used to identify persons in cases where the law requires that the identity of persons is established using a document referred to in the Compulsory Identification Act.

The TSP has to express that the authenticity certificate cannot be used when using government services, where the law requires that the identity of persons is established using a document in the Compulsory Identification Act.

RFC 3647

2.2 Publication of TSP information

PKIo

The Certification Practice Statement of the TSP must be structured according to RFC 2527, RFC 3647 or the Programme of Requirements of PKIoverheid that is based on RFC 3647 and must contain all relevant chapters as described in RFC 2527, RFC 3647 or the PoR PKIoverheid.

RFC 3647

2.2 Publication of TSP -information

PKIo

The CPS must be reviewed and renewed yearly. The TSP must report a renewal to the PA .

RFC 3647

2.2 Publication of TSP -information

PKIo

The CPS shall be made available in English and/or in Dutch. There may be notsubstantial substantive difference between the two versions.

RFC 3647

2.2 Publication of TSP -information

PKIo

The CPS MUST indicate which method of the Baseline Requirements has been used to perform domain validation. The indication must contain a reference to the appropriate paragraph (3.2.2.4.x) of the Baseline Requirements and must be placed in the relevant paragraph of the CPS .

RFC 3647

PKIo

The TSP MUST describe in its CPS which validation method for validating IP -adresses and/or FQDNs it uses for inclusion in the Subject.CommonName field, the SubjectAltName.dNSName field and/or the SubjectAltName.iPAdress field , including a reference to the appropriate chapter of the Baseline Requirements.

RFC 3647

PKIo

The TSP MUST describe in its CPS which validation methods for validating FQDNs it uses for inclusion in the Subject.CommonName field and the SubjectAltName.dNSName field including a reference to the relevant chapter of the Baseline Requirements.

RFC 3647

PKIo

The TSP MUST describe in its CPS which validation methods for validating IP addresses and / or FQDNs it uses for inclusion in the Subject.CommonName field, the SubjectAltName.dNSName field and / or theSubjectAltName.iPAdress field with a reference to the relevant chapter of the Baseline Requirements OR a reference to the number provided by the PA in the event of custom validation methods as described in requirement 3.2.5-pkio162.

RFC 3647

3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonimity of certificate holders

PKIo

Pseudonyms MUST NOT be used in certificates.

RFC 3647

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of the private key

PKIo

The TSP is responsible for ensuring that the subscriber supplies the certificate signing request ( CSR ) securely. The secure delivery must take place in the following manner:

· the entry of the CSR on the TSP 's application developed especially for that purpose, using an SSL connection with a PKIoverheid SSL certificate or similar or;

· the entry of the CSR on the HTTPS website of the TSP that uses a PKIoverheid SSL certificate or similar or;

· sending the CSR by e-mail, along with a qualified electronic signature of the certificate manager that uses a PKIoverheid qualified certificate or similar or;

· entering or sending a CSR in a way that is at least equivalent to the aforementioned ways.

RFC 3647

3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity

PKIo

When issuing organization-linked certificates the TSP has to verify that the subscriber is an existing organization.

RFC 3647

3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity

PKIo

The TSP has to verify that the subscriber is an existing organization.

RFC 3647

3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity

PKIo

The TSP has to verify that the subscriber is an existing and legal organization, and who the Authorised Representative (or Representation) of the subscriber is.

As evidence that it is an existing and legal organization and of the correctness and existence of the Authorised Representative (or Representation) registered by the subscriber, the TSP has to request and verify at least the following supporting documents:

§ For government organizations, a recently certified excerpt (no more than 1 month old) from the Chamber of Commerce's Trade Register or a law, deed of incorporation or a general governmental decree. If registration in the Trade Register has not yet taken place, a copy of the corresponding page from the most recent version of the Staatsalmanak where the Authorised Representative (or Representation) is mentioned;

§ For bodies governed by private law with and without a legal personality with a recently certified excerpt (maximum 1 month old) from the Chamber of Commerce's Trade Register where the Authorised Representative (or Representation) is mentioned.

The TSP must verify if the Organization and Authorised Representative appear on the latest EU list of prohibited terrorists and terrorist organizations, published by the European Council

These lists can be found on the web page:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001E0931:NL:NOT

These are decisions concerning updating the list of people, groups and entities referred to in articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/ GBVB concerning the use of specific measures to combat terrorism.

The TSP must not issue EV SSL certificates to an organization or its Authorized Representative that appears on this list.

RFC 3647

3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity

PKIo

In terms of organization-linked certificates, the TSP has to verify that the name of the organization registered by the subscriber that is incorporated in the certificate is correct and complete.

RFC 3647

3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity

PKIo

The TSP has to verify that the name of the organization registered by the subscriber that is incorporated in the certificate is correct and complete.

RFC 3647

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

PKIo

When issuing certificates to natural persons the TSP has to verify that the full name used by the certificate holder that is incorporated in the certificate is correct and complete, including the surname, first forename, initials or other forename(s) (if applicable) and surname prefixes (if applicable).

RFC 3647

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

PKIo

In accordance with Dutch legislation and regulations, the TSP has to check the identity and, if applicable, specific properties of the certificate manager. Proof of identity has to be verified based on the physical appearance of the person himself, either directly or indirectly, using means by which the same certainty can be obtained as with personal presence. The proof of identity can be supplied on paper or electronically.

RFC 3647

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

PKIo

The identity of the certificate manager can only be established using the valid documents referred to in article 1 of the Compulsory Identification Act (Wet op de identificatieplicht). The TSP has to check the validity and authenticity of these documents.

RFC 3647

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

PKIo

The certificate manager is a person whose identity has to be established in conjunction with an organizational entity. Proof has to be submitted of:

· full name, including surname, first name, initials or other first (names) (if applicable) and surname prefixes (if applicable);

· date of birth and place of birth, a nationally applicable registration number, or other characteristics of the certificate manager that can be used in order to, as far as possible, distinguish this person from other persons with the same name;

· proof that the certificate manager is entitled to receive a certificate for a certificate holder on behalf of the legal personality or other organizational entity.

RFC 3647

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

PKIo

To detail the provisions in 3.2.3- pkio22 , the identity of the certificate manager can only be established using the valid documents referred to in article 1 of the Compulsory Identification Act. The TSP has to check the validity and authenticity of these documents.

The TSP must also establish whether the certificate manager appears on the latest EU list of prohibited terrorists and terrorist organizations:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:028:0057:0059:EN:PDF

The TSP may not issue an EV SSL certificate to an organization or its certificate manager that is included on this list.

RFC 3647

3.2.3 Authentication of personal identity

PKIo

For certificates that are suitable for signing and / or securing e-mail messages and which include the e-mail address of the certificate holder, the TSP will take appropriate measures to ensure that the applicant has control over the e-mail address in question OR that he / she is authorized by the holder of the e-mail address to have this e-mail address included in a certificate.

The TSP must clearly state in its CPS which procedures are carried out to confirm the above.

RFC 3647

3.2.5 Validation of authority

PKIo

In terms of organization-linked certificate holders, the TSP has to check that:

· the proof that the certificate holder, authorized to receive a certificate on behalf of the subscriber, is authentic;

· the name and identity markers mentioned in this proof correspond with the certificate holder's identity established under 3.2.3 -pkio21.

In terms of profession-linked certificate holders, the TSP has to check that:

· the proof, that the certificate holder is authorised to practise the recognized profession, is authentic;

· the name and identity markers mentioned in this proof correspond with the certificate holder's identity established under 3.2.3 -pkio21.

RFC 3647

3.2.5 Validation of authority

PKIo

The TSP has to verify that:

· the proof that the certificate holder is authorized to receive a certificate on behalf of the subscriber, is authentic;

· the certificate manager has received permission from the subscriber to perform the actions that he has been asked to perform (if the certificate manager performs the registration process).

RFC 3647

3.2.5 Validation of authority

PKIo

The TSP has to verify that:

· the proof that the certificate holder is authorized to receive a certificate on behalf of the subscriber, is authentic;

· the certificate manager has received the consent of the subscriber to perform the actions that he has been asked to perform (if the certificate manager performs the registration process).

· the requested certificate in combination with the permanently stored data in the certificate holder (device) contain information to be able to trace the following unequivocally:

o the device's identity ( e.g. manufacturer and serial number);

othe proof that the device and its production process conform to the framework of standards established by the party responsible for establishing the framework.

RFC 3647

3.2.5 Validation of authority

PKIo

Subscriber is a legal personality (organization-linked certificates):

The agreement that the TSP enters into with the subscriber has to state that the subscriber is responsible for immediately informing the TSP of any relevant changes that have been made to the relationship between the subscriber and the certificate holder, by means of a revocation request. Relevant changes can, in this respect, for instance be termination of employment and suspension.

Subscriber is a natural person (occupation-linked certificates):

The agreement that the TSP enters into with the subscriber has to state that the subscriber is responsible for immediately informing the TSP of any relevant changes that have been made by means of a revocation request. A relevant change in this respect is, in any case, no longer having legal proof as outlined in 3.2.5-pkio29.

RFC 3647

3.2.5 Validation of authority

PKIo

The agreement that the TSP enters into with the subscriber has to state that the subscriber is responsible for immediately informing the TSP of any relevant changes to the relationship between the subscriber and certificate manager and/or service. When the service no longer exists, this has to take place by means of a revocation request.

RFC 3647

3.2.5 Validation of authority

PKIo

The agreement that the TSP enters into with the subscriber has to state that the subscriber is responsible for immediately informing the TSP of any relevant amendments to the relation between the subscriber and certificate manager and/or certificate holder (autonomous device). If the device fails, this has to be done using a revocation request.

RFC 3647

3.2.5 Validation of authority

PKIo

A TSP must verify if the subscriber is the owner of the FQDN that is incorporated in the server or EV certificate. The Baseline Requirements stipulate under 4.2.1 that additional verification activity must be undertaken for High Risk Requests. PKIoverheid understands that to mean at least the following:

· A domain name of a Fortune Global 500 company

· A domain name with a second level domain equal to a second level domain of the top 500 domain names worldwide and specific to the Netherlands

· A domain name that appears on a known spam- and/or phishing blacklist

Once it is established that the holder is an organization belonging to the global 500 or if the second level domain name is equal to the top 500 domain names, the TSP may only issue a certificate after the expressed permission of an accountable manager of the TSP who is not part of the standard approval process.

If the domain name appears on a phishing blacklist a certificate may not be issued.

RFC 3647

3.2.5 Authorization of the certificate holder

PKIo

The restrictive list of recognized professions for which professional certificates can be issued is as follows:

1. Accountant-Administratieconsulent (Accountant-Administration Officer);

2. Advocaat (Lawyer);

3. Octrooigemachtigde (Patent Agent);

4. Registerloods (Marine pilot);

5a. Those who have been entered into a register as meant in article 3 of the Professions in the individual healthcare Act (Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg (Wet BIG ))

5b. Those who practice a profession of which the education is mandated through article 34, section 1 and article 36a of the Professions in the individual healthcare Act (Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg (Wet BIG )).

6. Notaris (Civil Law Notary);

7. Kandidaat notaris (Junior Civil Law Notary);

8. Toegevoegd Notaris (Added Notary);

9. Gerechtsdeurwaarder (Court Bailiff);

10. Waarnemend gerechtsdeuraarder (Acting Court Bailiff);

11. Toegevoegd gerechtsdeurwaarder (Additional Court Bailiff);

12. Kandidaat gerechtsdeurwaarder (Junior Court Bailiff);

13. Registeraccountant (Registered Accountant);

14. Dierenarts (Veterinary Surgeon)

15. Zeevarende (Seafarer);

16. (Hoofd)bewaarder ((Head) Registrar);

17. Gemandateerd bewaarder Mandated Registrar;

18. Technisch Medewerker schapen (Ships Technician);

19. Inspecteur Scheepsregistraties (Ship Registration Inspector);

20. Belastingdeurwaarder (Government-appointed Tax Bailiff);

21. Rijksdeurwaarder (Government Bailiff).

22. Gemeentelijk Belastingdeurwaarder (Municipal Tax Bailiff)

RFC 3647

PKIo

The TSP MUST check that the FQDNs supplied by the subscriber (see definition in Part 4) included in a certificate are:

- Actually in the name of the subscriber OR;

- Authorized by the registered domain owner OR;

- That the subscriber can show that it exercises (technical) control over the FQDN in question.

This must be done for every FQDN that is included in a certificate. The TSP must limit itself to the methods as prescribed in the applicable version of the Baseline Requirements of the CABForum (chapter 3.2.2.4). The TSP must also adhere to the requirements in the EV Guidelines ( EVCG ) chapter 11.

The verified data may be reused in a subsequent application, provided that it is not older than 13 months. If the data is older than 13 months, the above check must be carried out again.

The TSP must also keep a record of the validation method (s) used for the included FQDNs per certificate.

This verification may not be outsourced by the TSP to external (sub) contractors

RFC 3647

PKIo

If an FQDN is included in the certificate, the TSP MUST check whether the FQDNs supplied by the subscriber (see definition in Part 4), included in a certificate, are:

- Actually in the name of the subscriber OR;

- Authorized by the registered domain owner OR;

- That the subscriber can show that it exercises (technical) control over the FQDN in question.

The verified data may be reused in a subsequent application, provided that it is not older than 39 months. If the data is older than 39 months, the above check must be carried out again

This must be done for every FQDN that is included in a certificate. The TSP must limit itself to:

- the methods as prescribed in the applicable version of the Baseline Requirements of the CABForum (chapter 3.2.2.4) OR;

- an alternative method approved in advance by the PA .

The TSP must also keep a record of the validation method (s) used for the included FQDNs per certificate.

This verification may not be outsourced by the TSP to external (sub) contractors

RFC 3647

PKIo

The TSP MUST check whether the FQDNs supplied by the subscriber (see definition in Part 4) or IP addresses, included in a certificate, are:

- Actually in the name of the subscriber OR;

- Authorized by the registered domain owner OR;

- That the subscriber can show that he exercises (technical) control over the FQDN in question.

This must be done for every FQDN that is included in a certificate. The TSP must limit itself to the methods as prescribed in the applicable version of the Baseline Requirements of the CABForum (chapter 3.2.2.4 for FQDNs and 3.2.2.5 for IP addresses).

The foregoing also holds that "Any Other Method" from 3.2.2.5 may not be used (for both 3.2.2.4.8 and for IP addresses).

The verified data may be reused in a subsequent application, provided that it is no older than 825 days. If the data is older than 825 days, the above check must be carried out again.

The TSP must also keep a record of the validation method (s) used for the included FQDNs per certificate. This verification may not be outsourced by the TSP to external (sub) contractors

RFC 3647

4.1 Certificate Application

PKIo

Before a services server certificate is issued, the TSP must enter into an agreement with the subscriber and receive a certificate request signed by the certificate manager. The agreement must be signed by the Authorized Representative or Representation of the subscriber.

RFC 3647

4.1 Certificate Application

PKIo

Before issuing an EV SSL certificate, the TSP has to have received a fully completed application, signed by the certificate manager on behalf of the subscriber. The application must contain the following information:

§ the name of the organization;

§ the domain name (FQDN);

§ Chamber of Commerce number or Government Identification Number;

§ subscriber's address consisting of:

ostreet name and house number;

otown or city;

oprovince;

ocountry;

opostcode and

ogeneral telephone number.

§ certificate manager's name.

RFC 3647

4.4.3 Notification of the certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

PKIo

The certificate SHALL contain at least the following number of SCT s:

The SCT s come from a log that is either qualified or awaiting qualification at the time of certificate issue. A qualified log is defined as a CT log that complies with Chromium's Certificate Transparency Log Policy and has been included by Chromium.

At least one SCT comes from a log maintained by Google and one SCT from a log not maintained by Google. When recording more than 2 SCT s (see table), the requirement remains that at least 1 of the SCT s of the logs where the certificate is submitted to is from Google.

RFC 3647

4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage

PKIo

When issuing Extended Validation certificates under this CP the TSP MUST adhere to the requirements in relation to certificate transparency.

RFC 3647

4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

PKIo

Certificates must be revoked when:

· the subscriber states that the original request for a certificate was not allowed and the subscriber does not provide consent with retrospective force;

· the TSP has sufficient proof that the subscriber's private key (that corresponds with the public key in the certificate) is compromised or if compromise is suspected, or if there is inherent security vulnerability, or if the certificate has been misused in any other way. A key is considered to be compromised in the event of unauthorized access or suspected unauthorized access to the private key, if the private key, SSCD , SUD or QSCD , is lost or suspected to be lost, if the key, SSCD , SUD or QSCD , is stolen or suspected to be stolen, or if the key or SSCD , SUD or QSCD is destroyed;

· a subscriber does not fulfil its obligations outlined in this CP or the corresponding CPS of the TSP or the agreement that the TSP has entered into with the subscriber;

· the TSP is informed or otherwise becomes aware of a substantial change in the information that is provided in the certificate. An example of that is: a change in the name of the certificate holder;

· the TSP determines that the certificate has not been issued in line with this CP or the corresponding CPS of the TSP or the agreement that the TSP has entered into with the subscriber;

· the TSP determines that information in the certificate is incorrect or misleading;

· the TSP ceases its work and the CRL and OCSP services are not taken over by a different TSP .

· The PA of PKIoverheid determines that the technical content of the certificate entails an irresponsible risk to subscribers, relying parties and third parties ( e.g. browser parties).

RFC 3647

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

PKIo

In any case, the TSP has to use a CRL to make the certificate status information available.

RFC 3647

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

PKIo

The TSP has to publish the procedure for revocation and, in that publication, provide unambiguous definitions of the following sub-processes, summarized in chronological order:

· The receipt of a request for revocation;

· The identification and authentication of the party that submits the request for revocation;

· The trustworthiness investigation with regard to the request for revocation;

· The processing of (the trustworthy request for) the revocation;

· The publication of the (processed) revocation.

The definition of every sub-process has to include as a minimum the conditions for following the sub-process and the data to be registered in that sub-process.

RFC 3647

4.9.3 Procedures for revocation request

PKIo

If there is an issuing subordinate CA under a TSP CA then:

§ the TSP has to use an OCSP and a CRL to make available the certificate status information, relating to the issuing subordinate CA ;

§ the TSP has to record the reason for the revocation of the issuing subordinate CA certificate;

§ the validity of the CRL , with regard to the certificate status information of the issuing subordinate CA , is no more than 7 days.

RFC 3647

4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request

PKIo

In the case of an issuing subordinate CA , the maximum delay between the time at which the decision is taken to revoke an issuing subordinate CA (recorded in a report) and the amendment of the revocation status information, which is available to all relying parties, is 72 hours.

RFC 3647

4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency

PKIo

The TSP has to update and reissue the CRL for end user certificates at least once every 7 calendar days and the date of the “Next update” field may not exceed the date of the “Effective date” field by 10 calendar days.

RFC 3647

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

PKIo

The revocation management services of the TSP can support the Online Certificate Status Protocol ( OCSP ) as an addition to the publication of CRL information. If this support is available, this has to be stated in the CPS .

RFC 3647

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

PKIo

If the TSP supports the Online Certificate Status Protocol ( OCSP ), this must conform to IETF RFC 6960.

RFC 3647

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

PKIo

To detail the provisions of IETF RFC 2560 , OCSP responses have to be signed digitally by either:

· the private ( CA ) key with which the certificate is signed of which the status is requested, or;

· a responder appointed by the TSP which holds an OCSP Signing certificate issued for this purpose by the TSP , or;

· a responder that holds an OCSP Signing certificate that falls under the hierarchy of the PKI for the government.

RFC 3647

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

PKIo

If the TSP supports OCSP , the information that is provided through OCSP has to be at least as equally up-to-date and reliable as the information that is published by means of a CRL , during the validity of the certificate that is issued and furthermore up to at least six months after the time at which the validity of the certificate has expired or, if that time is earlier, after the time at which the validity is ended by revocation.

RFC 3647

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

PKIo

If the TSP supports OCSP , the TSP has to update the OCSP service at least once every 4 calendar days. The maximum expiry term of the OCSP responses is 10 calendar days. In addition OCSP responses must contain the “nextUpdate” field in conformance to RFC 6960.

RFC 3647

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

PKIo

If the TSP supports OCSP , the OCSP response must have a minimum validity of 8 hours and a maximum validity of 7 calendar days. The next update must be available no later than half of the validity of an OCSP response.

RFC 3647

5.4.1 Types of events recorded

PKIo

Logging has to take place on at least:

· Routers, firewalls and network system components;

· Database activities and events;

· Transactions;

· Operating systems;

· Access control systems;

· Mail servers.

At the very least, the TSP has to log the following events:

· CA key life cycle management;

· Certificate life cycle management;

· Threats and risks such as:

· Successful and unsuccessful attacks on the PKI system;

· Activities of staff on the PKI system;

· Reading, writing and deleting data;

· Profile changes (Access Management);

· System failure, hardware failure and other abnormalities;

· Firewall and router activities;

· Entering and leaving the CA space.

At the very least, the log files have to register the following:

· Source addresses ( IP addresses if available);

· Destination addresses ( IP addresses if available);

· Time and date;

· User ID s (if available);

· Name of the incident;

· Description of the incident.

RFC 3647

5.5.1 Types of records that are archived

PKIo

The TSP MUST archive all information used to verify the identity of the subscriber, certificate manager and applicants of revocation requests. This information includes reference numbers of the documentation used for verification, including limitations concerning the validity.

RFC 3647

5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster.

PKIo

The TSP has to draw up a business continuity plan ( BCP ) for, at the very least, the core services dissemination service, revocation management service and revocation status service, the aim being, in the event of a security breach or emergency, to inform, reasonably protect and to continue the TSP services for subscribers, relying parties and third parties (including browser parties). The TSP has to test, assess and update the BCP annually. At the very least, the BCP has to describe the following processes:

§ Requirements relating to entry into force;

§ Emergency procedure/fall-back procedure;

§ Requirements relating to restarting TSP services;

§ Maintenance schedule and test plan that cover the annual testing, assessment and update of the BCP ;

§ Provisions in respect of highlighting the importance of business continuity;

§ Tasks, responsibilities and competences of the involved agents;

§ Intended Recovery Time or Recovery Time Objective ( RTO );

§ Recording the frequency of back-ups of critical business information and software;

§ Recording the distance of the fall-back facility to the TSP 's main site; and

§ Recording the procedures for securing the facility during the period following a security breach or emergency and for the organization of a secure environment at the main site or fall-back facility.

RFC 3647

6.1.1 Key pair generation for the TSP sub CA

PKIo

The algorithm and the length of the cryptographic keys that are used for generating the keys for the TSP sub CA have to fulfil the requirements laid down in that respect in the list of recommended cryptographic algorithms and key lengths as defined in ETSI TS 119 312.

RFC 3647

6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders

PKIo

The keys of certificate holders (or data for creating electronic signatures) have to be generated using a device that fulfils the requirements mentioned in EN 419 211 for QSCD ’s or CEN Workshop Agreement on Secure Signature Creation Devices"> CWA 14169 for SSCD ’s (transitional permission regime) "Secure signature-creation devices " EAL 4+"" or comparable security criteria.

RFC 3647

6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders

PKIo

The algorithm and the length of the cryptographic keys used by the TSP for generating keys of certificate holders has to fulfil the requirements laid down in that respect in the list of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths as defined in ETSI TS 119 312.

RFC 3647

6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders

PKIo

The generation of key pairs the certificate holder's key by the TSP is not allowed

RFC 3647

6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders

PKIo

If the TSP generates the private key for the subscriber, this MUST be supplied encrypted to the subscriber to safeguard the integrity and confidentiality of the private key. The following measures must then be taken into account:

a. The TSP MUST generate the private key for the subscriber in the secured environment to which the PKIoverheid PoR and the corresponding audit apply;

b. Once the private key has been generated for the subscriber, it MUST be stored encrypted using a strong algorithm (in accordance with the requirements of ETSI TS 102 176) within the TSP 's secured environment;

c. When storing this key, the TSP MUST apply the P12 standard, where the privacy mode and the integrity mode are used. To this end, the TSP MAY encrypt the P12 file with a personal PKI certificate of the subscriber/certificate manager. If this is not available, the TSP MUST use a password supplied by the subscriber. This password MUST be supplied by the subscriber through the TSP 's website, for which an SSL / TLS connection is used, or via a similar procedure which guarantees the same trustworthiness and security;

d. If a password is used to encrypt the P12 , this password has to contain at least 8 positions including at least one number and two special characters;

e. The TSP MAY NEVER send the password that is used to encrypt/decrypt the P12 in cleartext over a network or store it on a server. The password MUST be encrypted using a strong algorithm (in accordance with the requirements of ETSI TS 119 312);

f. The P12 file MUST be sent to the subscriber over an SSL / TLS secured network, or be supplied out-of-band on a data carrier ( e.g. USB stick or CD-Rom ).

g. If the P12 is supplied out-of-band, this must be additionally encrypted with a key other than the P12 file. In addition, the P12 MUST be delivered to the subscriber using a certified courier, or by a representative of the TSP in a seal bag. The courier must be certified in accordance with the requirements dictated in part 2 under paragraph 2.2 for the specific service applicable here.

h. If the P12 file is sent over a SSL / TLS secured network the TSP MUST ensure that the P12 file is successfully downloaded no more than once. Access to the P12 file when transferring via SSL / TLS has to be blocked after three attempts.

RFC 3647

6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders

PKIo

A TSP within PKIoverheid is not allowed to issue code signing certificates.

RFC 3647

6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders

PKIo

Instead of the TSP generating the keys, the certificate manager MAY generate the keys of the services authenticity and encryption certificates in a SUD using PKCS#10 to deliver the CSR to the TSP for signing, under the following conditions:

- The agreement between the TSP and the subscriber stipulates that the certificate manager generates, saves and uses the private key on a secure device that conforms to the requirements of CEN Workshop Agreement on Secure Signature Creation Devices"> CWA 14169 for a Secure signature-creation devices or EN 419 211 for Qualified signature-creation devices “ EAL 4+" or comparable security criteria .

With the request the subscriber must prove that the secure device used for key generation conforms to CEN Workshop Agreement on Secure Signature Creation Devices"> CWA 14169 for a Secure signature-creation devices or EN 419 211 for Qualified signature-creation devices EAL 4+"" or comparable security criteria.

The TSP must then verify that the SUD in question conforms (comparable to “The subscriber MUST prove that the organization may use this name.”)

- On registration the certificate manager must at least produce a written statement that measures have been taken in the environment of the system that generates/contains the keys. The measures must be of such quality that is practically impossible to steal or copy the keys unnoticed.

The agreement between the subscriber and the TSP must stipulate that the TSP has the right to perform an audit on the measures taken (conform 6.2.11-pkio107)

- The agreement between the subscriber and the TSP must contain the following condition. The subscriber must declare that the private key (and the corresponding access information such as a PIN code), relating to the public key in het SUD in question has, in an appropriate manner, been generated under the control of the certificate manager and will be kept secret and protected in the future.

RFC 3647

6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders

PKIo

Subject key generation of a qualified digital seal certificate for the use of mass automated signing of standardised data is allowed in ETSI 319 411-2. ETSI does not stipulate the applicable security requirements. Subject key generation within PKIoverheid is possible under the following conditions:

- The contract between the TSP and the subscriber contains an assertion that the subscriber will generate, store and use the private key on a qualified device for electronic signatures – such as a HSM – which meets the requirements of {7} CEN Workshop Agreement on Secure Signature Creation Devices"> CWA 14169 Secure signature-creation devices or EN 419 211 for Qualified signature-creation devices " EAL 4+" or equivalent security criteria such as FIPS 140-2 level 3.

The subscriber shall hand over evidence to this effect with the certificate request by submitting the certification of the secure device and, if applicable, a screenshot of the settings of the secure device on FIPS 140-2 level 3.

- The contract between the TSP and the subscriber contains an assertion in which the subscriber states that the private key (and associated activation data, such as a PIN code) related to the public key is generated in the qualified device and is kept secret and protected in future.

The subscriber shall hand over evidence to this effect of the PKI ceremony script which is used during the implementation of the qualified device for electronic signatures and the generation of the key pair.

- The TSP is present during the PKI ceremony for the commissioning of the qualified device for electronic signatures and the generation of the key pair. This enables the TSP to check the effectiveness of the security measures.

- During registration the Subscriber submits a written statement of demonstrably satisfying the requirements and/or conditions placed either on the use of the qualified device for electronic signatures, or by the certification of the device on the environment in which it is administrated and the administration itself.

- The Subscriber submits a written statement that the certificate holder has explicitly mandated the system administrators of the qualified device for electronic signatures for the administration and that access to this device is always subject to dual control.

RFC 3647

6.1.2 Private key and SSCD or QSCD delivery to certificate holder

PKIo

[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.2.2 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.2],

[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.2.1 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.1] and

[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.2 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.1].

The certificate holder's private key has to be delivered to the certificate holder, if required through the subscriber, in a manner such that the secrecy and the integrity of the key is not compromised and, once delivered to the certificate holder, the private key can be maintained under the certificate holder’s sole control.

RFC 3647

6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key

PKIo

The authorized persons who can gain access to the private key of the confidentiality certificate held in Escrow by the TSP (if applicable), have to identify themselves using the valid documents listed in article 1 of the Compulsory Identification Act (Wet op de identificatieplicht), or a valid qualified certificate (limited to a PKIoverheid signature certificate or equivalent).

RFC 3647

6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key

PKIo

The TSP has to describe in the CPS which parties can have access to the private key of the confidentiality certificate held in Escrow and under which conditions.

RFC 3647

6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key

PKIo

If the TSP keeps the private key of the confidentiality certificate in Escrow, the TSP has to guarantee that this private key is kept secret and only made available to appropriately authorized persons.

RFC 3647

6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating

PKIo

Secure devices issued or recommended by the TSP for creating electronic signatures ( SSCD s or QSCD s) have to fulfil the requirements laid down in document CEN Workshop Agreement on Secure Signature Creation Devices"> CWA 14169 " Secure signature-creation devices or EN 419 211 for Qualified signature-creation devices " EAL 4+"" and the requirements outlined in or pursuant to the Electronic Signatures Decree article 5, parts a, b, c and d.

RFC 3647

6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating

PKIo

Instead of demonstrating compliance with CEN Workshop Agreement on Secure Signature Creation Devices"> CWA 14169 (for SSCD ’s or SUD ’s) or EN 419 211 (for QSCD ’s) , TSP s can issue or recommend SSCD s, SUD s or QSCD s that are certified in line with a different protection profile against the Common Criteria ( ISO / IEC 15408 ) at level EAL 4+ or that have a comparable security level. This has to be established by a test laboratory that is accredited for performing Common Criteria evaluations.

RFC 3647

6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating

PKIo

The concurrence of SSCD s or QSCD s with the requirements outlined in PKIo requirement not 6.2.11-pkio104 has to have been ratified by a government body appointed to inspect the secure devices, for the creation of electronic signatures in accordance with the Dutch Telecommunications Act ( TW ) article 18.17, third paragraph. In this respect, also see the Ruling on Electronic Signatures, articles 4 and 5.

RFC 3647

6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating

PKIo

Instead of using a hardware-based SUD , the keys of a services certificate can be protected by software if compensating measures are taken in the system's environment that contains the keys. The compensating measures must be of such a quality that it is practically impossible to steal or copy the key unnoticed.

When registering, the manager of the services certificates that uses this option for software-based storage has, at the very least, to submit a written declaration to state that compensating measures have been taken that fulfil the condition stipulated to this end. The agreement between the subscriber and TSP must state that the TSP is entitled to check the measures that have been taken.

RFC 3647

6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating

PKIo

Secure devices issued or recommended by the TSP for storage of keys ( SUD s) have to fulfil the requirements laid down in document CEN Workshop Agreement on Secure Signature Creation Devices"> CWA 14169 "Secure signature-creation devices " EAL 4+""

RFC 3647

6.3.1 Public key archival

PKIo

[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.2.2, 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.2 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.2]

The signature certificate has to be saved during the term of validity and furthermore during a period of at least seven years after the date on which the validity of the certificate expired.

RFC 3647

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

PKIo

Private keys that are used by a certificate holder and issued under the responsibility of this CP must not be used for more than five years. The certificates, which are issued under the responsibility of this CP , must not be valid for more than five years.

RFC 3647

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

PKIo

Private keys that are used by a certificate holder and issued under the responsibility of this CP must not be used for more than ten years. The certificates, which are issued under the responsibility of this CP , must not be valid for more than ten years.

RFC 3647

6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

PKIo

The TSP attaches activation data to the use of a SUD , SSCD or QSCD , to protect the private keys of the certificate holders.

RFC 3647

6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

PKIo

An unlocking code can only be used if the TSP can guarantee that, at the very least, the security requirements are fulfilled that are laid down in respect of the use of the activation data.

RFC 3647

7.1 Certificate profile

PKIo

The certificate extension Extended Key Usage MUST be present, MUST NOT be marked “critical”, and MUST contain at least the following KeyPurposIds:

For an authenticity certificate:

client Authentication =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2

document Signing =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12

emailProtection = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

For a signature certificate:

document Signing =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12

emailProtection = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

(mandatory for G3 , optional for G2 )

For an confidentiality certificate:

emailProtection =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

Encrypting File System =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4

The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth MUST NOT be present and the KeyPurposeId id-kp-codeSigning MUST NOT be present.

Specifically for G2 certificates any other KeyPurposeId defined in an open or accepted standard corresponding to the key usage as indicated by the KeyUsage extension MAY be present. In the G3 and following generations this extension MAY NOT be present.

RFC 3647

7.1 Certificate profile

PKIo

The certificate extension Extended Key Usage MUST be present, MUST NOT be marked “critical”, and MUST contain at least the following KeyPurposIds:

For a services authentication certificate:

client Authentication =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2

document Signing =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12

For a services confidentiality certificate:

emailProtection =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

Encrypting File System =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4

emailProtection = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

For a seal certificate

document Signing =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12

emailProtection = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth MUST NOT be present, the KeyPurposeId id-kp-codeSigning MUST NOT be present, the KeyPurposeId AnyextendedKeyusage MUST NOT be present and any KeyPurposeId solely intended to identify a service based on its FQDN MUST NOT be present.

Specifically for G2 certificates any other KeyPurposeId defined in an open or accepted standard corresponding to the key usage as indicated by the KeyUsage extension MAY be present. In the G3 and following generations this extension MAY NOT be present.

RFC 3647

7.1 Certificate profile

PKIo

The certificate extension Extended Key Usage MUST be present, MUST NOT be marked “critical”, and MUST contain at least the following KeyPurposIds:

For an Autonomous Devices – authenticity certificate:

Client Authentication =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2

For an Autonomous Devices – confidentiality certificate:

emailProtection =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

Encrypting File System =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4

For an Autonomous Devices – combination certificate:

client Authentication =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2

document Signing =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12

emailProtection =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4

Encrypting File System =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4

The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth MUST NOT be present, the KeyPurposeId id-kp-codeSigning MUST NOT be present, the KeyPurposeId AnyextendedKeyusage MUST NOT be present and any KeyPurposeId solely intended to identify a service based on its FQDN MUST NOT be present.

Specifically for G2 certificates any other KeyPurposeId defined in an open or accepted standard corresponding to the key usage as indicated by the KeyUsage extension MAY be present. In the G3 and following generations this extension MAY NOT be present.

RFC 3647

PKIo

The Subject.CommonName field (if included) MUST contain a FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name). An FQDN MUST also appear in the SubjectAltName.DNsName field. An IP address MUST also appear in the SubjectAltName.iPAdress field.

A server certificate MAY contain multiple FQDNs from different domains on condition that these domains are registered in the name of the same subscriber or is authorization by the same subscriber.

This means that a TSP cannot combine FQDNs in one certificate that are both from different domains and are registered in the name of different owners.

The following is NOT allowed to be included in the Subject.Commonname field, SubjectAltName.iPAdress or the SubjectAltName.DNname field

- wildcard FQDNs

- local domain names,

- private IP addresses

- internationalized domain names ( IDN s)

- null characters \ 0

- generic TopLevel Domain ( gTLD )

- Country code TopLevelDomein ( ccTLD )

RFC 3647

PKIo

The Subject.CommonName field MUST contain a FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name). An FQDN MUST also appear in the SubjectAltName.DNsName field.

An Extended Validation certificate MAY contain several FQDNs. Every FQDN MUST fall under the same main domain. ( e.g. , www.logius.nl, application.logius.nl, secure.logius.nl etc.).

The following is NOT permitted to include in the Subject.Commonname field or the SubjectAltName.DNname field

- wildcard FQDNs

- local domain names,

- private IP addresses

- internationalized domain names ( IDN s)

- null characters \ 0

- generic TopLevel Domain ( gTLD )

- Country code TopLevelDomein ( ccTLD )

RFC 3647

PKIo

The Subject.CommonName SHOULD contain an FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) or an IP address. An FQDN must also appear in the SubjectAltName.DNsName field. An IP address must also appear in the SubjectAltName.iPAdress field.

A server certificate may contain multiple FQDNs from different domains on condition that these domains are registered in the name of the same subscriber or are authorized by the same subscriber.

This means that a TSP cannot combine FQDNs in one certificate that are both from different domains and are registered in the name of different owners.

If it is not possible or desirable to include an FQDN in the subject.commonName field, but the field is necessary for the server to function properly, it is allowed to use the function of an organizational entity or the name with which the service, device or system is indicated.

The following is not permitted to be included in the Subject.Commonname field, SubjectAltName.iPadres or the SubjectAltName.DNname field

- wildcard FQDNs

- local domain names,

- private IP addresses

- internationalized domain names ( IDN s)

- null characters \ 0

- generic TopLevel Domain ( gTLD )

- Country code TopLevelDomein ( ccTLD )

RFC 3647

PKIo

From ETSI TS 119 312, the TSP MUST choose from 1 of the following options for the Signature field in a certificate:

· sha256WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11

( OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)

member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11 })

· ecdsa-with-SHA256: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2

{OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

us(840)ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }})

· sha384WithRSAEncryption : 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12

{OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)

member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12 }

· ecdsa-with-SHA384:1.2.840.10045.4.3.3

{OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }

RFC 3647

PKIo

The Authority Information Access field must contain the following entries:

Access Method = - Id-ad-ocsp (On-line Certificate Status Protocol - 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1). This field must contain the URI where the OCSP responder can be found that is authorized by the issuing CA of the certificate to be checked;

Access Method = Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2). This field must contain the URI where the certificate of the issuing CA can be found.

RFC 3647

PKIo

All end-user certificates must contain at least 64 bits of unpredictable random data generated by a Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator ( CSPRNG ).

RFC 3647

PKIo

All end-user certificates must contain at least 64 bits of unpredictable random data, preferably generated by a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-random Number Generator ( CSPRNG ).

RFC 3647

7.3 OCSP profile

PKIo

If the TSP supports the Online Certificate Status Protocol ( OCSP ), the TSP has to use OCSP certificates and responses in accordance with the requirements laid down in this respect in appendix A of the Basic Requirements, " CRL and OCSP certificate Profiles for certificate status information ".

RFC 3647

8.6 Demonstration of BR conformity

The PA informs TSP s about relevant changes to the Baseline Requirements and / or the Extended Validation Guidelines. TSP s must prove that they comply with stated changes by submitting a signed statement from or on behalf of the authorized director to the PA before the effective date of the change in question. The PA provides a template for this.

If a TSP cannot comply on time or does not submit a signed declaration on time, the PA reserves the right to (temporarily) suspend certificate issuance at the relevant TSP until the TSP can (demonstrably) comply with the stated change.

RFC 3647

9.2. Financial Responsibility

PKIo

By means, for example, of insurance or its financial position, the TSP has to be able to cover third party recovery based on the types of liability mentioned in article 6:196b of the Civil Code (that relate to both direct and indirect damage) up to at least EUR 1,000,000 per annum.

RFC 3647

9.6.1 Representations and Warranties by TSP s

PKIo

In the agreement between the TSP and the subscriber, a clause (a clause as specified in article 6:253 of the Civil Code) will be included in which the TSP champions the interests of a third party relying on the certificate. This clause addresses a liability of the TSP in accordance with article 6:196b, first up to and including third paragraph, of the Civil Code, with the proviso that:

a. for "a qualified certificate specified in article 1.1, division ss Telecommunications Act": "an authenticity certificate" is read;

b. for "signatory": "certificate holder" is read;

c. for "electronic signatures": "authenticity properties" is read.

RFC 3647

9.6.1 Representations and Warranties by TSP s

PKIo

In the agreement between the TSP and the subscriber, a clause (a clause as specified in article 6:253 of the Civil Code) will be included in which the TSP champions the interests of a third party relying on the certificate. This clause addresses a liability of the TSP in accordance with article 6:196b, first up to and including third paragraph, of the Civil Code, with the proviso that:

a. for "a qualified certificate specified in article 1.1, division ss Telecommunications Act": "a server certificate" is read;

b. for "signatory": "certificate holder" is read;

c. for "creation of electronic signatures": "verification of authenticity features and creating encrypted data" is read;

d. For "verification of electronic signatures": "deciphering authentication features and encrypted data" is read.

RFC 3647

9.6.1 Representations and Warranties by TSP s

PKIo

In the agreement between the TSP and the subscriber, a clause (a clause as specified in article 6:253 of the Civil Code) will be included in which the TSP champions the interests of a third party relying on the certificate. This clause addresses a liability of the TSP in accordance with article 6:196b, first up to and including third paragraph, of the Civil Code, with the proviso that:

a. for "a qualified certificate specified in article 1.1, division ss Telecommunications Act": "a confidentiality certificate" is read;

b. for "signatory": "certificate holder" is read;

c. for "creation of electronic signatures": "creation of encrypted data" is read;

d. For "verification of electronic signatures": "decoding of encrypted data" is read.

RFC 3647

9.6.1 Representations and Warranties by TSP s

PKIo

[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.6.2]

In the agreement between the TSP and the subscriber, a clause (a clause as specified in article 6:253 of the Civil Code) will be included in which the TSP champions the interests of a third party relying on the certificate. This clause addresses a liability of the TSP in accordance with article 6:196b, first up to and including third paragraph, of the Civil Code, with the proviso that:

a. for "a qualified certificate specified in article 1.1, division ss Telecommunications Act": "a confidentiality certificate from the PKIoverheid Autonomous Devices domain" is read;

b. for "signatory": "certificate holder" is read;

c. for "creation of electronic signatures": "creation of encrypted data" is read;

d. For "verification of electronic signatures": "decoding of encrypted data" is read.

RFC 3647

9.6.1 Representations and Warranties by TSP s

PKIo

The TSP can include in a non-repudiation certificate restrictions with regard to the use of the certificate, provided that the restrictions are clear to third parties. The TSP is not liable for losses that results from the use of a signature certificate that is contrary to the provisions in accordance with the previous sentence listed therein.

RFC 3647

9.6.1 Representations and Warranties by TSP s

PKIo

The TSP excludes all liability for damages if the certificate is not used in accordance with the certificate use described in paragraph 1.4.

RFC 3647

9.8 Limitations of Liability

PKIo

Within the scope of certificates as mentioned in paragraph 1.4 in this CP the TSP is not allowed to place restrictions on the use of certificates.

RFC 3647

9.8 Limitations of Liability

PKIo

Within the scope of certificates as mentioned in paragraph 1.4 in this CP the TSP is not allowed to place restrictions on the use of EV SSL certificates.

RFC 3647

9.8 Limitations of Liability

PKIo

The TSP is allowed to place restrictions on the use of certificates within the scope of certificates as mentioned in paragraph 1.4 of the applicable PoR part for that type of certificate.

RFC 3647

9.17 Other Provisions

PKIo

The TSP has to be capable of issuing all types of personal certificates listed under [1.2] of the applicable PoR part for that type of certificate.

RFC 3647

9.17 Other Provisions

PKIo

The TSP has to be capable of issuing all types of services certificates listed under [1.2] of the applicable PoR part for that type of certificate.

RFC 3647

9.17 Other Provisions

PKIo

The TSP has to be capable of issuing at least one type of certificate listed under [1.2] of the applicable PoR part for that type of certificate.