Version

Date

Description

4.1

07-2015

Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2015

4.3

07-2016

Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2016

4.5

07-2017

Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2017

4.7

02-2019

Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2019

RFC 3647

Reference to the paragraph from the RFC 3647 structure to which the PKIo requirement relates. RFC 3647 is a PKIX framework of the Internet Engineering Task Force ( IETF ) and is the de facto standard for the structure of Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements [1] .

PKIo

The PKIo requirement that applies to this domain of the PKI for the government.

RFC 3647

2.1 Electronic repository

PKIo

The maximum period of time within which the availability of the dissemination service has to be restored is set at 24 hours.

RFC 3647

2.1 Electronic repository

PKIo

There MUST be an electronic repository where the information referred to in [2.2] is published. This repository can be managed by the TSP or by an independent organisation.

RFC 3647

2.2 Publication of TSP information

PKIo

The TSP has to include the OID s of the CP s that are used in the CPS .

RFC 3647

2.2 Publication of TSP information

PKIo

All information has to be available in Dutch.

RFC 3647

3.1.1 Types of names

PKIo

The TSP has to fulfil the requirements laid down for name formats in the Certificate, CRL and OCSP profiles.

RFC 3647

3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key

PKIo

ETSI EN 319 411-1 GEN -6.3.6-10 is only allowed for encryption certificates. For all other types of PKIoverheid certificates a re-key MUST take place when renewing a certificate.

RFC 3647

3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key

PKIo

Before certificates are renewed, it must be checked that both requirement 3.1.1-pkio and all requirements stated under [3.1] and [3.2] of the CP for that type of certificate have been fulfilled.

RFC 3647

3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

PKIo

After revocation of the certificate, the relevant keys cannot be recertified. ETSI EN 319 411-1 GEN -6.3.6-10 does not apply.

RFC 3647

4.4.1 Conduct constituting acceptance of certificates

PKIo

After issuance of a certificate, the certificate holder of a personal certificate or the certificate manager of the other types of certificate has to specifically confirm to the TSP the delivery of the key material that is part of the certificate.

RFC 3647

4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage

PKIo

The terms and conditions for users that are made available to the relying parties have to state that the relying party has to check the validity of the full chain of certificates up to the source (root certificate) that is relied on.

The terms and conditions must also state that the subscriber is personally responsible for prompt replacement in the event of an approaching expiry of validity, and for emergency replacement in the event of a private key compromise and/or other types of emergencies relating to the certificate or the higher level certificates. The subscriber is expected to take adequate measures in order to safeguard the continuity of the use of certificates.

RFC 3647

4.9.2 Who can request revocation

PKIo-OO

The following parties can request revocation of an end user certificate:

· the certificate manager;

· the certificate holder;

· the subscriber;

· the TSP ;

· any other party or person that has an interest, at the discretion of the TSP .

RFC 3647

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

PKIo

The TSP is entitled to lay down additional requirements in respect of a request for revocation. These additional requirements have to be included in the CPS of the TSP .

RFC 3647

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

PKIo

The maximum period of time within which the availability of the revocation management services have to be restored is set at four hours.

RFC 3647

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

PKIo

The TSP has to record the reasons for revocation of a certificate if the revocation is initiated by the TSP .

RFC 3647

4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request

PKIo

The maximum delay between receiving a revocation request or revocation report and the amendment of the revocation status information that is available to all relying parties, is set at four hours.

RFC 3647

4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

PKIo

An end-user who consults the certificate status information has to verify the authenticity of this information using the electronic signature with which the information has been signed and the corresponding certification path.

RFC 3647

4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

PKIo

The obligation mentioned in [4.9.6-pkio63] has to be included by the TSP in the terms and conditions for users that are made available to the relying parties.

RFC 3647

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

PKIo

To detail the provisions in {16} IETF RFC 2560 , the use of precomputed OCSP responses is not allowed.

RFC 3647

4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension

PKIo

Suspension of a certificate MUST NOT be supported.

RFC 3647

4.10.2 Service availability

PKIo

The maximum period of time within which the availability of the revocation status information has to be restored is set at four hours.

RFC 3647

5.2 Procedural Controls

PKIo

The TSP has to reperform the risk analysis at least every year, or if the PA provides an instruction to that end, or the NCSC provides advice to that end. The risk analysis has to cover all PKIoverheid processes that fall under the responsibility of the TSP .

Based on the risk analysis, the TSP has to develop, implement, maintain, enforce and evaluate an information security plan. This plan describes a cohesive framework of appropriate administrative, organizational, technical and physical measures and procedures with which the TSP can safeguard the availability, exclusivity and integrity of all PKIoverheid processes, requests and the information that is used to this end.

RFC 3647

5.2 Procedural Controls

PKIo

In addition to an audit performed by an accredited auditor, the TSP MAY perform an audit of the external suppliers of PKIoverheid core services, in order to satisfy itself that these suppliers have implemented and operationalized the relevant requirements from the PoR of PKIoverheid, in accordance with the requirements of the TSP and taking into account its business objectives, processes and infrastructure.

The TSP is entirely free to choose to perform its own audit, or to arrange for this to be performed, or to use existing audit results such as those from the formal certification audits, the various internal and external audits, Third Party Notifications and (foreign) compliancy reports.

The TSP is also entitled to view the underlying evidentiary material, such as audit files and other documentation including system documentation.

The above is limited to the TSP processes, systems and infrastructure hosted by the suppliers for PKIo core services.

RFC 3647

5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties

PKIo

The TSP has to enforce separation of duties between at least the following roles:

· Security officer The security officer is responsible for the implementation of and compliance with the stipulated security guidelines.

· System auditor The system auditor fulfils a supervisory role and provides an independent opinion on the manner in which the business processes are arranged and on the manner in which the requirements relating to security are fulfilled.

· Systems administrator The systems manager maintains the TSP systems, which includes installing, configuring and maintaining the systems.

· TSP operators The TSP operators are responsible for the everyday operation of the TSP systems for, among other things, registration, the generation of certificates, the delivery of an SSCD to the certificate holder and revocation management.

RFC 3647

5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties

PKIo

The TSP has to enforce separation of duties between staff who monitor the issuance of a certificate and staff who approve the issuance of a certificate.

RFC 3647

5.3 Declaration of confidentiality

PKIo

Because publication of confidential information can have significant consequences (among other things, for the trustworthiness) the TSP has to make every effort to make sure that confidential information is dealt with confidentially and that it remains confidential. One important aspect is to ensure that declarations of confidentiality are signed by staff members and contracted third parties.

RFC 3647

5.4.3 Retention period for audit log

PKIo

The TSP has to store log files for incidents relating to:

· CA key life cycle management and;

· Certificate life cycle management;

These log files must be retained for 7 years and then deleted.

The TSP has to store log files for incidents relating to:

· Threats and risks;

These log files must be retained for 18 months and then deleted.

The log files have to be retained in such a way that the integrity and accessibility of the data is safeguarded.

RFC 3647

5.5.2 Retention period for archive

PKIo

No PKIo requirement applies, only a comment.

RFC 3647

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures.

PKIo

In the event of a security breach and/or emergency the TSP has to immediately inform the PA , the NCSC , the Agentschap Telecom ( AT ) and the certifying body ( CB ). In case of the loss of privacy sensitive information the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens ( AP ) must also be informed. After analysis the TSP has to keep the PA , the NCSC , AT and the CB informed about how the incident is progressing.

RFC 3647

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures.

PKIo

The TSP will inform the PA immediately about the risks, dangers or events that can in any way threaten or influence the security of the services and/or the image of the PKI for the government. This is including, but not limited to, security breaches and/or emergencies relating to other PKI services performed by the TSP , which are not PKIoverheid services. To this end, the PA obliges the TSP to subscribe to the NCSC security advice.

RFC 3647

6.1.5 Key sizes

PKIo

The length of the certificate holders' cryptographic keys have to fulfil the requirements laid down in that respect in the list of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths as defined in ETSI TS 119 312.

RFC 3647

6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

PKIo

The key usage extension in X.509 v3 certificates ( CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile ) defines the purpose of the use of the key contained in the certificate. The TSP has to indicate the use of keys in the certificate, in accordance with the requirements laid down in that respect in appendix A of this document, namely 'CRL and OCSP profiles' and appendix A of the applicable PoR part for that type of certificate.

RFC 3647

6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key

PKIo

Escrow by the TSP is not allowed for the private keys of PKIoverheid certificates, with the exception of encryption certificates.

RFC 3647

6.2.4 Private key backup of certificate holder key

PKIo

Back-up of the certificate holders' private keys by the TSP is not allowed.

RFC 3647

6.2.5 Private key archival of certificate holder key

PKIo

Archiving of the certificate holders' private keys by the TSP is not allowed.

RFC 3647

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

PKIo

At the time that an end user certificate is issued, the remaining term of validity of the higher level TSP certificate has to exceed the intended term of validity of the end user certificate.

RFC 3647

6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

PKIo

The TSP has to use multi-factor authentication ( e.g. smartcard with personal certificates and a personal password or biometry and a personal password) for the system or all user accounts which are used to issue or approve certificates. This is also mandatory for systems or the user accounts with which data validation takes place.

The TSP may waive this measure for systems or user accounts with which data validation takes place, provided that it has implemented technical measures, as a result of which a user account can only validate certificate requests on the basis of a pre-approved list of domains or e-mail addresses.

RFC 3647

6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

PKIo

The staff of external Registration Authorities ( RA ) or Resellers may not have access to the system or the user accounts of the TSP which enables issuance or approval of certificates. This function is restricted to authorized staff of the TSP . If an RA or a Reseller does have this access, the RA or the Reseller will be seen as part of the TSP and it/they have to comply with the PKI for the government Programme of Requirements fully and demonstrably.

RFC 3647

6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

PKIo

The TSP prevents unauthorized access to the following core services: registration service, certificate generation service, subject device provision service, dissemination service, revocation management service and revocation status service. To this end, these core services are separated either physically or logically from the non-PKI network domains and PKI network domains that do not meet th e Network Security Guidelines of the Cabforum and network related PKIoverheid requirements from RFC 3647 paragraph 6, “Technical Security Controls”. The TSP enforces a unique authentication for each core service mentioned above.

When the physical or logical separation of the network domains described above is not feasible, the various core services must be implemented on separate network domains, where there has to be a unique authentication for each core service mentioned above.

The TSP must document the organization of the network domains, at least in a graphical manner.

RFC 3647

6.6.1 System development controls

PKIo

For ETSI requirements EN 319 401 7.7, EN 319 411-2 6.5.5 & EN 319 411-1 6.5.5,, the PKIoverheid has only formulated a comment and no specific PKIo requirement applies.

RFC 3647

6.7.1 Network security controls

PKIo

The TSP has to ensure that all PKIoverheid ICT systems relating to the registration service, certificate generation service, subject device provision service, dissemination service, revocation management service and revocation status service:

· are equipped with the latest updates and;

· the web application controls and filters all input by users and;

· the web application codes the dynamic output and;

· the web application maintains a secure session with the user and;

· the web application uses a database securely.

RFC 3647

6.7.1 Network security controls

PKIo

Using an audit tool, at least each month the TSP performs a security scan on its PKIoverheid infrastructure. The TSP documents the result of every security scan and the measures that were taken in relation to this scan.

RFC 3647

6.7.1 Network security controls

PKIo

At least once a year, the TSP arranges for a penetration test to be performed on the PKIoverheid internet facing environment, by an independent, experienced, and competent external supplier.

In addition a TSP is obliged to arrange a pen test to be performed when substantial changes to the internet facing environment have occurred,

- The assessment if substantial changes have occurred takes place by means of a documented risk analysis.

- The pen test is performed by an independent, experienced, and competent pen tester.

- The pen test must take place no later than one month after the release, but preferably before going to production.

The TSP has to document the findings from the pen tests mentioned above and the measures that will be taken in this respect, or to arrange for these to be documented.

If necessary, the PA can instruct the TSP to perform additional pen tests.

RFC 3647

7.1 Certificate profile

PKIo

The TSP has to issue certificates in accordance with the requirements stipulated in that respect in appendix A of the applicable PoR part for that type of certificate, namely "Certificate profiles".

RFC 3647

PKIo

All elements within the Issuer field must match the corresponding Subject field of the issuing CA .

RFC 3647

7.2 CRL profile

PKIo

The TSP has to issue CRL s in accordance with the requirements stipulated in that respect in appendix A of this document, " CRL and OCSP profiles".

RFC 3647

8.1 Aantonen conformiteit ETSI / BR

PKIo

A TSP is required for each (annual) ETSI audit:

- to use the current version of the Overview of Requirements developed and made available by PA PKIoverheid OR;

- use an Overview of Requirements developed by the TSP itself.

This Overview of Requirement must be reviewed and approved by the PA prior to the (annual) ETSI audit for completeness. To this end, the TSP must provide the Overview of Requirements (including accompanying Statement of Applicability) to the PA prior to an audit.

If one of these conditions is not met, the PA reserves the right to refuse the audit report.

RFC 3647

9.5 Intellectual property rights

PKIo

The TSP indemnifies the subscriber in respect of claims by third parties due to violations of intellectual property rights by the TSP .

RFC 3647

9.8 Limitations of liability

PKIo

Within the scope of certificates, as mentioned in paragraph 1.4 in this CP the TSP is not allowed to place restrictions on the value of the transactions for which certificates can be used.

RFC 3647

9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period

PKIo

If a published amendment of the CP can have consequences for the end users, the TSP s will announce the amendment to the subscribers and/or certificate holders registered with them in accordance with their CPS .

RFC 3647

9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period

PKIo

The TSP has to provide the PA with information about the intention to amend the CA structure. Consider, for example, the creation of a sub-CA.

RFC 3647

9.13 Dispute resolution provisions

PKIo

The complaints handling process and dispute resolution procedures applied by the TSP may not prevent proceedings being instituted with the ordinary court.

Version

V

MUST be set to 1 ( X.509v2 CRL profile).

CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

Integer

Describes the version of the CRL profile, the value 1 stands for X.509 version 2.

Issuer

V

MUST contain a Distinguished Name ( DN ). The field has attributes as described in the following rows.

PKIo, CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used. The attributes that are used MUST be the same as the corresponding attributes in the Subject field of the TSP certificate (for validation).

Issuer.stateOrProvinceName

N

Is not used.

PKIo

UTF8String

-

Issuer.organizationIdentifier

V/N

The organizationIdentifier filed contains an identification of the issuing CA . This field MUST be included in CRL s when the field subject.organizationIdentifier is part of the TSP certificate used to sign the CRL and MUST not be included in CRL ’s when this field is not part of the TSP certificate in question.

EN 319 412-1

UFF8String

The syntax of the identificatiestring is specified in paragraph 5.1.4 of ETSI EN 319 412-1 and contains:

• 3 character legal person identity type reference;

• 2 character ISO 3166 [2] country code;

• hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D ( ASCII ), U+002D ( UTF-8 )); and

• identifier (according to country and identity type reference).

Permissable values for this field are the OIN or the KVK number of the TSP . The information MUST be the same as the subject.organizationIdentifier incorporated in the TSP CA certificate.

Issuer.localityName

N

Is not used.

PKIo

UTF8String

-

Issuer.commonName

V

See requirement 7.1-pkio174

PKIo, CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

UTF8String

The commonName attribute MUST NOT be necessary to identify the issuing authority (not part of the Distinctive Name, requirement from RFC 3739 ).

NextUpdate

V

MUST indicate the date and time of the next version of the CRL (when it can be expected).

PKIo, CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

UTCTime

This is the latest date on which an update can be expected, however an earlier update is possible. MUST be completed in accordance with the applicable policy set out in the CPS .

authorityKeyIdentifier

O

No

This attribute is interesting if a TSP has more signature certificates with which a CRL could be signed (using this attribute, it can then be ascertained which public key has to be used to verify the signature of the CRL ).

CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

KeyIdentifier

The value MUST include the SHA -1 hash from the authorityKey (public key of the TSP / CA ).

CRLNumber

V

No

This attribute MUST contain an incremental number that provides support when determining the order of CRL s (the TSP provides the numbering in the CRL ).

CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

Integer

issuingDistributionPoint

O

Yes

If this extension is used, this attribute identifies the CRL distribution point. It can also contain additional information (such as a limited set of reason codes why the certificate has been revoked).

CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

If used, this field MUST fulfil the specifications in CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

authorityInfoAccess

O

No

Optional reference to the certificate of the CRL .Issuer.

CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

id-ad-caIssuers ( URI )

MUST conform to § 5.2.7 of CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 .

holdInstructionCode

N

No

Is not used.

CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

OID

The PKI for the government does not use the 'On hold' status.

certificateIssuer

A

Yes

If an indirect CRL is used, this attribute MAY be used to identify the original issuer of the certificate.

CRL Profile"> RFC 5280

GeneralNames

Issuer

V

MUST contain a Distinguished Name ( DN ).

PKIo

An OCSPSigning certificate MUST be issued under the hierarchy of the PKI for the government.

CertificatePolicies

V

No

MUST contain the OID of the PKIoverheid certificate policy ( CP ) as described alongside, the URI of the CPS , and a user notice. The OID schedule to be used in the PKI for the government is described in the CP - Services.

RFC 3739

OID , String, String

The OID for OCSP certificates (for all domains) under the G2 is: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.4.

The OID for OCSP certificates under the G3 is as follows:

- Organisation Person: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.1

- Organisation Services: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.4

- Organisation Servier: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.6

- Citizen: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.1

- Autonomous Devices: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.6.1

The OID for OCSP certificates under the EV is 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.7

The OID for OCSP certificates under the Private Root is as follows:

- Private Services/server: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.4

- Private Persons: 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.1

ocspNoCheck

V/O

The CA /B Forum Baseline Requirements require the use of the ocspNoCheck for publicly trusted server and EV certificates.

For the other PKIoverheid certificates the use is optional.

RFC 2560

The CA /B Forum Baseline Requirements require the use of the ocspNoCheck. It is therefore not clear how browsers are to react on OCSP responder certificates without a ocspNoCheck extension.

Browsers will most probably not check the status of an ocsp signing certificate without the extension.