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Programme of Requirements part 3: Basic Requirements PKIoverheid v4.7

Table of Contents

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This is part 3 Basic Requirements of the Programme of Requirements (PoR) of the PKI for the government and is called the Basic Requirements Pkioverheid. Set out in the PoR are the standards for the PKI for the government. This section of part 3 relates to the basic requirements laid down for the services of a Trust Service Provider (TSP) within the PKI for the government. Within the PKI for the government , a distinction is made between various domains. These basic requirements relate to all types of certificate issued under these domains.

A detailed explanation regarding the background and structure of the PKI for the government, as well as the cohesion between the various parts within the PoR is included in part 1 of the PoR.

For a list of the definitions and abbreviations used in this section, please refer to part 4 of the PoR.

1.1.1 Design of the Certificate Policies

Part 3 of the Programme of Requirements of PKIoverheid consitis of the following elements:

  • Part 3 Basic Requirements: The basic requirements are applicable to all Certificate Policies in part 3 of the Programme of Requirements;

  • Part 3 Additional Requirements: Contains all additional requirements that are applicable to one or more CPs, but not all CPs;

  • Part 3 Reference matrix PKIoverheid and ETSI: An overview of PKIoverheid requirements with a reference to the applicable ETSI norm(s);

  • Part 3a through 3i: The Certificate Policies for the different PKIoverheid certificates. These CP’s govern the issueance of end entity certificates under the regular root, the private root and the Extended Validation root. These root certificates are broken down into different versions or generations.

The CPs in part 3 of the PoR are structured as follows:

  • Part 3a: Personal certificates in the Organization domain;

  • Part 3b: Services authentication and encryption certificates in the Organization domain;

  • Part 3c: Personal certificates in the Citizen domain;

  • Part 3d: Services certificates in the Autonomous Devices domain;

  • Part 3e: Website and server certificates in the Organization domain;

  • Part 3f: Extended Validation certificates under the Extended Validation root;

  • Part 3g: Services authentication and encryption certificates in the Private Services domain;

  • Part 3h: Server certificates in the Private Services domain;

  • Part 3i: Personal certificates in the Private Services domain.

All PKIoverheid requirements have an unique and persistant number which also contains a reference to RFC 3647.

Furthermore each PKIoverheid requirement can have a relation with one or more ETSI requirements for the issuance of PKI certificates. In a separate Excel tabsheet in the OoA template “Referentiematrix PKIoverheid and ETSI” this relationship is listed, aiding in interpreting the PKIoverheid requirements in the context of the ETSI requirements.

The PKIoverheid requirements are devided into the Basic Requirements and the Additonal Requirements. The Basic Requirements are applicable to all CPs. Additionally, each CP contains references to the Additional Requirments that are applicable to that specific CP. The CPs do not contain reference to the Basic Requirements or relevant ETSI standard, as these are automatically applicable.

To comply with a specific CP the applicable ETSI standard, the Basic Requirements and part of the Additional Requirements of PKIoverheid must be met.

Incorporated in chapters 2 to 9 inclusive are the specific PKIoverheid requirements. The table below shows the structure within which all PKIoverheid requirements (PKIo requirement) are specified individually.

RFC 3647 Reference to the paragraph from the RFC 3647 structure to which the PKIo requirement relates. RFC 3647 is a PKIX framework of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and is the de facto standard for the structure of Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements[^1].
Number Unique number of the PKIo requirement. In each paragraph, consecutive numbering is used for the PKIo requirements. In combination with the RFC 3647 paragraph number, this forms a unique label for the PKIo requirement.
PKIo The PKIo requirement that applies to this domain of the PKI for the government.
Comment To provide a better understanding of the context in which the requirement has to be placed a comment has been added to a number of PKIo requirements.

1.1.2 Status

This is version 4.7 of part 3 Basic Requirements of the Programme of Requirements. The current version has been updated up to and including 8 February 2019.

The PA has devoted the utmost attention and care to the data and information incorporated in these Basic Requirements of the PoR. Nevertheless, it is possible that there are inaccuracies and imperfections. The PA accepts no liability for damage resulting from these inaccuracies or imperfections, nor is any liability assumed for damage caused by the use or distribution of these Basic Requirements, if these Basic Requirements are used for purposes other than for the use of certificates described in paragraph 1.4 of the individual PoR parts.

1.2 Contact information Policy Authority

The PA is responsible for these Basic Requirements. Questions relating to the Basic Requirements can be directed to the PA; the address can be found at: http://www.logius.nl/pkioverheid.

2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1 Electronic Repository

RFC 3647 2.1 Electronic repository
Number 2.1-pkio1
PKIo The maximum period of time within which the availability of the dissemination service has to be restored is set at 24 hours.
RFC 3647 2.1 Electronic repository
Number 2.1-pkio2
PKIo There MUST be an electronic repository where the information referred to in [2.2] is published. This repository can be managed by the TSP or by an independent organisation.
Comment The information that has to be published is included in ETSI TS 101 456. The relevant articles in which the information is specified can be found in the reference matrix in appendix B.

2.2 Publication of TSP Information

RFC 3647 2.2 Publication of TSP information
Number 2.2-pkio5
PKIo The TSP has to include the OIDs of the CPs that are used in the CPS.
RFC 3647 2.2 Publication of TSP information
Number 2.2-pkio6
PKIo All information has to be available in Dutch.

3 Identification and Authentication

3.1 Naming

RFC 3647 3.1.1 Types of names
Number 3.1.1-pkio10
PKIo The TSP has to fulfil the requirements laid down for name formats in the Certificate, CRL and OCSP profiles.
Comment Included in appendix A of the Basic Requirements are the CRL and OCSP profiles. The PoR part for a certain type of certificate contains the certificate profile in appendix A.

3.2 Initial Identity Validation

Contains no Basic Requirements.

3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

RFC 3647 3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key
Number 3.3.1-pkio36
PKIo ETSI EN 319 411-1 GEN-6.3.6-10 is only allowed for encryption certificates. For all other types of PKIoverheid certificates a re-key MUST take place when renewing a certificate.
Comment ETSI EN 319 411-1 GEN-6.3.6-10 states under which conditions recertification of the keys of encryption certificates is permitted. The requirement means that certificates CANNOT be renewed without a re-key for the authenticity, signature and server certificates.
RFC 3647 3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key
Number 3.3.1-pkio45
PKIo Before certificates are renewed, it must be checked that both requirement 3.1.1-pkio and all requirements stated under [3.1] and [3.2] of the CP for that type of certificate have been fulfilled.
Comment The relevant articles in which the requirements are specified can be found in part 3 Reference matrix PKIoverheid and ETSI. When replacing a personal certificate at the end of its lifetime the qualified signature of the non-repudiation certificate can be used during registration and identification, instead of the physical presence of the certificate holder. This is subject to a number of conditions: - The non-repudiation certificate must be valid at the time of renewal; - The file must be current and complete, including a copy of a valid ID document (WID); - Subject details of the applicant of the new personal certificate are the same as the details in the valid non-repudiation certificate, e.g. organization field; - The single renewal of the certificate without physical appearance is only possible through the TSP that issued the non-repudiation certificate based on physical identification. All personal certificates under PoR parts 3a, 3c and 3i can be renewed once in this manner.
RFC 3647 3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
Number 3.3.2-pkio46
PKIo After revocation of the certificate, the relevant keys cannot be recertified. ETSI EN 319 411-1 GEN-6.3.6-10 does not apply.

4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1 Certificate Application

Contains no Basic Requirements.

4.2 Certificate Acceptance

RFC 3647 4.4.1 Conduct constituting acceptance of certificates
Number 4.4.1-pkio49
PKIo After issuance of a certificate, the certificate holder of a personal certificate or the certificate manager of the other types of certificate has to specifically confirm to the TSP the delivery of the key material that is part of the certificate.
Comment When keys protected by software are used (see [6.2.11-pkio106 and 6.2.11-pkio107]) where the private key is generated by the certificate manager rather than the TSP, the delivery of key material is not applicable. However, the data required in 7.3.1.i and 7.3.1.m must be logged. This stipulation is applicable to CP parts E, F and H.

4.3 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

RFC 3647 4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage
Number 4.5.2-pkio51
PKIo The terms and conditions for users that are made available to the relying parties have to state that the relying party has to check the validity of the full chain of certificates up to the source (root certificate) that is relied on. The terms and conditions must also state that the subscriber is personally responsible for prompt replacement in the event of an approaching expiry of validity, and for emergency replacement in the event of a private key compromise and/or other types of emergencies relating to the certificate or the higher level certificates. The subscriber is expected to take adequate measures in order to safeguard the continuity of the use of certificates.
Comment The validity of a certificate does not indicate the certificate holder's authority to perform a specific transaction on behalf of an organization or pursuant to his or her profession. The PKI for the government does not arrange authorization; a relying party has to convince itself of that in a different manner. It is advisable to inform the subscriber to take into account the “ICT beveiligingsrichtlijnen voor de transport layer security (TLS)” of the NCSC when using PKIoverheid server certificates. This advice can be obtained online via the website of the NCSC.

4.4 Compliance, audit and assessment

Contains no Basic Requirements.

4.5 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

RFC 3647 4.9.2 Who can request revocation
Number 4.9.2-pkio53
PKIo-OO

The following parties can request revocation of an end user certificate:

  • the certificate manager;

  • the certificate holder;

  • the subscriber;

  • the TSP;

  • any other party or person that has an interest, at the discretion of the TSP.
RFC 3647 4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
Number 14.9.3-pkio54
PKIo The TSP is entitled to lay down additional requirements in respect of a request for revocation. These additional requirements have to be included in the CPS of the TSP. 
RFC 3647 4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
Number 4.9.3-pkio55
PKIo The maximum period of time within which the availability of the revocation management services have to be restored is set at four hours.
RFC 3647 4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
Number 4.9.3-pkio56
PKIo The TSP has to record the reasons for revocation of a certificate if the revocation is initiated by the TSP.
RFC 3647 4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request
Number 4.9.5-pkio61
PKIo The maximum delay between receiving a revocation request or revocation report and the amendment of the revocation status information that is available to all relying parties, is set at four hours.
Comment This requirement applies to all types of certificate status information (CRL and OCSP)
RFC 3647 4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
Number 4.9.5-pkio63
PKIo An end-user who consults the certificate status information has to verify the authenticity of this information using the electronic signature with which the information has been signed and the corresponding certification path.
RFC 3647 4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
Number 4.9.5-pkio64
PKIo The obligation mentioned in [4.9.6-pkio63] has to be included by the TSP in the terms and conditions for users that are made available to the relying parties.
RFC 3647 4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
Number 4.9.9-pkio69
PKIo To detail the provisions in {16} IETF RFC 2560, the use of precomputed OCSP responses is not allowed.
RFC 3647 4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension
Number 4.9.13-pkio72
PKIo Suspension of a certificate MUST NOT be supported.

4.6 Certificate Status Services

RFC 3647 4.10.2 Service availability
Number 4.10.2-pkio73
PKIo The maximum period of time within which the availability of the revocation status information has to be restored is set at four hours.
Comment This requirement only applies to the CRL and not to other mechanisms, such as OCSP.

5 Facility, Management and Operational Controls

5.1 Procedural Controls

RFC 3647 5.2 Procedural Controls
Number 5.2-pkio74
PKIo The TSP has to reperform the risk analysis at least every year, or if the PA provides an instruction to that end, or the NCSC provides advice to that end. The risk analysis has to cover all PKIoverheid processes that fall under the responsibility of the TSP. Based on the risk analysis, the TSP has to develop, implement, maintain, enforce and evaluate an information security plan. This plan describes a cohesive framework of appropriate administrative, organizational, technical and physical measures and procedures with which the TSP can safeguard the availability, exclusivity and integrity of all PKIoverheid processes, requests and the information that is used to this end.
RFC 3647 5.2 Procedural Controls
Number 5.2-pkio75
PKIo

In addition to an audit performed by an accredited auditor, the TSP MAY perform an audit of the external suppliers of PKIoverheid core services, in order to satisfy itself that these suppliers have implemented and operationalized the relevant requirements from the PoR of PKIoverheid, in accordance with the requirements of the TSP and taking into account its business objectives, processes and infrastructure.

The TSP is entirely free to choose to perform its own audit, or to arrange for this to be performed, or to use existing audit results such as those from the formal certification audits, the various internal and external audits, Third Party Notifications and (foreign) compliancy reports.

The TSP is also entitled to view the underlying evidentiary material, such as audit files and other documentation including system documentation.

The above is limited to the TSP processes, systems and infrastructure hosted by the suppliers for PKIo core services.
RFC 3647 5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties
Number 5.2.4-pkio76
PKIo The TSP has to enforce separation of duties between at least the following roles: - Security officer
The security officer is responsible for the implementation of and compliance with the stipulated security guidelines. - System auditor
The system auditor fulfils a supervisory role and provides an independent opinion on the manner in which the business processes are arranged and on the manner in which the requirements relating to security are fulfilled. - Systems administrator
The systems manager maintains the TSP systems, which includes installing, configuring and maintaining the systems. - TSP operators
The TSP operators are responsible for the everyday operation of the TSP systems for, among other things, registration, the generation of certificates, the delivery of an SSCD to the certificate holder and revocation management.
Comment The aforementioned job descriptions are not limitative and the TSP is free to extend the description within the requirements of segregation of functions, or to divide the functions further still, or to share these between other trusted officials.
RFC 3647 5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties
Number 5.2.4-pkio77
PKIo The TSP has to enforce separation of duties between staff who monitor the issuance of a certificate and staff who approve the issuance of a certificate.

5.2 Personnel Controls

RFC 3647 5.3 Declaration of confidentiality
Number 5.3-pkio78
PKIo Because publication of confidential information can have significant consequences (among other things, for the trustworthiness) the TSP has to make every effort to make sure that confidential information is dealt with confidentially and that it remains confidential. One important aspect is to ensure that declarations of confidentiality are signed by staff members and contracted third parties.

5.3 Audit Logging Procedures

RFC 3647 5.4.3 Retention period for audit log
Number 5.4.3-pkio81
PKIo

The TSP has to store log files for incidents relating to:

  • CA key life cycle management and;

  • Certificate life cycle management;

These log files must be retained for 7 years and then deleted.

The TSP has to store log files for incidents relating to:

  • Threats and risks;

These log files must be retained for 18 months and then deleted.

The log files have to be retained in such a way that the integrity and accessibility of the data is safeguarded.

5.4 Records Archival

RFC 3647 5.5.2 Retention period for archive
Number 5.5.2-pkio83
PKIo No PKIo requirement applies, only a comment.
Comment At the request of the entitled party, it can be agreed that the required information is stored for longer by the TSP. This is, however, not mandatory for the TSP.

5.5 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

RFC 3647 5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures.
Number 5.7.1-pkio84
PKIo In the event of a security breach and/or emergency the TSP has to immediately inform the PA, the NCSC, the Agentschap Telecom (AT) and the certifying body (CB). In case of the loss of privacy sensitive information the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (AP) must also be informed. After analysis the TSP has to keep the PA, the NCSC, AT and the CB informed about how the incident is progressing.
Comment

Understood to be meant by security breach in the PKIoverheid context is:

An infringement of the TSP core services: registration service, certificate generation service, subject device provisioning service, dissemination service, revocation management service and revocation status service. This is including, but not limited to:

  • unauthorized elimination of a core service or rendering this core service inaccessible;

  • unauthorized access to a core service in order to eavesdrop on, intercept and/or change electronic messaging;

  • unauthorized access to a core service for unauthorized removal, amendment or alteration of computer data.
RFC 3647 5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures.
Number 5.7.1-pkio85
PKIo The TSP will inform the PA immediately about the risks, dangers or events that can in any way threaten or influence the security of the services and/or the image of the PKI for the government. This is including, but not limited to, security breaches and/or emergencies relating to other PKI services performed by the TSP, which are not PKIoverheid services. To this end, the PA obliges the TSP to subscribe to the NCSC security advice.

6 Technical Security Controls

6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

RFC 3647 6.1.5 Key sizes
Number 6.1.5-pkio96
PKIo The length of the certificate holders' cryptographic keys have to fulfil the requirements laid down in that respect in the list of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths as defined in ETSI TS 119 312.
Comment Although ETSI TS 119 312 outlines the recommended algorithms and key lengths, these are compulsory within the PKI for the government. Requests relating to the use of other algorithms have to be submitted, along with the reasoning behind this, to the PA of the PKI for the government.
RFC 3647 6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
Number 6.1.7-pkio97
PKIo The key usage extension in X.509 v3 certificates (RFC 5280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile) defines the purpose of the use of the key contained in the certificate. The TSP has to indicate the use of keys in the certificate, in accordance with the requirements laid down in that respect in appendix A of this document, namely 'CRL and OCSP profiles' and appendix A of the applicable PoR part for that type of certificate.

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

RFC 3647 6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key
Number 6.2.3-pkio98
PKIo Escrow by the TSP is not allowed for the private keys of PKIoverheid certificates, with the exception of encryption certificates.
RFC 3647 6.2.4 Private key backup of certificate holder key
Number 6.2.4-pkio102
PKIo Back-up of the certificate holders' private keys by the TSP is not allowed.
RFC 3647 6.2.5 Private key archival of certificate holder key
Number 6.2.5-pkio103
PKIo Archiving of the certificate holders' private keys by the TSP is not allowed.

6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

RFC 3647 6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
Number 6.3.2-pkio110
PKIo At the time that an end user certificate is issued, the remaining term of validity of the higher level TSP certificate has to exceed the intended term of validity of the end user certificate.

6.4 Activation data

Contains no basic requirements.

6.5 Computer Security Controls

RFC 3647 6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements
Number 6.5.1-pkio114
PKIo The TSP has to use multi-factor authentication (e.g. smartcard with personal certificates and a personal password or biometry and a personal password) for the system or all user accounts which are used to issue or approve certificates. This is also mandatory for systems or the user accounts with which data validation takes place. The TSP may waive this measure for systems or user accounts with which data validation takes place, provided that it has implemented technical measures, as a result of which a user account can only validate certificate requests on the basis of a pre-approved list of domains or e-mail addresses.
Comment Multi-factor authentication tokens cannot be connected permanently or semi-permanently to the system (e.g. a permanently activated smartcard). That is because this would enable certificates to be issued or approved (semi) automatically, or for non-authorized staff to issue or approve certificates.
RFC 3647 6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements
Number 6.5.1-pkio115
PKIo The staff of external Registration Authorities (RA) or Resellers may not have access to the system or the user accounts of the TSP which enables issuance or approval of certificates. This function is restricted to authorized staff of the TSP. If an RA or a Reseller does have this access, the RA or the Reseller will be seen as part of the TSP and it/they have to comply with the PKI for the government Programme of Requirements fully and demonstrably.
RFC 3647 6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements
Number 6.5.1-pkio116
PKIo The TSP prevents unauthorized access to the following core services: registration service, certificate generation service, subject device provision service, dissemination service, revocation management service and revocation status service. To this end, these core services are separated either physically or logically from the non-PKI network domains and PKI network domains that do not meet the Network Security Guidelines of the Cabforum and network related PKIoverheid requirements from RFC3647 paragraph 6, “Technical Security Controls”. The TSP enforces a unique authentication for each core service mentioned above. When the physical or logical separation of the network domains described above is not feasible, the various core services must be implemented on separate network domains, where there has to be a unique authentication for each core service mentioned above. The TSP must document the organization of the network domains, at least in a graphical manner.
Comment This requirement applies to both the production environment and the fall-back environment. This requirement does not apply to other environments, such as acceptance and test.

6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

RFC 3647 6.6.1 System development controls
Number 6.6.1-pkio117
PKIo For ETSI requirements EN 319 401 7.7, EN 319 411-2 6.5.5 & EN 319 411-1 6.5.5,, the PKIoverheid has only formulated a comment and no specific PKIo requirement applies.
Comment

Compliance with 6.4.7, 7.4.7 and Electronic Signature Regulation art. 2 paragraph 1c can be demonstrated by:

  • an audit statement from the supplier of the products, which has had an independent EDP audit performed for QSCDs based on EN 419 211 or for SSCDs based on CWA 14167-1 (transitional permission regime);
  • an audit statement from an internal auditor from the TSP for QSCDs based on EN 419 211 or for SSCDs based on CWA 14167-1 (transitional permission regime);
  • an audit statement from an external auditor for QSCDs based on EN 419 211 or for SSCDs based on CWA 14167-1 (transitional permission regime).

6.7 Network Security Controls

RFC 3647 6.7.1 Network security controls
Number 6.7.1-pkio118
PKIo

The TSP has to ensure that all PKIoverheid ICT systems relating to the registration service, certificate generation service, subject device provision service, dissemination service, revocation management service and revocation status service:

  • are equipped with the latest updates and;

  • the web application controls and filters all input by users and;

  • the web application codes the dynamic output and;

  • the web application maintains a secure session with the user and;

  • the web application uses a database securely.
Comment The TSP has to use the NCSC's “Checklist beveiliging webapplicaties (Security of Web Applications Checklist)[^2]” as guidance for this. In addition it is recommended that the TSP implements all other recommendations from the latest version of the white paper “Raamwerk Beveiliging Webapplicaties (The Framework for Web Application Security)” by the NCSC.
RFC 3647 6.7.1 Network security controls
Number 6.7.1-pkio119
PKIo Using an audit tool, at least each month the TSP performs a security scan on its PKIoverheid infrastructure. The TSP documents the result of every security scan and the measures that were taken in relation to this scan.
Comment Some examples of commercial and non-commercial audit tools are GFI LanGuard, Nessus, Nmap, OpenVAS and Retina.
RFC 3647 6.7.1 Network security controls
Number 6.7.1-pkio120
PKIo At least once a year, the TSP arranges for a penetration test to be performed on the PKIoverheid internet facing environment, by an independent, experienced, and competent external supplier. In addition a TSP is obliged to arrange a pen test to be performed when substantial changes to the internet facing environment have occurred, - The assessment if substantial changes have occurred takes place by means of a documented risk analysis. - The pen test is performed by an independent, experienced, and competent pen tester. - The pen test must take place no later than one month after the release, but preferably before going to production. The TSP has to document the findings from the pen tests mentioned above and the measures that will be taken in this respect, or to arrange for these to be documented. If necessary, the PA can instruct the TSP to perform additional pen tests.
Comment CLARIFICATION Substantial changes include: - New software; - New version of existing software, excluding patches; - Changes in infrastructuur. As guidance for the selection of suppliers, the TSP can use the recommendation in chapter 4 (“Supplier Selection”) as described in the latest version of the whitepaper entitled “Pentesten doe je zo[^3]” (how to perform penetration testing) published by the NCSC.

7 Certificate, CRL and OSCP profiles

7.1 Certificate Profile

RFC 3647 7.1 Certificate profile
Number 7.1-pkio121
PKIo The TSP has to issue certificates in accordance with the requirements stipulated in that respect in appendix A of the applicable PoR part for that type of certificate, namely "Certificate profiles".
RFC 3647 7.1 Certificate profile
Number 7.1-pkio174
PKIo All elements within the Issuer field must match the corresponding Subject field of the issuing CA.

7.2 CRL Profile

RFC 3647 7.2 CRL profile
Number 7.2-pkio122
PKIo The TSP has to issue CRLs in accordance with the requirements stipulated in that respect in appendix A of this document, "CRL and OCSP profiles".

7.3 OCSP Profile

Contains no basic requirements.

8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

RFC 3647 8.1 Aantonen conformiteit ETSI/BR
Nummer 8.1-pkio159
PKIo A TSP is required for each (annual) ETSI audit: - to use the current version of the Overview of Requirements developed and made available by PA PKIoverheid OR; - use an Overview of Requirements developed by the TSP itself. This Overview of Requirement must be reviewed and approved by the PA prior to the (annual) ETSI audit for completeness. To this end, the TSP must provide the Overview of Requirements (including accompanying Statement of Applicability) to the PA prior to an audit. If one of these conditions is not met, the PA reserves the right to refuse the audit report.
Opmerking
  • As part of this statement, the legend must state which versions of the applicable standards have been used.
  • The TSP must allow for processing time by the PA (maximum of 15 working days)
  • A copy of the reviewed Overview of Requirements will be sent to the ETSI auditor.

9 Other Business and Legal Matters

9.1 Financial Responsibility

Contains no basic requirements.

9.2 Intellectual Property Rights

RFC 3647 9.5 Intellectual property rights
Number 9.5-pkio126
PKIo The TSP indemnifies the subscriber in respect of claims by third parties due to violations of intellectual property rights by the TSP.

9.3 Limitations of Liability

RFC 3647 9.8 Limitations of liability
Number 9.8-pkio135
PKIo Within the scope of certificates, as mentioned in paragraph 1.4 in this CP the TSP is not allowed to place restrictions on the value of the transactions for which certificates can be used.

9.4 Amendments

The change procedure for the PoR of the PKIoverheid is incorporated in PKIoverheid's Certificate Practice Statement. The CPS can be obtained in an electronic format on the PA's website:

https://cps.pkioverheid.nl

RFC 3647 9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period
Number 9.12.2-pkio136
PKIo If a published amendment of the CP can have consequences for the end users, the TSPs will announce the amendment to the subscribers and/or certificate holders registered with them in accordance with their CPS.
RFC 3647 9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period
Number 9.12.2-pkio137
PKIo The TSP has to provide the PA with information about the intention to amend the CA structure. Consider, for example, the creation of a sub-CA.

This CP and the approved amendments made to it can be obtained in an electronic format through the Internet on the PA's website. The address of this is: http://www.logius.nl/pkioverheid.

9.5 Dispute Resolution Provisions

RFC 3647 9.13 Dispute resolution provisions
Number 9.13-pkio138
PKIo The complaints handling process and dispute resolution procedures applied by the TSP may not prevent proceedings being instituted with the ordinary court.

9.6 Governing Law

Dutch law is applicable to the CPs of PKIoverheid (Part 3a through 3i).

9.7 Other Provisions

Contains no basic requirements.

Exported on: 2019-02-08.