Programme of Requirements part 3c: Certificate Policy for certificates in Citizen (G3) Domain v4.9
Table of Contents
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
- 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
- 4.
CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
- 4.1 Certificate Application
- 4.2 Certificate application processing
- 4.3 Certificate issuance
- 4.4 Certificate acceptance
- 4.5 Key pair and certificate usage
- 4.6
Certificate renewal
- 4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal
- 4.6.2 Who may request renewal
- 4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests
- 4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
- 4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
- 4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
- 4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
- 4.7
Certificate re-key
- 4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key
- 4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key
- 4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests
- 4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
- 4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
- 4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
- 4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
- 4.8
Certificate modification
- 4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification
- 4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification
- 4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests
- 4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
- 4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
- 4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
- 4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
- 4.9
Certificate revocation and
suspension
- 4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation
- 4.9.2 Who can request revocation
- 4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
- 4.9.4 Revocation request grace period
- 4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request
- 4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
- 4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)
- 4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)
- 4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
- 4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements
- 4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available
- 4.9.12 Special requirements related to key compromise
- 4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension
- 4.9.14 Who can request suspension
- 4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request
- 4.9.16 Limits on suspension period
- 4.10 Certificate status services
- 4.11 End of subscription
- 4.12 Key escrow and recovery
- 5.
FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND
OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
- 5.1 Physical controls
- 5.2 Procedural controls
- 5.3
Personnel controls
- 5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
- 5.3.2 Background check procedures
- 5.3.3 Training requirements
- 5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements
- 5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence
- 5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions
- 5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements
- 5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel
- 5.4 Audit logging procedures
- 5.5 Records archival
- 5.6 Key changeover
- 5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery
- 5.8 CA or RA termination
- 6.
TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
- 6.1 Key pair generation and installation
- 6.2
Private Key Protection and
Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
- 6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls
- 6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
- 6.2.3 Private key escrow
- 6.2.4 Private key backup
- 6.2.5 Private key archival
- 6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
- 6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module
- 6.2.8 Method of activating private key
- 6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key
- 6.2.10 Method of destroying private key
- 6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating
- 6.3 Other aspects of key pair management
- 6.4 Activation data
- 6.5 Computer security controls
- 6.6 Life cycle technical controls
- 6.7 Network security controls
- 6.8 Time-stamping
- 7.
CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP
PROFILES
- 7.1
Certificate profile
- 7.1.1 Version number(s)
- 7.1.2 Certificate extensions
- 7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers
- 7.1.4 Name forms
- 7.1.5 Name constraints
- 7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier
- 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension
- 7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics
- 7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension
- 7.2 CRL profile
- 7.3 OCSP profile
- 7.1
Certificate profile
- 8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS
- 9.
OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL
MATTERS
- 9.1 Fees
- 9.2 Financial responsibility
- 9.3 Confidentiality of business information
- 9.4
Privacy of personal
information
- 9.4.1 Privacy plan
- 9.4.2 Information treated as private
- 9.4.3 Information not deemed private
- 9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information
- 9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information
- 9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
- 9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances
- 9.5 Intellectual property rights
- 9.6 Representations and warranties
- 9.7 Disclaimers of warranties
- 9.8 Limitations of liability
- 9.9 Indemnities
- 9.10 Term and termination
- 9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants
- 9.12 Amendments
- 9.13 Dispute resolution provisions
- 9.14 Governing law
- 9.15 Compliance with applicable law
- 9.16 Miscellaneous provisions
- 9.17 Other provisions
- Appendix A: Certificate Profiles
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
1.2 Document name and identification
1.2.1 Revisions
1.2.1.1 Version 3.7 to 4.0
New
None.
Modifications
- PoR requirements have been renumbered according to a new naming convention;
- The creation of a document containing the baseline and additional requirements;
- Changes to requirements can be found in the baseline and additional requirements documents respectively.
Editorial
- Editorial changes to requirements can be found in the baseline and additional requirements documents respectively. These changes have no effect on the content of the information.
1.2.1.2 Version 4.0 to 4.1
New
- Certification against ETSI TS 102 042 (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.1).
Modifications
None.
Editorial
Small editorial modifications to the following requirements:
- 3.1.3-pkio11;
- 5.7.4-pkio86;
- 9.6.1-pkio131.
1.2.1.3 Version 4.1 to 4.2
New
- Requirement 7.1-pkio149 (effective date July 1, 2016).
Modifications
None.
Editorial
None.
1.2.1.4 Version 4.2 to 4.3
New
- Addition of Issuer.organizationalIdentifier in the certificate profile (effective date 1-7-2016).
Modifications
- Description with attribute CertificatePolicies (effective date 1-7-2016);
- Removal of optional use KeyAgreement with Key Usage (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.3);
- Mandatory QcStatement in qualified certificate (effective date 1-7-2016);
- ETSI TS 102 176-1 replaced by ETSI TS 119 312 (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.3);
- Use of values in the BasicConstraints field no longer permitted in end entity certificates (effective date 1-7-2016) ;
- ETSI TS 102 042 replaced by ETSI EN 319 411-1 (effective date 1-7-2016 or when the accreditation to the certifying body has been granted with a final date of June 30, 2017).
Editorial
- Removed references to G1 Root (expired).
1.2.1.5 Version 4.3 to 4.4
New
None.
Modifications
Removal of requirement 5.3.2-pkio79 (effective date 1-2-2017);
Clarification of issuer.organizationIdentifier field (effective date 1-2-2017);
Tightening of use optional EKUs that conflict with the parent TSP CA certificate (effective date 1-2-2017);
Probihition use of QCStatement with authenticity and confidentiality certificate (equalization of parts a, c &I, effective date 1-2-2017).
Editorial
- Replaced CSP (Certificate Service Provider) with TSP (Trust Service Provider) in accordance with eIDAS directive.
1.2.1.6 Version 4.4 to 4.5
New
- Mandatory English CPS (requirement 2.2-pkio3, effective date 1-10-2017);
- Mandatory yearly renewal CPS (requirement 2.2-pkio156, effective date 1-1-2017).
Modifications
- Requirement 4.9.9-pkio67 now references RFC6960 instead of RFC2560 (effective date 31-12-2016);
- Allow/require EKU emailProtection in authenticity and non-repudiation certificates in requirement 7.1-pkio149 (effectrive date 1-4-2017);
- Change in OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.1 to also cover OCSP responder certificates (effective date 1-7-2017);
- Mandatory use of field “NextUpdate” in OCSP responses (requirement 4.9.9-pkio71, effective date 1-7-2017).
Editorial
- Removed typos from certificate profile.
1.2.1.7 Version 4.5 to 4.6
New
None.
Modifications
- Modified reference to ETSI certificate profiles (effective date directly after publication of PoR 4.6);
- Certificate profile, removed exeption subject.surName and subject.givenName (effective date directly after publication of PoR 4.6);
- Corrected subjectAltName.othername field (effective date directly after publication of PoR 4.6).
Editorial
None.
1.2.1.8 Version 4.6 to 4.7
New
- Requirement 7.1-pkio177 (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.7);
- Requirement 3.2.3-pkio169 (effective date 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.7).
Modifications
- Description of a number of certificate attributes replaced by reference to requirement 7.1-pkio174 (effective date 8 weeks after publication PoR 4.7);
- Reference to CWA 14 169 amended to EN 419 211 for QSCDs. This also sets requirements for the issue of QSCDs for requirements 6.1.1-pkio88, 6.2.11-pkio104, 6.2.11-pkio105, 6.2.11-pkio106, 6.4.1-pkio112 and 4.9.1-pkio52 (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.7).
Editorial
None.
1.2.1.9 Version 4.7 to 4.8
New
None.
Modifications
- 9.17-pkio139 vervallen (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.8);
- 7.1-pkio173 aanpassing serienummer eisen (effective date August 29, 2019).
Editorial
- 6.1.2-pkio94 verwijzing naar ETSI TS 101 456 7.2.8.d aangepast naar 411-1 (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.8);
- 4.9.1-pkio52 definitie privé sleutel (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.8);
- 4.9.9-pkio68 aanpassing verwijzing (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.8).
1.2.1.10 Version 4.8 to 4.9
New
Requirement 2.2-pkio191, the CPS of the TSP MUST follow the layout according to RFC 3647 (effective date after 01-04-2020).
4.9.1-pkio192, describes when certificates will be revoked (effective date 02-17-2020).
8.1-pkio189, if the TSP issues or intends to issue qualified certificates under PKIoverheid, the following additional requirements apply in addition to those set out in requirement 8.1-pkio187 (effective date 02-17-2020).
Modifications
Change requirements 6.1.1-pkio89 to comply with Mozilla policy on signature encoding (effective date 01-03-2020).
Removed PoR Part 3c from scope of additional requirement 4.9.1-pkio52 (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.9).
Removals
Requirement 2.2-pkio7 has been removed (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.9).
Requirement 6.1.1-pkio87 has been removed (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.9).
Requirement 6.2.3-pkio101 has been removed (effective date immediately after publication PoR 4.9).
Editorial
None.
1.2.2 Relevant dates
| Version | Date | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 12-2014 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations December 2014 |
| 4.1 | 07-2015 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2015 |
| 4.2 | 01-2016 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2016 |
| 4.3 | 07-2016 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2016 |
| 4.4 | 02-2017 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2017 |
| 4.5 | 07-2017 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2017 |
| 4.6 | 01-2018 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2018 |
| 4.7 | 01-2019 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2019 |
| 4.8 | 02-2020 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2020 |
| 4.9 | 02-2021 | Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2021 |
1.3 PKI participants
1.3.1 Certification authorities
|
1.3.2 Registration authorities
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
1.3.3 Subscribers
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
1.3.4 Relying parties
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
1.3.5 Other participants
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
1.4 Certificate usage
1.4.1 Appropiate certificate uses
The use of certificates issued under this CP relates to communication of certificate holders who act in a private capacity.
[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.1]
Authenticity certificates, that are issued under this CP, can be used for reliable electronic identification and authentication of persons. This concerns both the mutual identification of people and identification between people and computerized devices.
Authenticity certificates that are issued under this CP cannot be used to identify people in cases where the law requires that the identity of persons may only be established using the document referred to in the Compulsory Identification Act (Wet op de identificatieplicht).
Under this OID OCSP responder certificates may be issued for use within the domain Citizen. Said certificates can be used to sign OCSP responses for use in the verification of the validity of the end user certificate. More information can be obtained in appendix A of the base requirements.
[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.2]
Signature certificates, that are issued under this CP, can be used to verify electronic signatures, that have "the same legal consequences as a handwritten signature", as specified in article 15a, first and second paragraphs, in Title 1 of Book 3 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) under section 1A and are qualified certificates as referred to in article 1.1, paragraph ss of the Telecommunications Act (Telecomwet).
[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.3]
Confidentiality certificates, issued under this CP, can be used to protect the confidentiality of data that is exchanged and/or stored in electronic form. This concerns both the mutual exchange between people and exchange between people and computerized devices.
1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
1.5 Policy administration
1.5.1 Organization administering the document
The Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) is responsible for this CPS. BZK has delegated this responsibility to Logius, including approval of changes of this document.
1.5.2 Contact person
Policy Authority
PKIoverheid
Wilhelmina van Pruisenweg
52
Postbus 96810
2509 JE DEN HAAG
http://www.logius.nl/pkioverheid
servicecentrum@logius.nl
1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
The Policy Authority PKIoverheid (PA) determines the suitability of CPSs published as a result of this CP.
1.5.4 CP approval procedures
The PA PKIoverheid reserves the right to amend this CP. Changes are applicable from the date that is listed in section 1.2.2. Relevant dates. The management of Logius is responsible for following the procedures as listed in section 9.12 Amendments and final approval of this CP.
1.6 Definitions and acronyms
1.6.1 Conventions
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”,“SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in these Requirements MUST be interpreted in accordance with RFC 2119.
2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1 Repositories
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
2.2 Publication of certification information
2.2-pkio191 —
| Description | The CPS of the TSP MUST follow the layout according to RFC 3647. All sections and subsections as defined in RFC3647 MUST be included in the CPS. Empty passages are not allowed. If there is no further requirement or explanation from a TSP for that paragraph, the text "No stipulation" MUST be included. Additional sections may be included, as long as they come after the sections and subsections defined by RFC 3647 and therefore do not change the RFC numbering. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
2.2-pkio3 —
| Description | The CPS shall be made available in English. In addition the TSP may issue a CPS in Dutch. There may be no substantial substantive difference between the two versions. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
2.3 Time or frequency of publication
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
2.4 Access controls on repositories
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
3.1 Naming
3.1.1 Types of names
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
3.1.3-pkio11 —
| Description | Pseudonyms MUST NOT be used in certificates. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.1.5 Uniqueness of names
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.2 Initial identity validation
3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity
3.2.3-pkio169 —
| Description | For certificates that are suitable for signing and / or encrypting e-mail messages and which include the e-mail address of the certificate holder, the TSP will take appropriate measures to ensure that the applicant has control over the e-mail address in question OR that he / she is authorized by the holder of the e-mail address to have this e-mail address included in a certificate. The TSP MUST state clearly in its CPS which procedures have been implemented to confirm the above. In these procedures, the TSP MUST perform validation of the domain part (@domain.com) itself. This check MUST NOT be performed by third parties. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
3.2.3-pkio21 —
| Description | When issuing certificates to natural persons the TSP has to verify that the full name used by the certificate holder that is incorporated in the certificate is correct and complete, including the surname, first forename, initials or other forename(s) (if applicable) and surname prefixes (if applicable). |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.2.5 Validation of authority
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Certificate Application
4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.2 Certificate application processing
4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.3 Certificate issuance
4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of Certificate
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.4 Certificate acceptance
4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other Entities
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.5 Key pair and certificate usage
4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.6 Certificate renewal
4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.6.2 Who may request renewal
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.7 Certificate re-key
4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.8 Certificate modification
4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation
4.9.1-pkio192 —
+————-+—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–+ | Description | Certificates will be revoked when: | | | | | | - the subscriber indicates that the original request for a certificate was not allowed and the subscriber does not grant permission retroactively; | | | | | | - the TSP has sufficient evidence that the subscriber's private key (associated with the corresponding certificate) has been compromised or there is a suspicion of compromise, inherent security weakness, or that the certificate has been misused in another way . A key is considered compromised in the event of unauthorized access or suspected unauthorized access to the private key, lost or presumably lost private key, SSCD, SUD or QSCD, stolen or presumably stolen key, SSCD, SUD or QSCD or destroyed key, SSCD, SUD or QSCD if applicable; | | | | | | - a subscriber does not fulfill his obligations as set out in this CP or the corresponding CPS of the TSP or the agreement that the TSP has with the subscriber; | | | | | | - the TSP is informed or otherwise becomes aware of a material change in the information contained in the certificate. An example of this is: change of the name of the certificate holder (service); | | | | | | - the TSP determines that the certificate has not been issued in accordance with this CP or the associated CPS of the TSP or the agreement that the TSP has with the subscriber; | | | | | | - the TSP determines that information in the certificate is incorrect or misleading; | | | | | | - the TSP ceases its activities and the CRL and OCSP services are not continued by another TSP; | | | | | | - the PA of PKIoverheid determines that the technical content of the certificate entails an irresponsible risk for subscribers, relying parties and third parties (e.g. browser parties); | | | | | | - one of the events occurs, as described in chapter 6.2 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy. |
+=============+=================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================+ | Comment | - | +————-+—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–+
4.9.2 Who can request revocation
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
4.9.3-pkio57 —
| Description | In any case, the TSP has to use a CRL to make the certificate status information available. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
4.9.4 Revocation request grace period
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)
4.9.7-pkio65 —
| Description | The TSP has to update and reissue the CRL for end user certificates at least once every 7 calendar days and the date of the “Next update” field may not exceed the date of the “Effective date” field by 10 calendar days. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
4.9.9-pkio66 —
| Description | The revocation management services of the TSP can support the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as an addition to the publication of CRL information. If this support is available, this has to be stated in the CPS. |
|---|---|
| Comment | If OCSP is offered the following requirements are applicable:
|
4.9.9-pkio67 —
| Description | If the TSP supports the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), this must conform to IETF RFC 6960. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
4.9.9-pkio68 —
+————-+———————————————————————————————————————-+ | Description | To detail the provisions of IETF RFC 6960, OCSP responses have to be signed digitally by either: | | | | | | - the private (CA) key with which the certificate is signed of which the status is requested, or; | | | | | | - a responder appointed by the TSP which holds an OCSP Signing certificate issued for this purpose by the TSP, or; | | | | | | - a responder that holds an OCSP Signing certificate that falls under the hierarchy of the PKI for the government. |
+=============+======================================================================================================================+ | Comment | - | +————-+———————————————————————————————————————-+
4.9.9-pkio70 —
| Description | If the TSP supports OCSP, the information that is provided through OCSP has to be at least as equally up-to-date and reliable as the information that is published by means of a CRL, during the validity of the certificate that is issued and furthermore up to at least six months after the time at which the validity of the certificate has expired or, if that time is earlier, after the time at which the validity is ended by revocation. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
4.9.9-pkio71 —
| Description | If the TSP supports OCSP, the TSP has to update the OCSP service at least once every 4 calendar days. The maximum expiry term of the OCSP responses is 10 calendar days. In addition OCSP responses must contain the “nextUpdate” field in conformance to RFC6960. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.12 Special requirements related to key compromise
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.14 Who can request suspension
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.9.16 Limits on suspension period
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.10 Certificate status services
4.10.1 Operational characteristics
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.10.2 Service availability
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.10.3 Optional features
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.11 End of subscription
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.12 Key escrow and recovery
4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
5.1 Physical controls
5.1.1 Site location and construction
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.1.2 Physical access
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.1.3 Power and air conditioning
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.1.4 Water exposures
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.1.6 Media storage
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.1.7 Waste disposal
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.1.8 Off-site backup
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.2 Procedural controls
5.2.1 Trusted roles
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.2.2 Number of persons required per task
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.3 Personnel controls
5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.3.2 Background check procedures
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.3.3 Training requirements
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.4 Audit logging procedures
5.4.1 Types of events recorded
5.4.1-pkio80 —
+————-+————————————————————————–+ | Description | Logging has to take place on at least: | | | | | | - Routers, firewalls and network system components; | | | | | | - Database activities and events; | | | | | | - Transactions; | | | | | | - Operating systems; | | | | | | - Access control systems; | | | | | | - Mail servers. | | | | | | At the very least, the TSP has to log the following events: | | | | | | | | | | | | - CA key life cycle management; | | | | | | - Certificate life cycle management; | | | | | | - Threats and risks such as: | | | | | | - Successful and unsuccessful attacks on the PKI system; | | | | | | - Activities of staff on the PKI system; | | | | | | - Reading, writing and deleting data; | | | | | | - Profile changes (Access Management); | | | | | | - System failure, hardware failure and other abnormalities; | | | | | | - Firewall and router activities; | | | | | | - Entering and leaving the CA space. | | | | | | At the very least, the log files have to register the following: | | | | | | | | | | | | - Source addresses (IP addresses if available); | | | | | | - Destination addresses (IP addresses if available); | | | | | | - Time and date; | | | | | | - User IDs (if available); | | | | | | - Name of the incident; | | | | | | - Description of the incident. |
+=============+==========================================================================+ | Comment | Based on a risk analysis the TSP determines which data it should save. | +————-+————————————————————————–+
5.4.2 Frequency of processing log
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.4.3 Retention period for audit log
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.4.4 Protection of audit log
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.5 Records archival
5.5.1 Types of records archived
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.5.2 Retention period for archive
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.5.3 Protection of archive
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.5.4 Archive backup procedures
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.6 Key changeover
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery
5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and_or data are corrupted
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
5.7.4-pkio86 —
+————-+———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-+ | Description | The TSP has to draw up a business continuity plan (BCP) for, at the very least, the core services dissemination service, revocation management service and revocation status service, the aim being, in the event of a security breach or emergency, to inform, reasonably protect and to continue the TSP services for subscribers, relying parties and third parties (including browser parties). The TSP has to test, assess and update the BCP annually. At the very least, the BCP has to describe the following processes: | | | | | | - Requirements relating to entry into force; | | | | | | - Emergency procedure/fall-back procedure; | | | | | | - Requirements relating to restarting TSP services; | | | | | | - Maintenance schedule and test plan that cover the annual testing, assessment and update of the BCP; | | | | | | - Provisions in respect of highlighting the importance of business continuity; | | | | | | - Tasks, responsibilities and competences of the involved agents; | | | | | | - Intended Recovery Time or Recovery Time Objective (RTO); | | | | | | - Recording the frequency of back-ups of critical business information and software; | | | | | | - Recording the distance of the fall-back facility to the TSP's main site; and | | | | | | - Recording the procedures for securing the facility during the period following a security breach or emergency and for the organization of a secure environment at the main site or fall-back facility. |
+=============+==================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================+ | Comment | - | +————-+———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-+
5.8 CA or RA termination
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
6.1 Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1 Key pair generation
6.1.1-pkio88 —
| Description | The keys of certificate holders (or data for creating electronic signatures) have to be generated using a device that fulfils the requirements mentioned in EN 419 211 for QSCD’s or CWA 14169 for SSCD’s (transitional permission regime) "Secure signature-creation devices "EAL 4+"" or comparable security criteria. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
6.1.1-pkio89 —
| Description | The algorithm and length of the cryptographic keys that the TSP uses to generate the keys of certificate holders must meet the requirements set in the list of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths, as defined in ETSI TS 119 312. In addition, the TSP must also follow the requirements described in Chapters 5.1 and 5.1.1 of the most current Mozilla Root Store Policy. The use of RSA-PSS is permitted, but is not recommended. |
|---|---|
| Comment | Although ETSI TS 119 312 outlines the recommended algorithms and key lengths, these are compulsory within the PKI for the government. Requests relating to the use of other algorithms have to be submitted, along with the reasoning behind this, to the PA of the PKI for the government. |
6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber
6.1.2-pkio94 —
| Description | [OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.2.2 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.2], [OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.2.1 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.1] and [OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.2 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.1]. The certificate holder's private key has to be delivered to the certificate holder, if required through the subscriber, in a manner such that the secrecy and the integrity of the key is not compromised and, once delivered to the certificate holder, the private key can be maintained under the certificate holder’s sole control. |
|---|---|
| Comment | This text corresponds with ETSI EN 319 411-1 SDP 6.3.3-09, but has been integrated because this requirement only applies to signature and authenticity certificates. |
6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.1.5 Key sizes
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.3 Private key escrow
6.2.3-pkio100 —
| Description | The TSP has to describe in the CPS which parties can have access to the private key of the confidentiality certificate held in Escrow and under which conditions. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
6.2.3-pkio99 —
| Description | The authorized persons who can gain access to the private key of the confidentiality certificate held in Escrow by the TSP (if applicable), have to identify themselves using the valid documents listed in article 1 of the Compulsory Identification Act (Wet op de identificatieplicht), or a valid qualified certificate (limited to a PKIoverheid signature certificate or equivalent). |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
6.2.4 Private key backup
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.5 Private key archival
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.8 Method of activating private key
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.10 Method of destroying private key
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating
6.2.11-pkio104 —
| Description | Secure devices issued or recommended by the TSP for creating electronic signatures (SSCDs or QSCDs) have to fulfil the requirements laid down in document CWA 14169 "Secure signature-creation devices or EN 419 211 for Qualified signature-creation devices "EAL 4+"" and the requirements outlined in or pursuant to the Electronic Signatures Decree article 5, parts a, b, c and d. |
|---|---|
| Comment | The use of different types of secure devices, such as a smartcard or a USB key, is allowed. The condition is that the SSCD or QSCD meets the substantive requirements as specified in 6.2.11-pkio104, 6.2.11-pkio105 and 6.2.11-pkio106. |
6.2.11-pkio105 —
| Description | Instead of demonstrating compliance with CWA 14169 (for SSCD’s or SUD’s) or EN 419 211 (for QSCD’s), TSPs can issue or recommend SSCDs, SUDs or QSCDs that are certified in line with a different protection profile against the Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) at level EAL4+ or that have a comparable security level. This has to be established by a test laboratory that is accredited for performing Common Criteria evaluations. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
6.2.11-pkio106 —
| Description | The concurrence of SSCDs or QSCDs with the requirements outlined in PKIo requirement no. 6.2.11-pkio104 has to have been ratified by a government body appointed to inspect the secure devices, for the creation of electronic signatures in accordance with the Dutch Telecommunications Act (TW) article 18.17, third paragraph. In this respect, also see the Ruling on Electronic Signatures, articles 4 and 5. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
6.3 Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1 Public key archival
6.3.1-pkio108 —
| Description | [OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.2.2, 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.5.2 and 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.3.2] The signature certificate has to be saved during the term of validity and furthermore during a period of at least seven years after the date on which the validity of the certificate expired. |
|---|---|
| Comment | The Electronic Signature Regulation article 2, paragraph 1i stipulates a term of seven years. No further provisions apply to the authenticity certificate and the confidentiality certificate in relation to archiving public keys. |
6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
6.3.2-pkio109 —
| Description | Private keys that are used by a certificate holder and issued under the responsibility of this CP must not be used for more than five years. The certificates, which are issued under the responsibility of this CP, must not be valid for more than five years. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
6.4 Activation data
6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation
6.4.1-pkio112 —
| Description | The TSP attaches activation data to the use of a SUD, SSCD or QSCD, to protect the private keys of the certificate holders. |
|---|---|
| Comment | The requirements that the activation data (for example the PIN code) have to fulfil can be determined by the TSPs themselves based on, for example, a risk analysis. Requirements that could be considered are the length of the PIN code and use of special characters. |
6.4.1-pkio113 —
| Description | An unlocking code can only be used if the TSP can guarantee that, at the very least, the security requirements are fulfilled that are laid down in respect of the use of the activation data. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
6.4.2 Activation data protection
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.5 Computer security controls
6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.5.2 Computer security rating
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.6 Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1 System development controls
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.6.2 Security management controls
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.6.3 Life cycle security controls
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.7 Network security controls
6.7.1 Network security controls (duplicate)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
6.8 Time-stamping
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES
7.1 Certificate profile
7.1-pkio149 —
| Description | The certificate extension Extended Key Usage MUST be present, MUST NOT be marked “critical”, and MUST contain at least the following KeyPurposIds: For an authenticity certificate: client Authentication =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 document Signing =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12 emailProtection = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4 For a signature certificate: document Signing =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12 emailProtection = 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4 (mandatory for G3, optional for G2) For an confidentiality certificate: emailProtection =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4 Encrypting File System =1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4 The KeyPurposeId id-kp-serverAuth MUST NOT be present and the KeyPurposeId id-kp-codeSigning MUST NOT be present. Specifically for G2 certificates any other KeyPurposeId defined in an open or accepted standard corresponding to the key usage as indicated by the KeyUsage extension MAY be present. In the G3 and following generations this extension MAY NOT be present. The above should take into account the EKUs included in the issuing TSP CA. If the issuing TSP CA is not provided with the mandatory EKUs stated above, these MAY NOT be included in the end-user certificate. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - | |
7.1-pkio173 —
+————-+———————————————————————————————————————————-+ | Description | The serial number of all end-user certificates must meet the following requirements: | | | | | | 1. The value of the serial number MUST NOT be 0 (zero); | | | | | | 2. The value of the serial number MUST NOT be negative; | | | | | | 3. The value of the serial number MUST be unique within the population of end-user certificates issued under an issuing TSP CA; | | | | | | 4. The serial number MUST have a minimum length of 96 bits (12 octets); | | | | | | 5. The value of the serial number MUST contain at least 64 bits of unpredictable random data; | | | | | | 6. Said random data MUST be generated by a Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator (CSPRNG); | | | | | | 7. The serial number MUST NOT be longer than 160 bits (20 octets). |
+=============+==================================================================================================================================+ | Comment | - | +————-+———————————————————————————————————————————-+
7.1.1 Version number(s)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.1.2 Certificate extensions
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.1.4 Name forms
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.1.5 Name constraints
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.2 CRL profile
7.2.1 Version number(s)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.3 OCSP profile
7.3-pkio123 —
| Description | If the TSP supports the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), the TSP has to use OCSP certificates and responses in accordance with the requirements laid down in this respect in appendix A of the Basic Requirements, "CRL and OCSP certificate Profiles for certificate status information ". |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
7.3.1 Version number(s)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
7.3.2 OCSP extensions
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS
8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
8.3 Assessors relationship to assessed entity
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
8.4 Topics covered by assessment
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
8.6 Communication of results
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
9.1 Fees
9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.1.2 Certificate access fees
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.1.3 Revocation or status information access fees
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.1.4 Fees for other services
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.1.5 Refund policy
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.2 Financial responsibility
9.2-pkio124 —
| Description | By means, for example, of insurance or its financial position, the TSP has to be able to cover third party recovery based on the types of liability mentioned in article 6:196b of the Civil Code (that relate to both direct and indirect damage) up to at least EUR 1,000,000 per annum. |
|---|---|
| Comment | The third party recovery described above is based on a maximum number of certificates to be issued of 100,000 for each TSP, which is in line with the current situation. When TSPs are going to issue more certificates, it will be determined whether a suitable, higher, recoverableness will be required. |
9.2.1 Insurance coverage
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.2.2 Other assets
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.3 Confidentiality of business information
9.3.1 Scope of confidential information
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.4 Privacy of personal information
9.4.1 Privacy plan
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.4.2 Information treated as private
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.4.3 Information not deemed private
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.5 Intellectual property rights
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.6 Representations and warranties
9.6.1 CA representations and warranties
9.6.1-pkio127 —
+————-+——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————+ | Description | In the agreement between the TSP and the subscriber, a clause (a clause as specified in article 6:253 of the Civil Code) will be included in which the TSP champions the interests of a third party relying on the certificate. This clause addresses a liability of the TSP in accordance with article 6:196b, first up to and including third paragraph, of the Civil Code, with the proviso that: | | | | | | 1. for "a qualified certificate specified in article 1.1, division ss Telecommunications Act": "an authenticity certificate" is read; | | | | | | 2. for "signatory": "certificate holder" is read; | | | | | | 3. for "electronic signatures": "authenticity properties" is read. |
+=============+======================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================+ | Comment | - | +————-+——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————+
9.6.1-pkio129 —
+————-+——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————+ | Description | In the agreement between the TSP and the subscriber, a clause (a clause as specified in article 6:253 of the Civil Code) will be included in which the TSP champions the interests of a third party relying on the certificate. This clause addresses a liability of the TSP in accordance with article 6:196b, first up to and including third paragraph, of the Civil Code, with the proviso that: | | | | | | 1. for "a qualified certificate specified in article 1.1, division ss Telecommunications Act": "a confidentiality certificate" is read; | | | | | | 2. for "signatory": "certificate holder" is read; | | | | | | 3. for "creation of electronic signatures": "creation of encrypted data" is read; | | | | | | 4. For "verification of electronic signatures": "decoding of encrypted data" is read. |
+=============+======================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================================+ | Comment | - | +————-+——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————+
9.6.1-pkio131 —
| Description | The TSP can include in a non-repudiation certificate restrictions with regard to the use of the certificate, provided that the restrictions are clear to third parties. The TSP is not liable for losses that results from the use of a signature certificate that is contrary to the provisions in accordance with the previous sentence listed therein. |
|---|---|
| Comment | This article is based on Civil Code art. 196b, paragraph 3 |
9.6.1-pkio132 —
| Description | The TSP excludes all liability for damages if the certificate is not used in accordance with the certificate use described in paragraph 1.4. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
9.6.2 RA representations and warranties
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.7 Disclaimers of warranties
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.8 Limitations of liability
9.8-pkio133 —
| Description | Within the scope of certificates as mentioned in paragraph 1.4 in this CP the TSP is not allowed to place restrictions on the use of certificates. |
|---|---|
| Comment | - |
9.9 Indemnities
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.10 Term and termination
9.10.1 Term
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.10.2 Termination
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.12 Amendments
9.12.1 Procedure for amendment
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.13 Dispute resolution provisions
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.14 Governing law
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.15 Compliance with applicable law
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.16 Miscellaneous provisions
9.16.1 Entire agreement
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.16.2 Assignment
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.16.3 Severability
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.16.5 Force Majeure
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
9.17 Other provisions
Refer to Programme of Requirements part 3 Basic Requirements.
Appendix A: Certificate Profiles
Profile of the certificate for the Citizen domain
Criteria
When defining the fields and attributes within a certificate, the following codes are used:
V : Compulsory; indicates that the attribute is compulsory and MUST be used in the certificate.
O : Optional; indicates that the attribute is optional and MAY be used in the certificate.
A : Advised against; indicates that the attribute is advised against and SHOULD NOT be used in the certificate.
N: Is NOT ALLOWED.
It is not allowed to use fields that are not specified in the certificate profiles.
For the extensions, fields/attributes are used that, in accordance with international standards, are critical, are marked in the 'Critical' column with 'yes' to show that the relevant attribute MUST be checked using a process by means of which a certificate is evaluated. Other fields/attributes are shown with 'no'.
Naming convention Subject.commonName
The following requirements apply to the CommonName of the Subject field. The main principle is that the TSP is responsible for correct entry of the CommonName. For a correct implementation this entails that the TSP has to be able to check each part that is entered. The CommonName has the following format[1]:
[aristocratic designation] [Full first forename OR nickname] [initials other forenames OR full other forenames] [surname prefixes + surname partner '-'] [aristocratic title] [surname prefixes + surname at birth]
whereby:
text in bold = compulsory part, style in accordance with Compulsory Identification Act document or presented Local Council Personal Records Database extract
Italic = compulsory part, choice from two options (full forenames or initials)
normal = optional part; if present, the style has to be the same as the Compulsory Identification Act document or the presented Local Council Personal Records Database extract
In principle, the TSP decides whether or not optional parts are allowed. If it prefers, the TSP can leave the choice for an option to the subscriber or the party requesting the certificate. If the CommonName becomes too long for the number of characters that are allowed, optional parts have to be omitted (starting with the replacement of other forenames by initials from the last to the first position) until the name fits in the maximum field length.
[1] The presented order is not compulsory, the surname can also be given first followed by forenames/initials.
Citizen certificates
Basic attributes
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Standard extensions
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Private extensions
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