Programme of Requirements part 3g: Certificate Policy for Authenticity and Confidentiality v4.7
Table of Contents
1 Introduction to the Certificate Policy
1.1.1 Design of the Certificate Policy
1.5 Contact Information Policy Authority
2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities
2.2 Publication of TSP Information
3 Identification and Authentication
3.2 Initial Identity Validation
3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests
4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage
4.9 Revocation and Suspension of Certificates
4.10 Certificate Status Services
5 Facility, Management and Operational Controls
5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery
6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
6.5 Computer Security Controls
6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls
7 Certificate, CRL and OSCP profiles
8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
9 Other Business and Legal Matters
9.5 Intellectual Property Rights
9.6 Representations and Warranties
9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures
Appendix A Certificate profile
10.1 Amendments from version 4.6 to 4.7
10.2 Amendments from version 4.5 to 4.6
10.3 Amendments from version 4.4 to 4.5
10.4 Amendments from version 4.3 to 4.4
10.5 Amendments between version 4.2 and 4.3
10.6 Amendments between version 4.1 and 4.2
10.7 Amendments between version 4.0 and 4.1
The Policy Authority ( PA ) of the PKI for the government supports the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in managing the PKI for the government.
The PKI for the government is an agreements system. This system enables generic and large-scale use of the electronic signature, and it also facilitates remote identification and confidential communication.
The tasks of the PA of PKIoverheid are:
· contributing towards the development and the maintenance of the framework of standards that underlies the PKI for the government, the Programme of Requirements ( PoR );
· assisting in the process of admittance by Trust Service Providers ( TSP s) to the PKI for the government and preparing the administration;
· supervising and monitoring the activities of TSP s that issue certificates under the root of the PKI for the government.
The purpose of the Policy Authority is:
Enforcement of a practicable and reliable framework of standards for PKI services that provides an established level of security for the government's communication needs that is transparent to users.
Revision control
Version |
Date |
Description |
4.0 |
12-2014 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations December 2014 |
4.1 |
07-2015 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2015 |
4.2 |
01-2016 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2016 |
4.3 |
07-2016 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2016 |
4.4 |
02-2017 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2017 |
4.5 |
07-2017 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2017 |
4.6 |
01-2018 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2017 |
4.7 |
02-2019 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2019 |
1 Introduction to the Certificate Policy
1.1 Overview
This is part 3g of the Programme of Requirements ( PoR ) for the PKI for the government and is known as the Certificate Policy ( CP ). Set out in the PoR are the standards for the PKI for the government. This section relates to the requirements laid down for the services of a Trust Service Provider ( TSP ) within the PKI for the government. Within the PKI for the government , a distinction is made between various root certificates and underlying domains. This document only relates to the services certificates issued by TSP s in the Private Services domain.
Certificates which are issued under the private root certificate are not publicly trusted by browsers or other applications. The scope of these certificates is primarily a closed usergroup within which an agreement has been reached regarding the use of the PKIoverheid Private Root.
This chapter includes a brief explanation of the CP . A more detailed explanation regarding the background and structure of the PKI for the government, as well as the cohesion between the various parts within the PoR is included in part 1 of the PoR .
For a list of the definitions and abbreviations used in this section, please refer to part 4 of the PoR .
1.1.1 Design of the Certificate Policy
As stated in part 1 of the PoR , the requirements that form part of the CP consist of requirements [1] :
· that ensue from the Dutch legal framework in relation to the electronic signature;
· that ensue from the latest version of the ETSI EN 319 411-1 standard where the policy NCP + + is applicable, so that a SUD is used ( ETSI CP OID 0.4.0.2042.1.2);
· that are specifically drawn up by and for the PKIoverheid.
Incorporated in chapters 2 to 9 inclusive are references to the specific PKIoverheid requirements in the Additional Requirements. The table below shows the structure of the reference to the actual PKIoverheid requirement (PKIo requirement).
RFC 3647 |
Reference to the paragraph from the RFC 3647 structure to which the PKIo requirement relates. RFC 3647 is a PKIX framework of the Internet Engineering Task Force ( IETF ) and is the de facto standard for the structure of Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements [2] . |
Number |
Unique number of the PKIo requirement. In each paragraph, consecutive numbering is used for the PKIo requirements. In combination with the RFC 3647 paragraph number, this forms a unique label for the PKIo requirement. |
This CP also includes a number of provisions that are not formulated as PKIo requirements. These provisions do not make any demands on the TSP s within the PKI for the government, but do apply as a policy to the PKI for the government. This concerns provisions from paragraphs 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8, 9.12.1, 9.12.2, 9.14 and 9.17.
The profiles used within PKIoverheid relating to the services certificates are listed in appendix A. The status information is listed in the basic requirements.
1.1.2 Status
This is version 4.7 of part 3g of the PoR . The current version has been updated up to and including 8 February 2019.
The PA has devoted the utmost attention and care to the data and information incorporated in this CP . Nevertheless, it is possible that there are inaccuracies and imperfections. The PA accepts no liability for damage resulting from these inaccuracies or imperfections, nor is any liability assumed for damage caused by the use or distribution of this CP , if this CP is used for purposes other than for the use of certificates described in paragraph 1.4 of this CP .
1.2 References to this CP
Within the PKI for the government multiple root certificates are in use for the regular – publicly trusted – root, the TRAIL root, the EV root and the private – not publicly trusted – root. Each of these root certificates contains a hierarchy consisting of differen domains. Each domain has its own specific domain structure.
Furthermore these root certificates often have multiple active generations or versions ( G1 , G2 , G3 ). In addition the different PKI for the government structures or roots are based both on the SHA -1 algorithm (regular root G1 ) and the SHA -2 56 algorithm (regular root G2 and G3 ).
Each type of certificate within PKIoverheid is uniquely identified by an OID . The OID s of the Certificate Policies of this part of the Programme of Requirements are in accordance with the following schedule.
Private Services Domain: |
|
OID |
CP |
2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.4 |
for the authenticity certificate for services within the Private Services domain, that contains the public key for identification and authentication. Under this OID OCSP certificates may be issued for use within the context of this CP part. |
2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.5 |
for the confidentiality certificate for services within the Private Services domain, that contains the public key for confidentiality. |
The OID is structured as follows: {joint-iso-itu-t (2). country (16). the Netherlands (528). Dutch organization (1). Dutch government (1003). PKI for the government (1). CP (2). private services domain (8). authenticity (4)/ confidentiality (5). version number}.
If requirements only apply to one or two types of certificates, this is expressly specified by stating the Object Identifier ( OID ) referencing the applicable CP or CP s.
1.3 User Community
Within the Private Services domain, the user community consists of subscribers who are organizational entities within the government and business community (see PKIo 3.2.2-pkio4) and of certificate holders, who also belong to these subscribers. In addition there are relying parties, who act with a reliance on certificates of the relevant certificate holders.
The parties within the user community are subscribers, certificate managers, certificate holders and relying parties.
· A subscriber is a natural or legal personality who enters into an agreement with a TSP on behalf of one or more certificate holders for the certification of public keys.
· A certificate holder is an entity, characterized in a certificate as the holder of the private key that is linked to the public key provided in the certificate. The certificate holder is part of an organizational entity, for which a subscriber is the contracting party. Within the Certificate Policy Services, the term certificate holder means:
oa device or a system (a non-natural person), operated
by or on behalf of an organizational entity; or
oa function of an organizational entity. In this CP we use the name "service" for the foregoing
certificate holders. To perform the actions in respect of the lifecycle
of the certificate holder's certificate, intervention by a party other
than the certificate holder is required. The subscriber is responsible
for this and has to appoint a certificate manager to perform these
actions.
· A certificate manager is a natural personality who performs actions on behalf of the subscriber in respect of the certificate holder's certificate. The subscriber instructs the certificate manager to perform the relevant actions and records these in a certificate manager's testimony.
· A relying party is every natural or legal personality who is a recipient of a certificate and who acts with a reliance on that certificate. Other than for personal certificates, relying parties mainly derive security from the connection of a service (device or feature) to the organizational entity to which the service belongs. The CP Services therefore places the emphasis on providing certainty about the connection of a message sent by or a web service provided by a device, system or (staff) position with the relevant organization. In view of this, establishing the identity of the certificate holder (device or feature) is less important than establishing the certificate holder's connection to the organizational entity.
1.4 Certificate Usage
The use of certificates issued under this CP relates to communication from certificate holders who act on behalf of the subscriber.
[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.4]
Authenticity certificates, issued under this CP , can be used to identify and authenticate, by electronic means, the service that is part of the organizational entity, which is responsible for the relevant service. Issuance of code signing certificates by means of which the integrity and authenticity of software can be safeguarded by a digital signature being placed are NOT allowed under this CP .
Under this OID OCSP responder certificates may be issued for use within the domain Private Services. Said certificates can be used to sign OCSP responses for use in the verification of the validity of the end user certificate. More information can be obtained in appendix A of the base requirements.
[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.5]
Confidentiality certificates, issued under this CP , can be used to protect the confidentiality of data that is exchanged and/or stored in an electronic format.
1.5 Contact Information Policy Authority
The PA is responsible for this CP . Questions relating to this CP can be put to the PA ; the address can be found at: http://www.logius.nl/pkioverheid.
2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities
2.1 Electronic Repository
Contains no additional requirements.
2.2 Publication of TSP Information
RFC 3647 |
2.2 Publication of TSP information |
Number |
2.2-pkio8 |
RFC 3647 |
2.2 Publication of TSP information |
Number |
2.2-pkio157 |
3 Identification and Authentication
3.1 Naming
Contains no additional requirements.
3.2 Initial Identity Validation
RFC 3647 |
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of the private key |
Number |
3.2.1-pkio13 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity |
Number |
3.2.2-pkio4 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity |
Number |
3.2.2-pkio144 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity |
Number |
3.2.3-pkio22 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity |
Number |
3.2.3-pkio24 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity |
Number |
3.2.3-pkio26 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.5 Validation of authority |
Number |
3.2.5-pkio30 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.5 Validation of authority |
Number |
3.2.5-pkio33 |
3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests
Contains no additional requirements.
4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1 Certificate Application
RFC 3647 |
4.1 Certificate Application |
Number |
4.1-pkio47 |
4.4 Certificate Acceptance
Contains no additional requirements.
4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage
Contains no additional requirements.
4.9 Revocation and Suspension of Certificates
RFC 3647 |
4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation |
Number |
4.9.1-pkio52 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.3 Procedures for revocation request |
Number |
4.9.3-pkio57 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency |
Number |
4.9.7-pkio65 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability |
Number |
4.9.7-pkio66 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability |
Number |
4.9.9-pkio67 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability |
Number |
4.9.9-pkio70 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability |
Number |
4.9.9-pkio71 |
4.10 Certificate Status Services
Contains no additional requirements.
5 Facility, Management and Operational Controls
5.2 ProceduralControls
Contains no additional requirements.
5.3 PersonnelControls
Contains no additional requirements.
5.4 Audit Loggin Procedures
RFC 3647 |
5.4.1 Types of events recorded |
Number |
5.4.1-pkio80 |
5.5 Records Archival
RFC 3647 |
5.5.1 Types of events recorded |
Number |
5.5.1-pkio82 |
5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery
RFC 3647 |
5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster. |
Number |
5.7.4-pkio86 |
6 Technical Security Controls
6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the TSP sub CA |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio87 |
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio88 |
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio89 |
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio92 |
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio93 |
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module EngineeringControls
RFC 3647 |
6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key |
Number |
6.2.3-pkio99 |
RFC 3647 |
6.2.3 Private key escrow of certificate holder key |
Number |
6.2.3-pkio100 |
RFC 3647 |
6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating |
Number |
6.2.11-pkio105 |
RFC 3647 |
6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating |
Number |
6.2.11-pkio125 |
6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
RFC 3647 |
6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods |
Number |
6.3.2-pkio109 |
6.4 Activation data
RFC 3647 |
6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation |
Number |
6.4.1-pkio112 |
RFC 3647 |
6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation |
Number |
6.4.1-pkio113 |
6.5 Computer Security Controls
Contains no additional requirements.
6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls
Contains no additional requirements.
6.7 Network Security Controls
Contains no additional requirements.
7 Certificate, CRL and OSCP profiles
7.1 Certificate Profile
RFC 3647 |
7.1 Certificate Profiles |
Number |
7.1-pkio150 |
7.2 CRL Profile
Contains no additional requirements.
7.3 OCSP Profile
RFC 3647 |
7.3 OCSP profile |
Number |
7.3-pkio123 |
8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
Subjects relating to the conformity assessment of the TSP s within the PKI for the government are covered in PoR part 2 And the Basic Requirements.
9 Other Business and Legal Matters
9.2 Financial Responsibility
RFC 3647 |
9.2.1 Insurance coverage |
Number |
9.2.1-pkio124 |
9.5 Intellectual Property Rights
Contains no additional requirements.
9.6 Representations and Warranties
RFC 3647 |
9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by TSP s |
Number |
9.6.1-pkio127 |
RFC 3647 |
9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by TSP s |
Number |
9.6.1-pkio129 |
RFC 3647 |
9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by TSP s |
Number |
9.6.1-pkio132 |
9.8 Limitations of Liability
RFC 3647 |
9.8 Limitations of liability |
Number |
9.8-pkio133 |
9.12 Amendments
Contains no additional requirements.
9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures
Contains no additional requirements.
9.14 Governing Law
Contains no additional requirements.
9.17 Miscellaneous provisions
RFC 3647 |
9.17 Miscellaneous provisions |
Number |
9.17-pkio140 |
If by judicial decision one or more provisions of this CP are declared to be invalid or not applicable, this does not affect the validity and applicability of all other provisions.
Appendix A Certificateprofile
Profile of services authenticity and confidentiality certificates for the Private Services domain
Criteria
When defining the fields and attributes within a certificate, the following codes are used:
· V : Compulsory; indicates that the attribute is compulsory and MUST be used in the certificate.
· O : Optional; indicates that the attribute is optional and MAY be used in the certificate.
· A : Advised against; indicates that the attribute is advised against and SHOULD NOT be used in the certificate.
It is not allowed to use fields that are not specified in the certificate profiles.
For the extensions, fields/attributes are used that, in accordance with international standards, are critical, are marked in the 'Critical' column with 'yes' to show that the relevant attribute MUST be checked using a process by means of which a certificate is evaluated. Other fields/attributes are shown with 'no'.
Services certificates for authenticity and confidentiality
Basic attributes
Field / Attribute |
Criteria |
Description |
Standard reference |
Type |
Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Version |
V |
MUST be set at 2 ( X.509v3 ). |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
Integer |
Describes the version of the certificate, the value 2 stands for X.509 version 3. |
SerialNumber |
V |
A serial number that MUST uniquely identify the certificate within the publishing CA domain. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
Integer |
All end user certificates have to contain at least 8 bytes of unpredictable random data in the certificate's serial number (SerialNumber). |
Signature |
V |
MUST be created on the algorithm, as stipulated by the PA . |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, ETSI TS 102176 |
OID |
This certificate MUST at least contain a 2048 bit RSA key. |
Issuer |
V |
MUST contain a Distinguished Name ( DN ). The field contains the following attributes: |
PKIo, RFC 3739, ETSI TS 102280 |
Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used. |
|
Issuer.countryName |
V |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
ETSI TS 101862, X520 , ISO 3166 |
Printable String |
|
Issuer.OrganizationName |
V |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
ETSI TS 102280 |
UTF8String |
|
Issuer. organizationalUnitName |
O |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
ETSI TS 102280 |
UTF8String |
|
Issuer.serialNumber |
O |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
RFC 3739 |
Printable String |
|
Issuer.commonName |
V |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
PKIo, RFC 3739 |
UTF8String |
The commonName attribute MUST NOT be needed to identify the issuing government body (no part of the Distinguished Name, requirement from RFC 3739 ) |
Issuer.organizationIdentifier |
V |
The organizationIdentifier field contains an identification of the issuing CA . This field MUST be present when the subject.organizationIdentifier field is present in the TSP certificate and MUST NOT be present when this field is not part of the corresponding TSP certificate. |
EN 319 412-1 |
String |
The syntax of the identification string is specified in paragraph 5.1.4 van ETSI EN 319 412-1 and contains: • 3 character legal person identity type reference; • 2 character ISO 3166 [2] country code; • hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D ( ASCII ), U+002D ( UTF-8 )); and • identifier (according to country and identity type reference). |
Validity |
V |
MUST define the period of validity of the certificate according to CRL Profile"> RFC 5280. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
UTCTime |
MUST include the start and end date for validity of the certificate in accordance with the applicable policy laid down in the CPS . |
Subject |
V |
The attributes that are used to describe the subject (service) MUST mention the subject in a unique way and include information about the subscriber organization. The field has the following attributes: |
PKIo, RFC 3739, ETSI TS 102 280 |
MUST contain a Distinguished Name ( DN ). Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used. |
|
Subject.countryName |
V |
complete C with two-letter country code in accordance with ISO 3166 -1. If an official alpha-2 code is missing, the TSP MAY use the user-assigned code XX. |
RFC 3739 , X520 , ISO 3166 , PKIo |
PrintableString |
The country code that is used in Subject.countryName MUST correspond with the subscriber's address in accordance with the accepted document or registry. |
Subject.commonName |
V |
Name that identifies the service. In services certificates this field is compulsory |
RFC 3739 , ETSI TS 102 280, PKIo |
UTF8String |
Incorporated in the subject.commonname is the function of an organizational entity or the name by which the service, device or system is known. This MAY be a local domain name or host name. |
Subject.organizationName |
V |
The full name of the subscriber's organization in accordance with the accepted document or Basic Registry. |
PKIo |
UTF8String |
The subscriber organization is the organization with which the TSP has entered into an agreement and on behalf of which the certificate holder (service/server) communicates or acts. |
Subject.organizationalUnitName |
O |
Optional specification of an organizational entity. This attribute MUST NOT include a function indication or similar. |
PKIo |
This attribute MAY appear several times. The field MUST contain a valid name of an organizational entity of the subscriber in accordance with an accepted document or registry. |
|
Subject.stateOrProvinceName |
A |
The use is advised against. If present, this field MUST contain the province in which the subscriber is established in accordance with an accepted document or Basic registry. |
PKIo, RFC 3739 |
UTF8String |
Name of the province MUST correspond with the address of the subscriber in accordance with the accepted document or registry. |
Subject.localityName |
A |
The use is advised against. If present, this field MUST contain the location of the subscriber in accordance with an accepted document or Basic registry. |
PKIo, RFC 3739 |
UTF8String |
Name of the location MUST correspond with the address of the subscriber in accordance with the accepted document or registry. |
Subject.postalAddress |
A |
The use is advised against. If present, this field MUST contain the postal address of the subscriber in accordance with an accepted document or Basic registry. |
PKIo, RFC 3739 |
UTF8String |
The address MUST correspond with the address of the subscriber in accordance with the accepted document or registry. |
Subject.serialNumber |
O |
The TSP is responsible for safeguarding the uniqueness of the subject (service). The Subject.serialNumber MUST be used to identify the subject uniquely. The use of 20 positions is only allowed for OIN and HRN after additional arrangements with Logius. |
RFC 3739 , X 520, PKIo |
Printable String |
The number is determined by the TSP and/or the government. The number can differ for each domain and can be used for several applications. |
subjectPublicKeyInfo |
V |
Contains, among other things, the public key. |
ETSI TS 102 280, RFC 3279 |
Contains the public key, identifies the algorithm with which the key can be used. |
Standard extensions
Field / Attribute |
Criteria |
Critical? |
Description |
Standard reference |
Type |
Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
authorityKeyIdentifier |
V |
No |
The algorithm to generate the AuthorityKey MUST be created on an algorithm determined by the PA . |
ETSI TS 102 280, CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
BitString |
The value MUST contain the SHA -1 hash from the authorityKey (public key of the TSP / CA ). |
SubjectKeyIdentifier |
V |
No |
The algorithm to generate the subjectKey MUST be created on an algorithm determined by the PA . |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
BitString |
The value MUST contain the SHA -1 hash from the subjectKey (public key of the certificate holder). |
KeyUsage |
V |
Yes |
The attribute extension specifies the intended purpose of the key incorporated in the certificate. In the PKI for the government, for each certificate type various bits are incorporated in the keyUsage extension. In authenticity certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be incorporated and marked as being essential. Another keyUsage MUST NOT be combined with this. In confidentiality certificates, keyEncipherment and dataEncipherment bits MUST be incorporated and marked as being essential. Another keyUsage MUST NOT be combined with this. |
RFC 3739 , CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, ETSI TS 102 280 |
BitString |
|
CertificatePolicies |
V |
No |
MUST contain the OID of the certificate policy ( CP ), the URI of the certification practice statement ( CPS ), and a user notice. The applicable PKI for the government OID scheme is described in the CP . The TSP SHOULD use UTF8String in the userNotice, but MAY use IA5String. |
RFC 3739 |
OID , String, UTF8String or IA5String |
Reference to the paragraph numbers of the PoR / CP in the user notice is advised against because the persistency of this cannot be guaranteed (unlike the OID number of the CP ). |
SubjectAltName |
V |
No |
MUST be used and given a worldwide unique number that identifies the service. |
RFC 4043, CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, PKIo, ETSI 102 280 |
MUST include a unique identifier in the othername attribute for services certificates. Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used. |
|
SubjectAltName.dNSName |
V/N |
Name that identifies the server. In services authentication and confidentiality certificates this field MUST NOT be used. |
RFC 2818, RFC 5280 |
IA5String |
The subscriber MUST prove that the organization is eliable to use the FQDN |
|
SubjectAltName.iPAddress |
N |
No |
The public IP address that identifies the service. MUST NOT be used in services certificates |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, RFC 791, RFC 2460 |
Octet string |
|
SubjectAltName.otherName |
V |
MUST be used containing a unique identification number that identifies the certificate holder. An additional othername entry MAY be included in the authentication certificate for use with SSO (Single Sign On). |
PKIo |
IA5String, Microsoft UPN, IBM Principal-Name, Kerberos PrincipalName or Permanent-Identifier |
Includes an OID of the TSP awarded by the PA to the TSP and a number that is unique within the namespace of that OID that permanently identifies the subject, in one of the following ways: 1. MS UPN: [number]@[OID] 2. MS UPN: [OID].[number] 3. IA5String: [OID]-[number] 4. Permanent Identifier: Identifiervalue = [number] Assigner = [OID] Alternative 1. is also suitable for SSO . If a second othername for SSO is given in the certificate, the SSO othername MUST be given first in the SubjectAltName, before the PKIoverheid format othername described above, in order to ensure the proper operation of the SSO mechanism. It is recommended that an existing registration number from back office systems is used, in combination with a code for the organization. In combination with the TSP OID , this identifier is internationally unique. This number MUST be persistent. |
|
SubjectAltName.rfc822Name |
A |
MAY be used for the service's e-mail address, for applications that need the e-mail address in order to be able to function properly. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
IA5String |
For PKIoverheid certificates, the use of e-mail addresses is advised against, because e-mail addresses of certificate holders often change and are susceptible to spam. |
|
BasicConstraints |
O |
Yes |
The " CA " field MUST be omitted (default value is then "FALSE"). |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
A (Dutch language) browser can then be seen: Subjecttype = Eindentiteit", "Beperking voor padlengte = Geen ("Subjecttype = End Entity", "Path length constraint = None") |
|
CRLDistributionPoints |
V |
No |
MUST include the URI of a CRL distribution point. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, ETSI TS 102 280 |
The reference MUST be accessible through the http or LDAP protocol. The attribute Reason MUST NOT be used, reference MUST be made to 1 CRL for all types of reasons for revocation. In addition to CRL , other types of certificate status information service MAY be supported. |
|
ExtKeyUsage |
V |
No |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
KeyPurposeId's |
See requirement 7.1-pkio150. |
|
FreshestCRL |
O |
No |
MUST contain the URI of a Delta CRL distribution point, if Delta CRL s are used. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, PKIo |
Delta-CRLs are an optional extension. In order to fulfil the requirements of PKIoverheid a TSP MUST also publish full CRL s at the required release frequency. |
Private extensions
Field / Attribute |
Criteria |
Critical? |
Description |
Standard reference |
Type |
Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
authorityInfoAccess |
O |
No |
This attribute MUST include the URI of an OCSP responder if Online Certificate Status Protocol ( OCSP ) plays a role. |
This field can optionally be used to reference other additional information about the TSP . |
||
SubjectInfoAccess |
O |
No |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
OID , Generalname |
This field can be used to reference additional information about the subject. |
10 Revisions
10.1 Amendments from version 4.6 to 4.7
10.1.1 New
· Requirement 7.1-pkio177 (effective date immediately after publication of PoR 4.7)
10.1.2Modifications
· Description of a number of certificate attributes replaced by reference to requirement 7.1-pkio174 (effective date 8 weeks after publication of PoR 4.7)
· Reference to CWA 14 169 amended to EN 419 211 for QSCD s. This also sets requirements for the issueance of QSCD s for requirements 6.1.1-pkio88, 6.1.1-pkio93, 6.2.11-pkio105, 6.4.1-pkio112 and 4.9.1-pkio52 (effective date immediately after publication of PoR 4.7)x
10.2 Amendments from version 4.5 to 4.6
10.2.1Modifications
· Corrected subjectAltName.othername field (effective date directly after publication of PoR 4.6)
10.3 Amendments from version 4.4 to 4.5
10.3.1 New
· Possibility to offer CPS in English and/or Dutch (requirement 2.2-pkio157, effective date 1-10-2017)
· Mandatory yearly renewal CPS (requirement 2.2-pkio156, effective date 1-1-2017)
10.3.2Modifications
· Requirement 4.9.9-pkio67 now references RFC 6960 instead of RFC 2560 (effective date 31-12-2016)
· Change in OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.4 to also cover OCSP responder certificates (effective date 1-7-2017)
· Mandatory use of field “NextUpdate” in OCSP responses (requirement 4.9.9-pkio71, effective date 1-7-2017)
10.4 Amendments from version 4.3 to 4.4
10.4.1 New
None
10.4.2Modifications
· Removal of requirement 5.3.2-pkio79 (effective date 1-2-2017)
· Clarification of issuer.organizationIdentifier field (effective date 1-2-2017)
· Tightening of use optional EKU s that conflict with the parent TSP CA certificate (effective date 1-2-2017)
10.4.3 Editorial
· Replaced CSP (Certificate Service Provider) with TSP (Trust Service Provider) in accordance with eIDAS directive.
10.5 Amendments between version 4.2 and 4.3
10.5.1 New
· Addition of issuer.organizationalIdentifier in the certificate profile (effective date 1-7-2016)
10.5.2Modifications
· Description with attribute CertificatePolicies (effective date 1-7-2016)
· Removal optional use KeyAgreement with Key Usage (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.3)
· ETSI TS 102 176-1 replaced by ETSI TS 119 312 (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.3)
· Removal of requirement pkio95 due to duplicate with ETSI EN 319 411-1
· Use of values in BasicConstraints field no longer permitted in end entity certificates (effective date 1-7-2016)
· ETSI TS 102 042 replaced by ETSI EN 319 411-1 ( effective date 1-7-2016 or when the accreditation to the certifying body has been granted with a final date of 30 June 2017)
10.5.3 Editorial
None
10.6 Amendments between version 4.1 and 4.2
10.6.1 New
· Requirement 7.1-pkio150 (effective date 1 july 2016)
10.6.2Modifications
· Change in subjectAltName in the certificate profile (effective date directly after publication of PoR )
10.6.3 Editorial
None
10.7 Amendments between version 4.0 and 4.1
10.7.1 New
· Certification against ETSI TS 102 042 (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.1 );
10.7.2 Modifications
Not applicable
10.7.3 Editorial
· Small editorial modification to the following requirement:
oRequirement 5.7.4-pkio86.
[1] For an explanation regarding the positioning of the requirements applicable within the PKI for the government, please refer to part 1 of the PoR .
[2] Chapters 2 to 9 inclusive only include those paragraphs from RFC 3647 to which a PKIorequirement applies.
