Table of Contents
1 Introduction to the Certificate Policy
1.1.1 Design of the Certificate Policy
1.5 Contact Information Policy Authority
2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities
2.2 Publication of TSP Information
3 Identification and Authentication
3.2 Initial Identity Validation
3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests
4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage
4.9 Revocation and Suspension of Certificates
4.10 Certificate Status Services
5 Facility, Management and Operational Controls
5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery
6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
6.5 Computer Security Controls
6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls
7 Certificate, CRL and OSCP profiles
8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
9 Other Business and Legal Matters
9.5 Intellectual Property Rights
9.6 Representations and Warranties
9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures
Appendix A Certificate Profile
10.1 Amendments from version 4.6 to 4.7
10.2 Amendments from version 4.5 to 4.6
10.3 Amendments from version 4.4 to 4.5
10.4 Amendments from version 4.3 to 4.4
10.5 Amendments from version 4.2 to 4.3
10.6 Amendments from version 4.1 to 4.2
10.7 Amendments from version 4.0 to 4.1
The Policy Authority ( PA ) of the PKI for the government supports the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in managing the PKI for the government.
The PKI for the government is an agreements system. This system enables generic and large-scale use of the electronic signature, and it also facilitates remote identification and confidential communication.
The tasks of the PA of PKIoverheid are:
· contributing towards the development and the maintenance of the framework of standards that underlies the PKI for the government, the Programme of Requirements ( PoR );
· assisting in the process of admittance by Trust Service Providers ( TSP s) to the PKI for the government and preparing the administration;
· supervising and monitoring the activities of TSP s that issue certificates under the root of the PKI for the government.
The purpose of the Policy Authority is:
Enforcement of a practicable and reliable framework of standards for PKI services that provides an established level of security for the government's communication needs that is transparent to users.
Revision control
Version |
Date |
Description |
4.0 |
12-2014 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations December 2014 |
4.1 |
07-2015 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2015 |
4.2 |
01-2016 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2016 |
4.3 |
07-2016 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2016 |
4.4 |
02-2017 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2017 |
4.5 |
07-2017 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations July 2017 |
4.6 |
01-2018 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations January 2018 |
4.7 |
02-2019 |
Ratified by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations February 2019 |
1 Introduction to the Certificate Policy
1.1 Overview
This is part 3h of the Programme of Requirements ( PoR ) for the PKI for the government and is known as the Certificate Policy ( CP ). Set out in the PoR are the standards for the PKI for the government. This section relates to the requirements laid down for the services of a Trust Service Provider ( TSP ) within the PKI for the government. Within the PKI for the government , a distinction is made between various root certificates and underlying domains. This document only relates to the private server certificates issued by TSP s in the Private Services domain under the private root certificate.
Certificates which are issued under the private root certificate are not publicly trusted by browsers or other applications. The scope of these certificates is primarily a closed usergroup within which an agreement has been reached regarding the use of the PKIoverheid Private Root.
This chapter includes a brief explanation of the CP . A more detailed explanation regarding the background and structure of the PKI for the government, as well as the cohesion between the various parts within the PoR is included in part 1 of the PoR .
For a list of the definitions and abbreviations used in this section, please refer to part 4 of the PoR .
1.1.1 Design of the Certificate Policy
As stated in part 1 of the PoR , the requirements that form part of the CP consist of requirements [1] :
· that ensue from the Dutch legal framework in relation to the electronic signature;
· that ensue from the latest version of the ETSI EN 319 411-1 standard where policy NCP + is applicable for server certificates (extendedKeyUsage client and server authentication).;
· that are specifically drawn up by and for the PKIoverheid.
Incorporated in chapters 2 to 9 inclusive are references to the specific PKIoverheid requirements in the Additional Requirements. The table below shows the structure of the reference to the actualPKIoverheid requirement (PKIo requirement).
RFC 3647 |
Reference to the paragraph from the RFC 3647 structure to which the PKIo requirement relates. RFC 3647 is a PKIX framework of the Internet Engineering Task Force ( IETF ) and is the de facto standard for the structure of Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements [2] . |
Number |
Unique number of the PKIo requirement. In each paragraph, consecutive numbering is used for the PKIo requirements. In combination with the RFC 3647 paragraph number, this forms a unique label for the PKIo requirement. |
This CP also includes a number of provisions that are not formulated as PKIo requirements. These provisions do not make any demands on the TSP s within the PKI for the government, but do apply as a policy to the PKI for the government. This concerns provisions from paragraphs 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 8, 9.12.1, 9.12.2, 9.14 and 9.17.
The profiles used within PKIoverheid relating to the services certificates are listed in appendix A. The status information is listed in the basic requirements.
1.1.2 Status
This is version 4.7 of part 3h of the PoR . The current version has been updated up to and including 8 February 2019.
The PA has devoted the utmost attention and care to the data and information incorporated in this CP . Nevertheless, it is possible that there are inaccuracies and imperfections. The PA accepts no liability for damage resulting from these inaccuracies or imperfections, nor is any liability assumed for damage caused by the use or distribution of this CP , if this CP is used for purposes other than for the use of certificates described in paragraph 1.4 of this CP .
1.2 References to this CP
Within the PKI for the government multiple root certificates are in use for the regular – publicly trusted – root, the TRAIL root, the EV root and the private – not publicly trusted – root. Each of these root certificates contains a hierarchy consisting of differen domains. Each domain has its own specific domain structure.
Furthermore these root certificates often have multiple active generations or versions (g1, g2, g3). In addition the different PKI for the government structures or roots are based both on the SHA -1 algorithm (regular root G1 ) and the SHA -2 56 algorithm (regular root G2 and G3 ).
Each type of certificate within PKIoverheid is uniquely identified by an OID . The OID s of the Certificate Policies of this part of the Programme of Requirements are in accordance with the following schedule.
Private Services Domain:
OID
CP
2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.6
for the private server certificate within the Private Services domain, that contains the public key for authenticity and confidentiality.
Under this OID OCSP certificates may be issued for use within the context of this CP part.
The OID is structured as follows: {joint-iso-itu-t (2). country (16). the Netherlands (528). Dutch organization (1). Dutch government (1003). PKI for the government (1). CP (2). private services domain (8). server (6). version number}.
If requirements only apply to one or two types of certificates, this is expressly specified by stating the Object Identifier ( OID ) referencing the applicable CP or CP s.
1.3 User Community
Within the Private Services domain, the user community consists of subscribers who are organizational entities within the government and business community (see PKIo 3.2.2-pkio4) and of certificate holders, who also belong to these subscribers. In addition there are relying parties, who act with a reliance on certificates of the relevant certificate holders.
The parties within the user community are subscribers, certificate managers, certificate holders and relying parties.
· A subscriber is a natural or legal personality who enters into an agreement with a TSP on behalf of one or more certificate holders for the certification of public keys.
oA certificate holder is an entity, characterized in a certificate as the holder of the private key that is linked to the public key provided in the certificate. The certificate holder is part of an organizational entity, for which a subscriber is the contracting party. Within the Certificate Policy Private Server Certificates, the term certificate holder means a device or a system (a non-natural person), operated by or on behalf of an organizational entity.
· A certificate manager is a natural person who performs actions on behalf of the subscriber in respect of the certificate holder's certificate. The subscriber instructs the certificate manager to perform the relevant actions and records these in a certificate manager's testimony.
· A relying party is every natural or legal personality who is a recipient of a certificate and who acts with a reliance on that certificate. Other than for personal certificates, relying parties mainly derive security from the connection of a service (device or feature) to the organizational entity to which the service belongs. This CP therefore places the emphasis on providing certainty about the connection of a message sent by or a web service provided by a device or system with the relevant organization. In view of this, establishing the identity of the certificate holder (device) is less important than establishing the certificate holder's connection to the organizational entity.
1.4 Certificate Usage
The use of certificates issued under this CP relates to communication from certificate holders who act on behalf of the subscriber.
[OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.6]
Server certificates that are issued under this CP , can be used to secure a connection between a specific client and a server that is part of the organizational entity listed as the subscriber in the relevant certificate.
Under this OID OCSP responder certificates may be issued for use within the domain Private Services. Said certificates can be used to sign OCSP responses for use in the verification of the validity of the end user certificate. More information can be obtained in appendix A of the base requirements.
1.5 Contact Information Policy Authority
The PA is responsible for this CP . Questions relating to this CP can be put to the PA ; the address can be found at: http://www.logius.nl/pkioverheid.
2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities
2.1 Electronic Repository
Contains no additional requirements.
2.2 Publication of TSP Information
RFC 3647 |
2.2 Publication of TSP Information |
Number |
2.2-pkio8 |
RFC 3647 |
2.2 Publication of TSP Information |
Number |
2.2-pkio157 |
RFC 3647 |
2.2 Publication of TSP Information |
Number |
2.2-pkio168 |
3 Identification and Authentication
3.1 Naming
Contains no additional requirements.
3.2 Initial Identity Validation
RFC 3647 |
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of the private key |
Number |
3.2.1-pkio13 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity |
Number |
3.2.2-pkio4 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.2 Authentication of organizational entity |
Number |
3.2.2-pkio144 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity |
Number |
3.2.3-pkio22 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity |
Number |
3.2.3-pkio24 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity |
Number |
3.2.3-pkio26 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.5 Validation of authority |
Number |
3.2.5-pkio30 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.5 Validation of authority |
Number |
3.2.5-pkio33 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.5 Authorization of the certificate holder |
Number |
3.2.5-pkio146 |
RFC 3647 |
3.2.5 Authorization of the certificate holder |
Number |
3.2.5-pkio162 |
3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests
Contains no additional requirements.
4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1 Certificate Application
RFC 3647 |
4.1 Certificate Application |
Number |
4.1-pkio47 |
4.4 Certificate Acceptance
Contains no additional requirements.
4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage
Contains no additional requirements.
4.9 Revocation and Suspension of Certificates
RFC 3647 |
4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation |
Number |
4.9.1-pkio52 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request |
Number |
4.9.3-pkio57 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency |
Number |
4.9.7-pkio65 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability |
Number |
4.9.9-pkio66 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability |
Number |
4.9.9-pkio67 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability |
Number |
4.9.9-pkio70 |
RFC 3647 |
4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability |
Number |
4.9.9-pkio71 |
4.10 Certificate Status Service s
Contains no additional requirements.
5 Facility, Management and Operational Controls
5.2 ProceduralControls
Contains no additional requirements.
5.3 PersonnelControls
Contains no additional requirements.
5.4 Audit Logging Procedures
RFC 3647 |
5.4.1 Types of events recorded |
Number |
5.4.1-pkio80 |
5.5 Records Archival
RFC 3647 |
5.5.1 Types of events recorded |
Number |
5.5.1-pkio82 |
5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery
RFC 3647 |
5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster. |
Number |
5.7.4-pkio86 |
6 Technical Security Controls
6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the TSP sub CA |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio87 |
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the TSP sub CA |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio89 |
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio91 |
RFC 3647 |
6.1.1 Key pair generation for the certificate holders |
Number |
6.1.1-pkio92 |
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module EngineeringControls
RFC 3647 |
6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating |
Number |
6.2.11-pkio125 |
RFC 3647 |
6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating |
Number |
6.2.11-pkio105 |
RFC 3647 |
6.2.11 Cryptographic module rating |
Number |
6.2.11-pkio107 |
6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
Contains no additional requirements.
6.4 Activation data
RFC 3647 |
6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation |
Number |
6.4.1-pkio112 |
RFC 3647 |
6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation |
Number |
6.4.1-pkio113 |
6.5 Computer Security Controls
Contains no additional requirements.
6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls
Contains no additional requirements.
6.7 Network Security Controls
Contains no additional requirements.
7 Certificate, CRL and OSCP profiles
7.1 Certificate Profile
RFC 3647 |
|
|
Number |
7.1-pkio177 |
RFC 3647 |
|
|
Number |
7.1-pkio165 |
7.2 CRL Profile
Contains no additional requirements.
7.3 OCSP Profile
RFC 3647 |
7.3 OCSP profile |
Number |
7.3-pkio123 |
8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
All subjects relating to the conformity assessment of the TSP s within the PKI for the government are covered in PoR part 2 And the Basic Requirements.
9 Other Business and Legal Matters
9.2 Financial Responsibility
RFC 3647 |
9.2.1 Insurance coverage |
Number |
9.2.1-pkio124 |
9.5 Intellectual Property Rights
Contains no additional requirements.
9.6 Representations and Warranties
RFC 3647 |
9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by TSP s |
Number |
9.6.1-pkio128 |
RFC 3647 |
9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties by TSP s |
Number |
9.6.1-pkio132 |
9.8 Limitations of Liability
RFC 3647 |
9.8 Limitations of liability |
Number |
9.8pkio133 |
9.12 Amendments
Contains no additional requirements.
9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures
Contains no additional requirements.
9.14 Governing Law
Contains no additional requirements.
9.17 Miscellaneous provisions
Contains no additional requirements.
If by judicial decision one or more provisions of this CP are declared to be invalid or not applicable, this does not affect the validity and applicability of all other provisions.
Appendix A CertificateProfile
Profile of server certificates for the Private Services domain
Criteria
When defining the fields and attributes within a certificate, the following codes are used:
· V : Compulsory; indicates that the attribute is compulsory and MUST be used in the certificate.
· O : Optional; indicates that the attribute is optional and MAY be used in the certificate.
· A : Advised against; indicates that the attribute is advised against and SHOULD NOT be used in the certificate.
It is not allowed to use fields that are not specified in the certificate profiles.
For the extensions, fields/attributes are used that, in accordance with international standards, are critical, are marked in the 'Critical' column with 'yes' to show that the relevant attribute MUST be checked using a process by means of which a certificate is evaluated. Other fields/attributes are shown with 'no'.
Server certificates – Private Services Domain
Basic attributes
Field / Attribute |
Criteria |
Description |
Standard reference |
Type |
Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Version |
V |
MUST be set at 2 ( X.509v3 ). |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
Integer |
Describes the version of the certificate, the value 2 stands for X.509 version 3. |
SerialNumber |
V |
A serial number that MUST uniquely identify the certificate within the publishing CA domain. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
Integer |
All end user certificates have to contain at least 8 bytes of unpredictable random data in the certificate's serial number (SerialNumber). |
Signature |
V |
MUST be created on the algorithm, as stipulated by the PA . |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, ETSI TS 102176 |
OID |
This certificate MUST contain at least a 2048 bit RSA key. |
Issuer |
V |
MUST contain a Distinguished Name ( DN ). The field contains the following attributes: |
PKIo, RFC 3739, ETSI TS 102280 |
Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used. |
|
Issuer.countryName |
V |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
ETSI TS 101862, X520 , ISO 3166 |
Printable String |
|
Issuer.OrganizationName |
V |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
ETSI TS 102280 |
UTF8String |
|
Issuer. organizationalUnitName |
O |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
ETSI TS 102280 |
UTF8String |
|
Issuer.serialNumber |
O |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
RFC 3739 |
Printable String |
|
Issuer.commonName |
V |
See requirement 7.1-pkio174 |
PKIo, RFC 3739 |
UTF8String |
The commonName attribute MUST NOT be needed to identify the issuing government body (no part of the Distinguished Name, requirement from RFC 3739 ) |
Issuer.organizationIdentifier |
V |
The organizationIdentifier field contains an identification of the issuing CA . This field MUST be present when the subject.organizationIdentifier field is present in the TSP certificate and MUST NOT be present when this field is not part of the corresponding TSP certificate. |
EN 319 412-1 |
String |
The syntax of the identification string is specified in paragraph 5.1.4 van ETSI EN 319 412-1 and contains: • 3 character legal person identity type reference; • 2 character ISO 3166 [2] country code; • hyphen-minus "-" (0x2D ( ASCII ), U+002D ( UTF-8 )); and • identifier (according to country and identity type reference). |
Validity |
V |
MUST define the period of validity of the certificate according to CRL Profile"> RFC 5280. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
UTCTime |
MUST include the start and end date for validity of the certificate in accordance with the applicable policy laid down in the CPS . |
Subject |
V |
The attributes that are used to describe the subject (service) MUST mention the subject in a unique way and include information about the subscriber organization. The field has the following attributes: |
PKIo, RFC 3739, ETSI TS 102 280 |
MUST contain a Distinguished Name ( DN ). Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used. |
|
Subject.countryName |
V |
complete C with two-letter country code in accordance with ISO 3166 -1. If an official alpha-2 code is missing, the TSP MAY use the user-assigned code XX. |
RFC 3739 , X520 , ISO 3166 , PKIo |
PrintableString |
The country code that is used in Subject.countryName MUST correspond with the subscriber's address in accordance with the accepted document or registry. |
Subject.commonName |
A |
Name that identifies the server. |
RFC 3739 , ETSI TS 102 280, PKIo |
UTF8String |
See requirement 7.1-pkio165 for requirements for the content of this field See requirement 3.2.5-pkio162 for validation |
Subject.organizationName |
V |
The full name of the subscriber's organization in accordance with the accepted document or Basic Registry. |
PKIo |
UTF8String |
The subscriber organization is the organization with which the TSP has entered into an agreement and on behalf of which the certificate holder (service / server) communicates or acts. |
Subject.organizationalUnitName |
O |
Optional specification of an organizational entity. This attribute MUST NOT include a function indication or similar. |
PKIo |
This attribute MAY appear several times. The field MUST contain a valid name of an organizational entity of the subscriber in accordance with an accepted document or registry. |
|
Subject.stateOrProvinceName |
A |
The use of this attribute is advised against. If present it MUST include the province of the subscriber's branch, in accordance with the accepted document or Basic registry. |
PKIo, RFC 3739 |
UTF8String |
Name of the province MUST correspond with the address of the subscriber in accordance with the accepted document or registry. |
Subject.localityName |
A |
The use of this attribute is advised against. If present it MUST include the location of the subscriber, in accordance with the accepted document or Basic registry. |
PKIo, RFC 3739 |
UTF8String |
Name of the location MUST correspond with the address of the subscriber in accordance with the accepted document or registry. |
Subject.postalAddress |
A |
The use is advised against. If present, this field MUST contain the postal address of the subscriber in accordance with an accepted document or Basic registry. |
PKIo, RFC 3739 |
UTF8String |
The address MUST correspond with the address of the subscriber in accordance with the accepted document or registry. |
Subject.serialNumber |
O |
The TSP is responsible for safeguarding the uniqueness of the subject (service). The Subject.serialNumber MUST be used to identify the subject uniquely. The use of 20 positions is only allowed for OIN and HRN after additional arrangements with Logius. |
RFC 3739 , X 520, PKIo |
Printable String |
The number is determined by the TSP and/or the government. The number can differ for each domain and can be used for several applications. |
subjectPublicKeyInfo |
V |
Contains, among other things, the public key. |
ETSI TS 102 280, RFC 3279 |
Contains the public key, identifies the algorithm with which the key can be used. |
Standard extensions
Field / Attribute |
Criteria |
Critical? |
Description |
Standard reference |
Type |
Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
authorityKeyIdentifier |
V |
No |
The algorithm to generate the AuthorityKey MUST be created on an algorithm determined by the PA . |
ETSI TS 102 280, CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
BitString |
The value MUST contain the SHA -1 hash from the authorityKey (public key of the TSP / CA ). |
SubjectKeyIdentifier |
V |
No |
The algorithm to generate the subjectKey MUST be created on an algorithm determined by the PA . |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
BitString |
The value MUST contain the SHA -1 hash from the subjectKey (public key of the certificate holder). |
KeyUsage |
V |
Yes |
The attribute extension specifies the intended purpose of the key incorporated in the certificate. In the PKI for the government, for each certificate type various bits are incorporated in the keyUsage extension. In server certificates the digitalSignature, keyEncipherment and keyAgreement bits MUST be incorporated and marked as being essential. Another keyUsage MUST NOT be combined with this. |
RFC 3739 , CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, ETSI TS 102 280 |
BitString |
|
CertificatePolicies |
V |
No |
MUST contain the OID of the certificate policy ( CP ), the URI of the certification practice statement ( CPS ), and a user notice. The applicable PKI for the government OID scheme is described in the CP . The TSP SHOULD use UTF8String in the userNotice, but MAY use IA5String. |
RFC 3739 |
OID , String, UTF8String or IA5String |
Reference to the paragraph numbers of the PoR / CP in the user notice is advised against because the persistency of this cannot be guaranteed (unlike the OID number of the CP ). |
SubjectAltName |
V |
No |
MUST be used and given a worldwide unique identifier that identifies the server. |
RFC 4043, CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, PKIo, ETSI 102 280 |
It is preferred to use FQDNs as a unique identifier. When using FQDNs these are incorporated in the dnsName field. If it is not possible or preferable to use a FQDN as a unique identifier the otherName field MUST be used. Attributes other than those mentioned below MUST NOT be used. |
|
SubjectAltName.dNSName [3] |
V/O |
Name that identifies the server. |
RFC 2818, RFC 5280 |
IA5String |
See requirement 7.1-pkio165 for requirements for the content of this field See requirement 3.2.5-pkio162 for validation requirements |
|
SubjectAltName.iPAddress |
O |
No |
Contains a public IP address |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, RFC 791, RFC 2460 |
Octet string |
See requirement 7.1-pkio165 for requirements for the content of this field See requirement 3.2.5-pkio162 for validation requirements for the data entered in this field |
SubjectAltName.otherName |
V/O |
When the otherName field is used it contains a unique number that identifies the subject (service). |
PKIo |
IA5String, Microsoft UPN, IBM Principal-Name of Permanent-Identifier |
Contains the OID of the TSP and a number, separated by a period or hyphen ('-'), that uniquely and persistently identifies the subject (service). It is recommended to use an existing registration number from the backoffice systems in combination with a code for the organization. In combination with the TSP OID number this identifier is globally unique. This number MUST be persistent. |
|
BasicConstraints |
O |
Yes |
The " CA " field MUST be omitted (default value is then "FALSE"). |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
A (Dutch language) browser can then be seen: Subjecttype = Eindentiteit", "Beperking voor padlengte = Geen ("Subjecttype = End Entity", "Path length constraint = None") |
|
CRLDistributionPoints |
V |
No |
MUST include the URI of a CRL distribution point. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, ETSI TS 102 280 |
The reference MUST be accessible through the http or LDAP protocol. The attribute Reason MUST NOT be used, reference MUST be made to 1 CRL for all types of reasons for revocation. In addition to CRL , other types of certificate status information service MAY be supported. |
|
ExtKeyUsage |
V |
No |
Extension that indicates for which application the certificate can be used. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
KeyPurposeId's |
In server certificates this extension MUST be included, this extension MUST NOT be labelled “critical” and this extension MUST include the KeyPurposIds id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth. |
FreshestCRL |
O |
No |
MUST contain the URI of a Delta CRL distribution point, if Delta CRL s are used. |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280, PKIo |
Delta-CRLs are an optional extension. In order to fulfil the requirements of PKIoverheid a TSP MUST also publish full CRL s at the required release frequency. |
Private extensions
Field / Attribute |
Criteria |
Critical? |
Description |
Standard reference |
Type |
Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
authorityInfoAccess |
O |
No |
This attribute MUST include the URI of an OCSP responder if Online Certificate Status Protocol ( OCSP ) plays a role. |
This field can optionally be used to reference other additional information about the TSP . |
||
SubjectInfoAccess |
O |
No |
CRL Profile"> RFC 5280 |
OID , Generalname |
This field can be used to reference additional information about the subject. |
10 Revisions
10.1 Amendments from version 4.6 to 4.7
10.1.1 New
· Requirement 7.1-pkio177 (effective date immediately after publication of PoR 4.7)
· Requirement 7.1-pkio165 (effective date immediately after publication of the PoR 4.7)
· Requirement 2.2-pkio168 (effective date immediately after publication of PoR 4.7)
· Requirement 3.2.5-pkio162 (effective date immediately after publication of PoR 4.7)
10.1.2 Modifications
· Description of a number of certificate attributes replaced by reference to requirement 7.1-pkio174 (effective date 8 weeks after publication PoR 4.7)
· Reference to CWA 14 169 amended to EN 419 211 for QSCD s. This also sets requirements for the issuance of QSCD s for requirements 6.2.11-pkio105, 6.4.1-pkio112 and 4.9.1-pkio52 (effective date immediately after publication of PoR 4.7)
10.2 Amendments from version 4.5 to 4.6
10.2.1 Modifications
· Corrected subjectAltName.othername field (effective date directly after publication of PoR 4.6)
10.3 Amendments from version 4.4 to 4.5
10.3.1 New
· Possibility to offer CPS in English and/or Dutch (requirement 2.2-pkio157, effective date 1-10-2017)
· Mandatory yearly renewal CPS (requirement 2.2-pkio156, effective date 1-1-2017)
10.3.2 Modifications
· Requirement 4.9.9-pkio67 now references RFC 6960 instead of RFC 2560 (effective date 31-12-2016)
· Change in OID 2.16.528.1.1003.1.2.8.6 to also cover OCSP responder certificates (effective date 1-7-2017)
· Mandatory use of field “NextUpdate” in OCSP responses (requirement 4.9.9-pkio71, effective date 1-7-2017)
10.4 Amendments from version 4.3 to 4.4
10.4.1 New
None
10.4.2 Modifications
· Clarification of issuer.organizationIdentifier field (effective date 1-2-2017)
· Tightening of use optional EKU s that conflict with the parent TSP CA certificate (effective date 1-2-2017)
· Removed requirement 5.3.2-pkio79 (effective date 1-2-2017)
10.4.3 Editorial
· Modified the field “ExtKeyUsage from critical to non-critical (solving conflict between the description and the field value)
· Replaced CSP (Certificate Service Provider) with TSP (Trust Service Provider) in accordance with eIDAS directive.
10.5 Amendments from version 4.2 to 4.3
10.5.1 New
· Addition of Issuer.organizationalIdentifier in the certificate profile ( effective date 1-7-2016)
10.5.2 Modifications
· Description with attribute CertificatePolicies ( effective date 1-7-2016)
· Removal of optional use KeyAgreement with Key Usage (effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.3)
· ETSI TS 102 176-1 replaced by ETSI TS 119 312 ( effective date no later than 4 weeks after publication of PoR 4.3)
· Removal of requirement pkio95 due to duplicate with ETSI EN 319 411-1
· Use of values in the BasicConstraints field no longer permitted in end entity certificates (effective date 1-7-2016)
· ETSI TS 102 042 replaced by ETSI EN 319 411-1 ( effective date 1-7-2016 or when the accreditation to the certifying body has been granted with a final date of 30 June 2017)
10.5.3 Editorial
None
10.6 Amendments from version 4.1 to 4.2
10.6.1 New
None
10.6.2 Modifications
· Change in subjectAltName in certificate profile (effective date direct after publication PoR )
10.6.3 Editorial
None
10.7 Amendments from version 4.0 to 4.1
10.7.1 New
Not applicable.
10.7.2 Modifications
Not applicable
10.7.3 Editorial
· Small editorial modificatoin to the following requirements:
oRequirement 5.7.4-pkio86.
[1] For an explanation regarding the positioning of the requirements applicable within the PKI for the government, please refer to part 1 of the PoR .
[2] Chapters 2 to 9 inclusive only include those paragraphs from RFC 3647 to which a PKIorequirement applies.
[3] This field/attribute has to be included in certificates that are issued as from 1-7-2011.
